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To put it crudely economic development is about enhancing capability and opportunity to learn at all levels. 
Technological learning is fundamentally important but so is the social and political learning that is necessary to 
build institutions and policy strategies that support competence-building (Lundvall, Vang, Joseph, & 
Chaminade, 2009, p. 19).  
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ABSTRACT 
Innovation and innovation system studies have traditionally not dealt with natural resource 
industries in developing countries. This seems to be the case even when considering strategic 
sectors such as the petroleum industry, where oil-rich countries are typically struggling to 
transform their hydrocarbons into sustained economic growth and development. 
 This thesis seeks to address the void in the literature. By combining the sectoral 
systems of innovation approach with bargaining power and value chain theory, the thesis sets 
out to explore the small-scale and onshore-based petroleum industry of Cuba.   
 A central argument throughout the thesis is that for Cuba to further develop its 
petroleum industry, it would be well-advised to formulate a policy aimed at facilitating the 
transfer of technology and knowledge held by foreign oil companies. In parallel it is 
acknowledged that such transfers are difficult to facilitate, depending among others on the 
bargaining power of Cuba to access the technology and knowledge, and on the ability of 
Cuban actors to assimilate and exploit the transfers.   
 Based on a collection of various documents, archival records, and interviews, it is 
found that the processes of inward transfers of technology and knowledge in the Cuban 
petroleum industry are limited to whatever agreements Cuba manages to strike with foreign 
oil companies directly investing in its sector. Through joint ventures and other agreements, 
however, domestic industry actors have managed to expand on their knowledge and 
technological base. This feat can be attributed to the ability of the Cuban educational system 
to supply the industry with manpower capable of absorbing the transfers.  
 On the background of this study it is argued that oil-rich developing countries should 
take a firm look into its petroleum technology policy, and outline goals and measures to 
facilitate the successful transfer of knowledge and technology from foreign oil companies 
operating on their soil. This would be crucial not just for the development of capabilities 
among domestic industry actors, but also to ensure that a proportionate share of the economic 
rent accrues to the country in question.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Although the innovation literature endows us with few certainties, some assumptions seem to 
enjoy a near-general consensus. One is that innovation – or the development and diffusion of 
new technology – is crucial for long-term economic growth (Fagerberg, 2005; OECD, 2005; 
Rosenberg, 2004; Verspagen, 2005). Accordingly, innovation performance has been identified 
as one of the central factors explaining growth and growth-differences between countries 
(Fagerberg, 1987, 1994). A second central finding is that innovation activities rely heavily on 
external sources, which has led a number of scholars to apply system perspectives when 
examining innovation processes (Fagerberg, 2005). System perspectives on innovation have 
gained widespread popularity during the last couple of decades (Sharif, 2006), but fall short of 
providing anything close to a blueprint for the design and evaluation of growth-inciting 
policies (Fagerberg, 2005). In addition, the bulk of these studies have focused on 
industrialized nations, or alternatively on countries that have already succeeded in their 
catching-up efforts (Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, & Tangchitpiboon, 2002).  
During the past few years, however, studies dealing with systems of innovation in 
developing countries have grown in number (Lundvall, Vang, Joseph, & Chaminade, 2009). 
Nevertheless, in large they do not address systems where natural resource industries are the 
focal point of study. This seems to be the case even when considering strategic industries such 
as the petroleum industry, where countries with abundant endowments have been struggling 
to transform their hydrocarbons into sustained economic growth and development 
(Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007).
1
  
This thesis seeks to address the void in the literature by applying the sectoral systems 
of innovation and complementary approaches on Cuba, a country possessing a small, onshore-
based petroleum industry prone to significant growth if major offshore discoveries are made 
in the future. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The notion that petroleum-rich countries generally fail to reap the benefits of their favorable 
resource endowment has been coined the ‘oil curse’ (Humphreys et al., 2007). This inability 
                                                 
1
 System studies of countries that have succeeded in this transformation seem more abundant, however (See e.g. 
Dantas & Bell, 2009; Engen, 2009; Fagerberg, Mowery & Verspagen, 2009; Sasson & Blomgren, 2011; 
Silvestre & Dalcol, 2009).  
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has been especially prominent in developing countries, where the vast bulk of global oil and 
gas resources are located today. The oil curse is a complex phenomenon, where several 
different processes come into play. There are purely economic challenges, such as currency 
appreciation due to resource revenues and its negative effect on the competitive position of 
other industries, phrased as the ‘Dutch Disease’. Second, oil and gas are subject to 
considerable price fluctuations that often have disruptive effects on domestic economies. 
Third, a political challenge lies in the fact that large petroleum revenues create incentives for 
rent-seeking behavior, as observed in many countries. Adding to this are challenges stemming 
from asymmetries in information and bargaining power between oil-rich developing countries 
and foreign oil companies (Soros, 2007). The outcome has often left the former with a 
disproportionally small share of the value stemming from petroleum activities at their own 
soil.    
 Nevertheless, notions of the inevitability of the oil curse have been challenged in 
recent years. Increasingly, a number of petroleum rich countries have been able to reduce the 
asymmetries, develop well-functioning domestic petroleum sectors, and capture a larger share 
of the value added. As will be discussed, this has been noted in countries as different as 
Norway and Angola over the last decades. Facilitating such processes is not a straightforward 
task, however. It involves the development of appropriate regulations and frameworks that 
optimize national value creation – by stimulating employment and entrepreneurship, value-
addition, as well as the transfer and exploitation of technology and knowledge from abroad. In 
addition, it requires petroleum-rich countries to acquire a firm understanding of the petroleum 
industry value chain and its economics (Sigam & Garcia, 2012).   
 
1.2 THE CASE 
For Cuba, a country with a tradition of being dependent on external powers to subsidize most 
of its energy consumption, prospects of an offshore-based petroleum industry have been 
debated for some years. A U.S. Geological Survey report estimates that a mean 4.6 billion 
barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lie undiscovered below the seabed of the 
deepwater area of Cuba’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Gulf of Mexico (U.S. Geological 
Survey, 2008). If certified as recoverable, it could make Cuba self-sufficient in energy and 
leave the island financially independent for the first time. Although much is uncertain and 
offshore reserves have yet to be discovered in commercially viable quantities, Cuba’s 
petroleum sector will probably grow in significance in the future.  
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The quest for Cuba is to transform its hydrocarbon potential to long-term economic 
growth and development. As for other countries, this will pose significant challenges. Much 
will depend on whether Cuba is able to build on and further develop its petroleum sector 
capabilities, by facilitating transfers of technology and other knowledge-related assets from 
abroad, while supporting capability building in domestic organizations.    
  
1.3 OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objective of this thesis is to describe the characteristics of Cuba’s petroleum industry, and 
to explore its opportunities to access and facilitate transfers of technology and knowledge 
from abroad. In doing so, I will apply the sectoral system of innovation framework and 
complementary approaches. As Cuba’s petroleum sector is located far from the global 
technology frontier, a broad and context-specific interpretation of innovation is assumed: 
rather than to develop capabilities to create new to the world innovations, what is relevant for 
the development of Cuba’s petroleum sector is to facilitate transfers of technology and 
knowledge from abroad and adapt these to local circumstances (González, 2012; OECD, 
2012; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2009).  
 It is further discussed that power relations, an often neglected theme in the systems of 
innovation literature (Lundvall, 2007), are critical when considering development 
opportunities in the petroleum sector. In the international petroleum industry, large and 
prevailing asymmetries in power, capital, and technological know-how between oil-rich 
countries and international oil companies have been identified as some of the main 
explanatory factors for the low share of value added accruing to the former (Soros, 2007). In 
relation, the relative bargaining power between the two sets of actors is identified as the key 
determinant of this distribution (Vivoda, 2009, 2011). It is argued here that the relative 
bargaining power of Cuba is crucial for the sector’s access to foreign technology and 
knowledge, as well as for its share of economic rent stemming from petroleum production on 
Cuban soil.  
 In parallel, it is acknowledged that transfers of these types are difficult to facilitate. It 
depends on a variety of factors, including whether the Cuban government aims at facilitating 
such transfers in the first place. As noted in the oil curse literature, this is rarely the case in 
oil-rich countries, where purely rent-seeking behavior seem to be higher on the agenda of 
political elites (Humphreys et al., 2007; Kurtz & Brooks, 2011; Ross, 2003; Swilling, 2012). 
Further, transfers of these types are often tacit in nature (Verspagen, 2005), and involve actors 
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that often differ in goals and interests. What is more, the successful facilitation of such 
transfers demands a sufficient level of absorptive capacity on the part of the receiver (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). In consequence, it is argued that the successful facilitation of such 
transfers heavily depends on the petroleum technology policy of the oil-rich country: whether 
it aims at and manages to facilitate inward transfers, while stimulating sufficient absorptive 
capacity in domestic actors. 
Although difficult to achieve, if the oil-rich country manages to access and facilitate 
inward transfers this will result in increased capabilities among domestic petroleum sector 
actors. This would leave the host stat less dependent on the resources of foreign oil companies 
to conduct activities in its petroleum sector. It is argued here that this would increase the 
relative bargaining power of the host state in future bargaining processes, making it better 
positioned to grasp a larger share of the value added.  
Based on the preceding sections, the research question of this thesis is:  
 
What characterize the processes of domestic capability building and inward transfer 
of knowledge and technology in the Cuban petroleum industry? 
 
In order to answer this, the following three sub-questions are posed:  
 
 What is the basis of Cuba’s bargaining power versus foreign oil companies? 
 
This question is formulated to explore Cuba’s opportunities to access technology and 
knowledge held by foreign oil companies. The main finding shows that Cuba, based on a 
limited level of proved oil reserves and a high dependence on the participation of foreign oil 
companies to extract and produce the petroleum, possesses a weak relative bargaining power 
versus foreign oil companies. Factors related to a high risk assessment for business 
investments, and a high dependence on petroleum for electricity production provide additional 
support to this perception.  
 Nevertheless, additional Cuban petroleum reserves might be discovered in the future. 
What is more, as will be shown in the cases of Norway and Angola, a high dependence on 
foreign oil companies does not preclude substantial transfers of technology and knowledge 
from these companies to domestic actors.   
 The successful facilitation of such transfers depends on the petroleum technology of 
the host state, however. As such the second sub-question of this thesis is: 
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 What are the main components of Cuba’s petroleum technology policy? 
 
The main findings is that (i) Cuba has favored a high degree of openness to foreign 
participation in its petroleum sector since the beginning of the 1990s; and (ii) inward 
transfers and domestic capability building have been actively sought through joint ventures 
and product sharing agreements with foreign oil companies operating in Cuba’s petroleum 
sector.  
 This has allowed for significant transfers of technology and knowledge to domestic 
industry actors, resulting among others in the capabilities of Cupet – Cuba’s national oil 
company – to extract and produce petroleum without foreign assistance. This is significant in 
that is has allowed for a greater share of economic rent accruing to Cuba than what would 
have otherwise been the case.  
 Despite the policy measures, Cuba’s access to foreign technology and knowledge 
seem limited to whatever agreements the country is able to strike with foreign oil companies 
operating in its sector. As a whole, the island state does not belong to the international 
petroleum industry knowledge network due to its lack of attractive projects, finance, and 
managerial expertise.  
 The third sub-research question of this thesis is posed to give a contextual account of 
Cuba’s petroleum industry, and to further explore the processes of domestic capability 
building and inward transfers in the sector: 
   
What is the division of tasks between Cuban and foreign actors along Cuba’s 
petroleum sector value chain? 
 
As all subsoil petroleum resources are the property of the state, they are under the ultimate 
control of the Cuban government. In this sense (i) the whole petroleum value chain is 
controlled by the state or state-controlled enterprises. There is no room for private domestic 
actors. Most significantly, Cupet has operations along all stages of the value chain. 
 On the other hand, (ii) there is a small number of joint ventures with foreign oil 
companies along the chain. The ventures can be categorized into two broad types. In the 
‘market oriented’ ventures, Cuba is trading a significant share of the economic rent in return 
for increased production of oil and gas, as well as for inward transfer of technology and 
knowledge to domestic actors. The ‘strategically oriented’ type on the other hand, stems from 
Cuba’s close relationship with Venezuela. The aim here is to increase domestic capabilities a 
variety of downstream activities, in particular in crude oil refining.  
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Based on the findings from the three sub-research questions, the main research question is 
answered: 
 
 What characterize the processes of domestic capability building and inward transfer 
of knowledge and technology in the Cuban petroleum industry? 
 
Through its petroleum technology policy, Cuba has sought to access foreign technology and 
knowledge to build domestic petroleum sector capabilities. The scale of the transfers is, 
however limited by Cuba’s petroleum resources, and its lack of access to the international 
petroleum industry knowledge network. As such (i) The processes of inward transfer of 
technology and knowledge in the Cuban petroleum industry are limited to whatever 
agreements Cuba manages to strike with foreign oil companies investing in its sector.  
 Through its contractual framework, Cuba has nevertheless managed to link up with a 
small number of foreign oil companies investing in its sector. (ii) Through these agreements, 
domestic actors in Cuba’s petroleum sector, most notably Cupet, have managed to expand on 
their knowledge and technological base, and increased their capabilities.  
 The learning conducted through these linkages can be accredited to (iii) the ability of 
the Cuban educational system to supply the industry with manpower capable of absorbing the 
inward transfers. 
1.4 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contributions from this thesis are manifold. First, this thesis shows that the combination 
of different theoretical frameworks works as to study domestic capability building and inward 
transfers in a developing country context.    
 Second, it offers an extension to the sectoral system of innovation literature by 
focusing on processes of domestic capability building and inward transfer of knowledge and 
technology in a petroleum sector. In doing so, it draws on the bargaining power literature, 
arguing that a country’s access to these assets is mediated by its relative bargaining power 
versus the foreign oil companies in possession of them. In parallel, the thesis also suggest a 
revision of the bargaining power literature, arguing that processes of inward transfer of 
technology and knowledge have been neglected as a source of bargaining power for host 
states.  
 Third, a new model is formulated in this thesis. The model concerns the circular 
causality between host state relative bargaining power and host state capabilities. It is 
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suggested that this model, linking the system of innovation approach with bargaining power 
theory, is applicable to other cases than the one under study in this thesis.     
1.5 OVERWIEW OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of five different chapters. The current introductory chapter contains the 
thesis rationale, its objective and research questions, as well as its main contributions. Chapter 
two covers the theoretical framework and concepts to be applied in the analysis. Chapter three 
encompasses the relevant domestic and international context of Cuba’s petroleum sector, as 
well as a brief presentation of the successful development of the petroleum sectors of Norway 
and Angola. Chapter four describes the methodology of this thesis, presenting the research 
design, procedures of data collection and analysis, as well as considerations of validity, 
reliability, and ethics. Chapter five presents the empirical findings, and is structured to answer 
each of the research questions in turn. Chapter six concludes the thesis with a summary of the 
main findings, before implications and suggestions for further research are offered.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It starts out by discussing the 
system of innovation literature, stressing the conceptual similarities of the different 
approaches. Based on this, an account of the sectoral systems of innovation approach is 
presented. Then some considerations that have to be taken into account when studying 
innovation systems in developing countries are given. The two concepts of inward transfer 
and absorptive capacity are discussed in this context.   
 Subsequently, a presentation of the value chain approach is offered, stressing its 
compatibility with the systems of innovation framework. This section continues with an 
account of the petroleum sector value chain. Next, the bargaining power approach is 
presented, emphasizing its relevance for host states’ access to technology and knowledge 
from abroad. Further, an account of petroleum technology policy is presented. The chapter 
ends with a proposed model concerning the circular causality of host state relative bargaining 
power and host state capabilities.  
 
2.1 SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION 
In the following sections I present and discuss the main propositions from the systems of 
innovation literature; its controversies, strengths and weaknesses, - as well as its application in 
this thesis. I will mainly focus on the sectoral system of innovation and production approach 
as developed by Franco Malerba, although contributions from other systemic approaches will 
be taken into account when they contribute to elaborations and clarifications. In this regard, it 
is important to note that the various approaches share many features, while maintaining that 
they are distinguished along other dimensions, such as in their technological, industrial, and 
spatial characteristics (Edquist, 2005; Fagerberg, 2005). 
 
2.1.1 Sectoral Systems of Innovation 
As stated in the introduction, innovation activities depend heavily on external sources. Firms 
and other innovation agents do not innovate in isolation, but in collaboration and 
interdependence with other organizations (Edquist, 2005). This has inspired a broad and 
heterogeneous literature, building on early contributions from authors such as Christopher 
Freeman (1987), Bengt-Åke Lundvall (1992), and Richard R. Nelson (1993), some of which 
use sectoral characteristics to distinguish between different systems (Fagerberg, 2005). It has 
been argued that the systems of innovation concept has its roots in the observation that 
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technological and social factors interact in the process of economic development, and that this 
might support a broad, more systemic approach to innovation (Fagerberg & Srholec, 2008).    
The sectoral systems of innovation approach is applied here because it can be a useful 
tool in describing the development and characteristics of Cuba’s petroleum industry. Malerba 
(2005a) offers the following definition of a sector: 
 
A sector is a set of activities that are unified by some linked product groups for a given or emerging 
demand which share some common knowledge (Malerba, 2005a, p. 385). 
 
As for sectoral systems of innovation and production, Malerba (2002) states that: 
 
A sectoral system of innovation and production is a set of new and established products for specific uses 
and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and 
sale of those products. (Malerba, 2002, p. 250). 
 
 
The agents in the system are organizations or individuals (e.g. scientists, entrepreneurs, and 
consumers). Organizations can be either firms or non-firm organizations, such as universities, 
financial institutions, government agencies, trade-unions and technical associations, or sub-
units and groups of these. Agents interact through communication, exchange, co-operation, 
competition, supply and demand. Interactions among agents are shaped by institutions, like 
rules and regulations. Further, agents are heterogeneous, and differ in their learning processes, 
capabilities, beliefs, objectives, organizational structures, and behaviors. 
As a whole the sectoral system is not static, but transforms over time through co-
evolution of its different components (Malerba, 2002). A sectoral system has a knowledge 
base upon which innovation and production activities are conducted. The knowledge base 
differs across sectors, making innovative activities, organization and the behavior of agents 
unique for each sector. In addition to the knowledge base, sectoral systems contain 
technologies, inputs, and demand levels that may be both static and dynamic. A sector is 
further interconnected with other sectors, either vertically or horizontally (Malerba, 2002).   
 A sectoral system contains of different building blocks, the first of which is knowledge 
base and learning processes. Knowledge is central to the learning and innovation activities of 
agents. It varies in its properties of accessibility (e.g. opportunities of gaining knowledge 
external to the agent) and cumulativeness (e.g. to what degree the generation of new 
knowledge builds upon knowledge currently held by agents). If knowledge is easily 
accessible, the level of industry concentration goes down, and vice versa.  
 The ease of an agent’s knowledge appropriability is mediated by its external 
environment. This can provide the agent with human capital or scientific and technological 
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knowledge produced in other organizations, like universities, research institutes, or suppliers 
(Malerba, 2002). 
Further, cumulativeness means that innovation agents that currently possess 
knowledge will be more capable of acquiring new knowledge (Malerba, 2002, 2005a). In 
relation, cumulativeness is expected to lead to a selection process that favors established 
firms, or technological leaders.  
In short, when knowledge is hard to access and characterized by a high degree of 
cumulativeness, the sector will tend to consist of a few large technological leaders. This is a 
resemblance of the Schumpeter Mark II model, and is typical for mature industries. Such 
industries are recognized by a pattern of creative accumulation, where innovations are 
introduced by firms that have innovated before. Here, technological change typically follows 
established trajectories, and economies of scale, entry barriers, and financial resources are 
important factors in the competitive process. According to Breschi, Malerba, & Orsenigo 
(2000) the oil and gas industry belongs to this category. Conversely, if the knowledge is easily 
accessible and low in cumulativeness, the resulting sectoral structure will tend to resemble a 
Schumpeter Mark I, where innovations are introduced by new, often smaller firms in a pattern 
of creative destruction (Malerba, 2002). 
 Secondly, sectoral systems differ in basic technologies, inputs, and demand. The 
products of a sector are often linked with a variety of technologies. Since the products of a 
sector differ from those of other sectors, the resulting technology-product matrix is unique for 
each sector. Further, basic technologies and demand shape the behavior and organization of 
innovation agents in a system:  
 
A given technological environment or demand defines the nature of the problems firms have to solve in 
their innovative and production activities and the types of incentives and constraints to particular 
behavior and organizations. (Malerba, 2002, p. 154).   
 
The third building block of sectoral systems is the types and structure of interactions among 
heterogeneous firms and non-firm organizations. Firms are commonly noted to be the key 
agents in innovation systems (Edquist, 2005; Malerba, 2002). They are involved in the 
innovation, production and sale of products, and in the generation, adoption and use of new 
technologies. Firms can also be users or suppliers in production and innovation processes. 
They are heterogeneous in terms of types, beliefs, capabilities, behavior, interests, and 
organizational structure. The heterogeneity stems from differences in their knowledge base, 
experience and learning processes, interactions, histories, and rates and trajectories of 
innovation and growth.  
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Firms interact in various ways with other firms and non-firm organizations, such as 
different political entities, banks, universities and others. These organizations can contribute 
to the creation and diffusion of innovation and technology, but their roles differ across 
sectoral systems. In summary, “a sectoral system is composed by webs of relationships among 
heterogeneous agents with different beliefs, competencies and behavior […] these 
relationships affect agent’s actions. They are rather stable over time.” (Malerba, 2002, p. 256). 
 Institutions comprise the fourth building block. Institutions can be more or less formal, 
and include laws, rules, standards, routines, norms, established practices, or common habits. 
Institutions shape the cognition, behavior, and interactions among agents. Sectoral systems 
are often affected by national institutions, such as the juridical framework of the nation. 
National institutions often favor specific sectors, and may constrain the development of other 
sectors. On the other hand, sectoral variables can also influence and change national 
institutions, especially if the sector is of high strategic importance for the economy as a whole 
(Malerba, 2002). 
Finally, processes of selection and variety creation form the fifth building block in 
sectoral systems of innovation. Related to the heterogeneity of agents in a system, these 
evolutionary processes greatly contribute to differences across sectoral systems (Malerba, 
2005b). First, processes of variety creation refer to products, technologies, organizations, 
institutions, strategies, and behaviors. The creation of e.g. new non-firm organizations, such 
as technical institutes increase variety and can lead to new firm-entrants, technologies, or 
knowledge.  
Variety creation greatly contributes to the dynamics of sectoral systems. In contrast, 
processes of selection reduce heterogeneity, either through market selection (e.g. changes in 
demand) or non-market selection, such as through processes of public procurement (Malerba, 
2002). 
 
2.1.2 Innovation Systems in Developing Countries 
Given that the case under study in this thesis is the petroleum sector of Cuba, some points on 
innovation and innovation systems in developing countries deserve mention. In recent years 
efforts have been made to adapt and apply the systems of innovation framework on countries, 
regions, or sectors in the developing parts of the world.
2
 This has not been uncontroversial, 
however, and the attempts have been criticized on several accounts. Pietrobelli & Raboletti 
                                                 
2
 See Lundvall, Vang et al. (2009) for a comprehensive account of SIs and developing countries (Lundvall, 
Joseph, Chaminade, & Vang, 2009). 
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(2009) list several reasons for why the application of innovation system frameworks in 
developing countries have been problematic: (i) because the processes of innovation are 
different in nature in developing countries as incremental innovation and absorption are more 
important than the creation of radical and new to the world innovations; (ii) because the 
nature of technological needs and market failures that surround technological efforts are of a 
different nature; and (iii) because science & technology organizations are often missing in 
developing countries, making linkages between non-firm organizations and firms weak or 
non-existent (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2009). 
In relation, one strand of criticism states that full-blown systems of innovation rarely 
exist in most developing countries. Thus, it has been argued, the task is not to study the 
structure and functions of such systems. Rather, the emphasis should be on developing 
strategies to create full-blown systems (Arocena & Sutz, 2000). Another, related criticism 
states that the system of innovation approach is solely applicable to developed nations. Only 
here are firms capable of introducing new to the world innovations. Following this strand, one 
should discard the notion of systems of innovation in developing countries and replace it with 
a more moderate concept, namely learning systems (Viotti, 2002).  
 Nevertheless, these views seem to be based on narrow understandings of innovation 
and innovation systems, where the focus is more on R&D-based innovation (or Science-
Technology-Innovation (STI) mode of innovation). Learning conducted as employees 
encounter problems and challenges on the job, or in interactions with external customers (so-
called Doing, Using, and Interacting (DUI) mode of innovation) on the other hand, are often 
neglected (Brundenius, Lundvall, & Sutz, 2009) – but by no means less important (Lundvall, 
Vang, et al., 2009). 
 As argued by Freeman (1995), economic growth is more dependent on effective 
diffusion of knowledge and technology than on being the first to create radical innovations, 
and as much on social innovations as on strict technological innovations.
3
 Lundvall et al. 
(2009) elaborates on these points: “Having a long tail of slow adopters and a few world-
leading firms may be less attractive than having many firms that are quick adopters without 
any world leaders.” .” (Lundvall, Vang, et al., 2009, pp. 9–10). When considering innovation 
in developing countries it is thus more appropriate to understand it as not only new to the 
world technologies “ but also improvements in areas such as logistics, distribution and 
marketing [that are] new to the local context, even if the contribution to the  global knowledge 
                                                 
3
 These issues are also discussed in Von Tunzelmann & Acha (2005).   
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frontier is negligible.” (Fagerberg, Srholec, & Verspagen, 2010, p. 2). With such an 
understanding, it is valid to discuss innovation processes and their corresponding systems in 
developing countries (Fagerberg & Srholec, 2009). 
 
2.1.3 Inward Transfer and Absorptive Capacity 
As discussed, small and developing countries typically find themselves far from the global 
technology frontier in most sectors. According to the National Science Board (2010), the G7 
countries alone accounts for about 65 percent of global R&D spending, whereas the countries 
included in the OECD accounts for some 80 percent (National Science Board, 2010, pp. 4–
34).
4
  
However, the real economic benefits of innovation stem from its effective translation 
into economic gains, not from its creation. In consequence, what is most relevant for sectoral 
systems in countries like Cuba is often to facilitate the successful transfer of knowledge and 
technology from abroad and to adapt these to local circumstances (González, 2012; OECD, 
2012; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2009). This seems to be the case also when considering Cuba’s 
petroleum industry, as this type of industry - despite being based on natural resources – is 
becoming increasingly technology intensive (Petrad, 2012).   
In the literature on technology transfer there is, however, no consensus as to how 
easily such transfers move between agents and across borders. Most fundamentally there are 
different interpretations concerning whether technological knowledge is public or private in 
nature. Neoclassical theories of endogenous technological change have long noted that 
technology is non-rival and public in nature, thus creating spillovers to other agents 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1995; Romer, 1990). Hence, since innovation is costly and risky, a 
sound strategy for developing countries would be to simply acquire foreign technologies 
created in frontier countries and sectors.  
On the other hand is the view – prominent in the innovation literature – that transfer of 
technology and knowledge is neither costless nor unconditional (Keller, 2004).
5
 This is 
because important aspects of technology make it a private rather than public good. According 
to Verspagen (2005), the transfer of “[p]ure public goods do not require any special efforts or 
special skills on the side of the consumer or receiver of the services of the good. This is 
obviously not the case for technological knowledge.” (Verspagen, 2005, p. 490). The reason 
                                                 
4
 Although associated with considerable constraints, R&D indicators are commonly used as a measurement for 
innovation (Smith, 2005). 
5
 According to Fagerberg & Godinho (2005) the view that technology transfer and ‘catch-up’ is difficult to 
achieve is associated with the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron.   
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is that technological knowledge often has a strongly tacit and cumulative character, making 
knowledge asymmetries hard to even out. 
In relation, the empirical evidence of the benefits of inward transfers – meaning 
international flows of technology and knowledge through channels such as FDI (Mowery & 
Oxley, 1995) - is mixed (Görg & Greenaway, 2004; Keller, 2004). However, the lack of clear-
cut evidence of its benefits might be explained by the lack of sufficient absorptive capacity 
(Fu, Pietrobelli, & Soete, 2011). 
In this thesis it is therefore argued that the successful transfer of technology and 
knowledge relies on substantial and well-directed technological efforts (Lall, 2004) and on 
sufficient absorptive capacity on the part of the receiver (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & 
George, 2002), the latter referring to an ability to “recognize the value of new information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends.” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128).  
     
2.1.4 Limitations of the Systems of Innovation Approach  
On his account of systems of innovations Edquist (2005) considers some of the weaknesses of 
the approach. They are often related to the fact that the framework still lacks conceptual 
clarity, and that it does not qualify as a formal theory. This is because it does not provide 
“specific propositions regarding causal relations among variables.” (Edquist, 2005, p. 186). 
Innovation system researchers disagree on the seriousness of these limitations (Edquist, 
2005), as is further discussed in Sharif (2006) regarding national innovation systems.  
 A number of scholars have also stressed that the systems of innovation literature has 
underemphasized the international dimension (Asheim & Herstad, 2005; Pietrobelli & 
Rabellotti, 2009, 2011). They stress that international exchanges of information and 
technology have a great impact on the generation and diffusion of knowledge. In addition, as 
stressed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the literature has traditionally left little focus 
on systems in developing countries. Further, the approach seldom addresses resource-based 
sectors. Finally, the approach has been criticized for neglecting power relations and its impact 
on development (Lundvall, 2007). 
 In this thesis I will seek to address some of these points by stressing the importance for 
Cuba’s petroleum sector to establish and maintain channels of inward transfers from foreign 
actors, at different stages of the petroleum sector value chain. Further, power relations are 
taken into account with the emphasis on relative bargaining power between petroleum-rich 
countries and foreign oil companies, and how this determines the distribution of petroleum 
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rents, technology and other knowledge-related assets. Finally, the choice of case addresses the 
relative lack of system studies, both in natural resource-based industries and in developing 
countries.   
 
2.2 THE PETROLEUM SECTOR VALUE CHAIN 
2.2.1 Value Chains and Innovation Systems 
Value chain analysis investigates the sequence of activities required to bring a product or 
service from conception or procurement, through the different phases of production and 
distribution, to the final customer and disposal after use (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001, p. 4). 
The value chain approach is applied at different analytical levels, from individual firms to 
selected industries, within or across national borders. It was popularized by Porter (1985) who 
stresses that activities along the chain are not independent form each other, but interconnected 
by intra-chain linkages (Porter, 1985, p. 48). Value chains are often depicted in a simplistic 
matter. In reality, though, each link in the chain can consist of a range of different activities. 
Further, intra-chain linkages are often of a two-way nature, and significantly more complex 
than what is depicted in models (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001, pp. 4–8).  
 Value chain analysis has been criticized for downplaying contextual factors that 
influence the function of the chain, such as the institutional framework (Pietrobelli & 
Rabellotti, 2009), environmental considerations  (Bridge, 2008), and other factors that feature 
more prominently in the systems of innovation literature. Nevertheless, as was in fact noted 
by Malerba (2002), the value chain approach as developed by Porter (1985) shares several 
common characteristics with the (sectoral) systems of innovation framework. Recent studies 
have integrated the two approaches. They stress that effective flows of knowledge and 
collaboration for innovation among actors in the chain, are prerequisites for the chain to be 
competitive and meet consumer demand. Moreover, the role of a supporting environment is 
emphasized in this respect (Anandajayasekeram & Gebremedhin, 2009). 
Innovation researchers also stress the compatibility of the two approaches. As stated 
by Lundvall & Borrás (2005): “The systems approach introduces a vertical perspective on the 
industrial system, seeing it as a network and as value chains where certain stages might be 
more suitable for firms in a specific country.” (Lundvall & Borrás, 2005, p. 612). Further, 
according to Lundvall et al. (2011): “The innovation system may be seen as constituted by 
‘relationships’ between agents operating at different stages in the value chains.” .” (Lundvall, 
Gregersen, Johnson, & Lorenz, 2011, p. 7). 
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2.2.2 The Petroleum Sector Value Chain 
In the petroleum industry the value chain encompasses the range of interlinked activities that 
jointly contribute to the transformation of petroleum resources into usable end-products 
(Figure 2.1). According to Tordo, Tracy, & Arfaa (2011), value creation (understood as social 
value at the industry level rather than private shareholder value) stems from three general 
sources. The first source is variables that are exogenous to the actor’s decision-making, 
including the quality and quantity of the petroleum endowments, the geographic location of 
the country, as well as the structure of the domestic economy - including its dependence on 
and interactions with the petroleum sector. The second source is the companies participating 
in the sector, both private and public (national). Finally, the sector’s organization and 
institutional properties is a source of value creation, and affect the ability and willingness of 
the companies to perform well (Tordo, Tracy, & Arfaa, 2011, p. 3). 
The structure of the petroleum sector value chain is usually divided into upstream, 
midstream, and downstream activities. The different activities along the chain are conditioned 
by the characteristics of the hydrocarbons, of which the most important are oil and gas.  
First, crude oil is a heterogeneous material, and is therefore classified along several 
dimensions. Of these, density and sulfur content are the two most important. Density is 
measured according to the guidelines set by the American Petroleum Institute (API). Here, 
(perhaps contra intuitively for some readers) light crudes generally exceeds 38∞ API, whereas 
heavy crudes have an API gravity of 22∞ or less. As for sulfur, crudes are usually described 
as sweet if the sulfur content is less than 1 percent. If it exceeds that level, it is sour (Tordo et 
al., 2011, p. 109). Crudes that are lighter (in terms of density) and sweeter (in terms of sulfur 
content) naturally produce a higher yield of lighter, more valuable products in the refining 
process further down the chain. In consequence, crudes that are light and sweet are valued 
higher than heavy and sour crudes. As will be explained in the analysis, Cuba’s crude oil is 
heavy and sour, which have wide repercussions for activities along the value chain.   
Gas on the other hand, can be found either in separate accumulations from oil (non-
associated gas), or in combination with or in solution in crude oil (associated gas). Its 
composition varies widely, but often contains pure natural gas (methane); natural gas liquids 
(NGLs, such as ethane, butane, propane, iso-butane, and natural gasoline); and a number of 
impurities (such as carbon dioxide and water). Natural gas can either be classified as dry or 
wet, depending on its NGL content. Although efforts to find and process gas have stepped up 
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in recent years, it has historically not been considered as attractive as crude oil. This is 
because gas has to be moved by pipeline or by dedicated liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels, 
which still make the development of markets for gas much more expensive than for oil (Tordo 
et al., 2011, p. 109).   
Upstream activities include the exploration, development and production stages of the 
chain. It usually requires the highest amount of investments in the chain but also yield the 
highest potential profits (Sigam & Garcia, 2012). The exploration stage involves the 
identification of promising areas, geological analysis, and subsequent exploratory drilling if 
prospects are promising. If sufficient amounts of petroleum are found, additional appraisal 
wells are drilled to assess the commercial viability of the discovery (Tordo et al., 2011). The 
exploration stage can take from three to five years to complete. After the initial exploration 
the reserves are developed. Further, the development stage includes all activities and 
investments needed to prepare the site for commercial production, including evacuation 
routes. It can take from two to four years to complete, and the investments made here can 
amount to half of the total costs of a project (Sigam & Garcia, 2012). The next stage is 
petroleum production, which includes all activities connected to commercial extraction of the 
petroleum from the deposit. The cost of production varies considerably depending on the ease 
of extraction, field size, whether the field is on- or offshore, and the region of production. The 
amount of oil and gas production depends on the natural pressure of the reservoirs, and 
whether secondary and/or tertiary recovery methods are being used (Tordo et al., 2011). 
Production can last from 15 to 25 years and concludes the upstream section of the value chain.  
Midstream activities cover transportation and storage, and link the supply and demand 
side of the value chain. Here, oil and natural gas are transported to appropriate processing 
facilities, and from those sites distributed or marketed. Crude oil is typically stored in holding 
tanks and transported by pipeline, truck, railroad, and/or tanker to processing refineries. 
Natural gas storage is carried out underground in depleted reservoirs, aquifers, or salt caverns. 
The type of transportation depends on the physical state of the gas: natural gas liquids (NGLs) 
are transported by pipeline or tanker trucks; dry gas only by pipeline, and even then not across 
the seabed of deep oceans (Tordo et al., 2011). Margins are usually lower in the midstream 
sector than in either upstream or downstream activities (Sigam & Garcia, 2012). 
Further, downstream activities include oil refining and gas processing that turn the 
extracted petroleum into usable products. The value of the refined oil depends on the 
characteristics of the crude. As stated, crudes that are lighter and sweeter produce a higher 
yield of lighter, more valuable end products. Gas processing is usually conducted in dedicated 
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plants (fractionators) to become suitable for pipeline transportation (Tordo et al., 2011). When 
the refining or processing stage is completed, the hydrocarbons are marketed or distributed to 
end costumers, whether through wholesale, retail, or direct industrial clients.  
Lastly, oil refining and gas processing products can also be distributed to the 
petrochemical industry. Here, the primary chemicals are turned into everyday products such 
as pipes, plastic packaging, electronic components, and tires. The plants are usually located 
next to refineries. Further, the industry is dependent on minimum plant dimensions to achieve 
economies of scale and be competitive (Sigam & Garcia, 2012). 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The petroleum value chain (Adapted from Tordo et al., 2011, p. 2). Upstream activities marked with 
blue border, midstream activities with green, downstream activities with red. Adjacent industries, other services, 
and petroleum resources marked with black.    
 
2.3 BARGAINING POWER 
The relative bargaining power among actors has been identified as a key determinant in the 
distribution of economic rent stemming from petroleum industry activities (Vivoda, 2009, 
2011). It comes into play when petroleum-rich countries seek foreign assistance to contribute 
in the extraction and production of their hydrocarbon resources. Since petroleum industry 
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intensive, petroleum-rich countries often depends on the participation of experienced and 
resource-rich foreign and multinational oil companies.  
The model that is applied here was proposed by Vivoda (2011), who developed it 
based on an extensive review of previous literature on the subject. The framework focuses on 
upstream activities, which are spatially localized according to petroleum discoveries. The 
factors determining relative bargaining power among the actors – the host state and foreign oil 
company in question – are categorized into basic entry conditions and international and host 
country contextual factors respectively (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Figure 2.2: Oil industry dynamic bargaining model (Vivoda, 2011, p. 11). 
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Basic entry conditions are the set of unique resources that both the host state and foreign oil 
company need to possess in order to enter bargaining processes. For host countries these are 
the possession of petroleum resources, whose attractiveness are valued according to reserve 
size, longevity, and profitability. This point is in line with Dunning’s (1981, 1988) view that 
multinational firms will invest abroad in order to access the immobile resources of a particular 
place. The foreign oil company on the other hand, needs to possess capital, technological 
know-how and managerial skills that are not easily copied by others. The relative possession 
of these assets shapes the potential relative bargaining power of the actors (Vivoda, 2011).  
International and host country contextual factors mediate the potential and actual 
relative bargaining power between the actors. In the international context these are divided 
into firm-specific, industry-specific, and institutional factors. Here, firm-specific contextual 
factors are resources and constraints of the oil company in question, such as its home country, 
its access to and production in fields elsewhere, and its access to markets and global networks.  
Industry-specific factors at the international level comprise among others the price of 
oil, industry competition, scarcity perception, and the level of resource concentration and 
nationalism in the in the international petroleum industry. If the industry-specific factors reach 
high levels, they are expected to increase the relative bargaining power of a host state, making 
it less dependent on foreign participation to increase domestic petroleum sector efficiency, 
and increasingly able to play the foreign oil companies against each other for block 
concessions.   
In the model, institutional factors come into play when the host state is member of 
international organizations with sanction power. Such organizations might limit the actions of 
the host state on e.g. expropriation issues. On the other hand, membership of an international 
institution such as OPEC might increase the relative bargaining power of the host state 
(Vivoda, 2011).   
In the host country context, factors are divided into firm-specific, industry-specific, and 
host-state specific factors. Here firm-specific factors relate among others to the size of the 
irretrievable costs that an oil company has already invested in the host state, its reputation in 
the host state, as well as its availability of local allies. If the oil company has already invested 
a large amount of sunk cost in the host state, its relative bargaining power is expected to 
decrease, whereas a good reputation and availability of allies is expected to increase its 
relative bargaining power.  
 Industry specific factors are conditions such as the domestic legal context of the 
petroleum sector, the size of the local market, and the strategic importance of the petroleum 
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industry for the host country. If the host country fails to provide sufficient investor protection, 
or if there is a history of legal battles between the host state and foreign firms, this is expected 
to decrease the relative bargaining power of the host state. Further, if the petroleum sector is 
of high strategic importance, or if the host state contains large and growing markets, the host 
state is expected to increase its relative bargaining power.  
   Finally, host state-specific factors comprise non-industry factors. These include the 
size of the host state, its level of economic development, its dependence on FDI, the political 
and cultural context (such as type of political system and policies toward foreign actors), as 
well as the economic and political risks of investing in the host state (Vivoda, 2011). 
If a host state is highly developed, it is expected to enjoy a high level of absorptive 
capacity, thus being able utilize new information, and transform it to commercial ends. This is 
expected to increase the relative bargaining power of the host state. This also applies if the 
host state is large; it is then more likely to have power at its disposal in bargaining processes. 
Further, if the host state largely depends on FDI in its economy, this is expected to decrease 
its relative bargaining power. Finally, the political and cultural factors can mediate bargaining 
power. Sudden changes in attitude towards foreign participation can evaporate the relative 
bargaining power of these firms, whereas centralized authoritarian governments are less 
expected to be vulnerable to the influence of domestic societal groups (Vivoda, 2011). 
Whether this last point reduces or increases the relative bargaining power of the host state is 
not elaborated on in the model, although one could theorize that this depends on the attitudes 
of the domestic societal groups towards foreign participation in the first place.  
 The actual relative bargaining power between the host state and foreign oil company 
shapes the bargaining outcome if an agreement is reached. The outcome will also affect future 
bargaining processes, thus emphasizing the dynamic nature of the model (Figure 2.2).  
A few clarifications about the application of the bargaining power model in this thesis 
have to be made. The bargaining power model proposed by Vivoda (2011) aims at being 
applied in analyses where specific bargaining processes between host states and foreign oil 
companies are the focal point of study. As such the model aims at offering a balanced 
framework of such processes, where no particular host state or oil company perspective is 
given predominance. Such a detailed analysis of one or more of Cuba’s bargaining processes 
could undoubtedly lead to interesting propositions, but is outside the scope of this thesis.  
The goal here is not to offer a detailed analysis of different bargaining processes that 
Cuba has conducted with foreign oil companies. Rather, the framework is applied in order to 
assess the basis of Cuba’s bargaining power. This is done in order to explore the general 
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leverage Cuba possesses to access foreign technology and other knowledge related assets 
through foreign oil companies interested in investing in its petroleum sector. In consequence, 
industry-specific factors both on the international and host country context, as well as host 
country (non-industry) specific factors are especially emphasized, whereas firm-specific 
factors are downplayed.   
 
2.4 TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
As is hopefully clear from the sections on systems of innovation, the activities of innovation 
agents are strongly affected by external factors. Further, activities and performances of 
various actors in sectors co-evolve with institutions and policies at the national level. Hence, a 
country’s technology policy is crucial for the innovative performance of a sector, and for its 
capabilities to access and absorb foreign technology.  
Technology policy generally means different things for small and developing countries 
than it does for large and industrialized ones. Instead of building capabilities to produce and 
apply new (science-based) technologies, the focus is more often on outlining policies that 
facilitates the successful transfer of technology and knowledge from abroad. This is often 
sought done in targeted and established industries (Chaminade, Lundvall, Vang, & Joseph, 
2009; Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). 
In consequence, it is argued that the goal of Cuba’s petroleum technology policy 
should be to facilitate linkages between firms and non-firm organizations domestically, as 
well as between domestic firms and foreign companies. Figure 2.3 illustrates the difference 
between mature and emerging innovation systems, and depicts the relative lack of linkages 
between agents in emerging systems. In emerging systems, the role of universities is typically 
limited to supplying manpower. DUI forms of learning are inhibited because of low user 
competence, and because the relationships among agents are lacking in trust. Similarly, STI 
forms of learning are often weak, due to low levels of research capabilities in universities and 
research entities (Chaminade et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, emerging systems of innovation might evolve into mature systems, 
as firms and other building blocks accumulate the capabilities needed to engage in different 
forms of learning (Chaminade et al., 2009). In mature systems, linkages are more extensive. 
This signifies extensive transfers of technology and knowledge between different firms and 
non-firm agents along the value chain, which contributes to learning, capability building, and 
innovations.  
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Figure 2.3: Linkage differences between emerging and mature innovation systems (Chaminade & Vang, 2008). 
 
As stated, fostering linkages demands substantial and well-directed policy efforts, especially 
when the linkages cross borders. Nevertheless, accessing the knowledge and technology of 
foreign oil companies and other organizations can be a source of significant value creation, 
not least for petroleum sectors in developing countries.  
In the petroleum industry, two main policy choices are relevant in this regard. The first 
and most basic one regards the level of desired foreign participation in the petroleum industry. 
This level may be varied along a continuum (Figure 2.4).
6
 Countries often adopt different 
policies for the different stages of the petroleum sector value chain, but in reality no country 
in the world today resides on either of the extreme ends (Tordo et al., 2011). The degree of 
openness of a sector is usually formalized in laws and resolutions on the national level, such 
as the law of foreign investment of a country.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Options for levels of competition and participation in the petroleum sector (Tordo et al., 2011, p. 4). 
 
The second policy choice is conditioned by the first, and concerns the specific agreements 
between host states and foreign oil companies. Host states might adopt a variety of contractual 
                                                 
6
 In every country in the world (apart from the U.S), the sub-soil is either state-owned, or the state retains a veto 
on its use, making the national government in charge of entry regulations for foreign and domestic firms 
(Mommer, 2002). 
 Market structure and entry regulation/openness 
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 Degree of direct state participation 
 Role of state companies (operators/investors) 
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forms, such as risk service contracts (where all of the production belongs to the state) or 
product sharing agreements (where production is shared between the host government and the 
foreign company, see Appendix 1). Block concessions are usually auctioned or awarded to 
interested companies through bidding rounds.  
 Depending on the competition, bidding takes the form of commitments to the host 
country, and can be in the form of infrastructure development, training and capability 
building, technology transfer, the use of local contractors, or a minimum amount of spending 
on exploration (Tordo et al., 2011, p. 5). Included in the agreement between host states and 
foreign firms is also the level of taxation, such as on salaries and net profits. In upstream oil 
and gas, the total government take (or share of available cash flow from a petroleum project, 
see Appendix 1) varies around the world from around 40 percent to well over 90 percent 
(Johnston, 2007) (See Appendix 5).  
After the bidding has been concluded, the contractual arrangements between the host 
country and foreign oil company are subject to further bargaining, where factors such as the 
quality of the oil, perceived risk, and transportation costs come into play.   
 
2.5 BARGAINING POWER, CAPABILITY, AND POLICY 
As stated in section 2.3, bargaining power is thought to determine the distribution of added 
value between host states and foreign oil companies. Among bargaining power researchers, 
value addition is usually understood as economic rent stemming from petroleum related 
activities (Vivoda, 2009, 2011). The concept of economic rent was widely discussed by 
classical economist, with David Ricardo being the first to develop a complete theory of the 
concept. In straight terms, economic rent equals extra incomes above the average profit rate in 
an economy, which stems from the ownership or control of especially fruitful land, such as 
oil-rich territories (Ryggvik, 2010, p. 20). In consequence, the bargaining between the actors 
is the process where the distribution of this particular type of rent is decided.  
However, it is argued here that there is a by-product of bargaining processes that has 
received little attention in the bargaining power literature. The by-product stems from the fact 
that when agreement is reached, large amounts of foreign capital, technology, and managerial 
skills are transferred into the host country in question. Whether and to what degree this 
benefits the host state (beyond the share of economic rent resulting from the extraction of 
petroleum) depends on several factors, of which three are emphasized here: (i) the relative 
bargaining power of the host state; (ii) whether the petroleum policy of the host state includes 
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demands of technology and other knowledge-related assets to be transferred from the foreign 
oil company to domestic actors as part of the bargain and; (iii) the ability of the host state to 
assimilate and exploit the transfers.  
If the host state succeeds in facilitating and absorbing the transfers, however, domestic 
actors will more able to conduct different petroleum sector activities. This increase in 
domestic capabilities will also increase the relative bargaining power of the host state in 
future bargaining processes. This will happen because the host state is now relatively more 
capable of conducting petroleum activities without foreign assistance (Figure 2.5). To put it 
differently, the host state has managed to reduce asymmetries in areas such technology and 
industry know-how relative to foreign oil companies.  
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.5: The circular causality of host state relative bargaining power and capabilities. (IS) = innovation 
system.           
 
In consequence, efforts to facilitate such transfers should figure high on the technology policy 
agenda of host states. Further, as firms and other innovation agents are heavily influenced by 
systemic factors in their activities, the development of a well-functioning system that is 
capable of nurturing the absorptive capacity of domestic agents should be highly prioritized.  
Note also that if the capabilities of domestic actors increase, this will not only improve 
the chances of the host state to capture a larger share of the economic rent in, but also its 
chances of accessing and facilitating the knowledge and technology of foreign oil companies. 
The resulting increase in inward transfers of technology and knowledge will again reduce 
asymmetries, making the host state even less dependent on foreign participation, and in an 
even stronger relative bargaining position than before. The processes signify a circular 
causality of host state relative bargaining power and capabilities (Figure 2.5). 
Although the empirical material collected in this thesis cannot offer any valid 
conclusions of whether such processes have manifested themselves in Cuba’s petroleum 
sector, it is worth noting that the successful facilitation inward transfers and domestic 
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petroleum sector capabilities have been identified by several authors as key factors for 
Norway’s success in developing through its petroleum resources (Engen, 2009; Fagerberg, 
2009; Ryggvik, 2010, pp. 90–114; Sæther, Isaksen, & Karlsen, 2011). 
 
2.6 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
In this chapter I have presented the different theories and models to be applied in the analysis 
of the processes of domestic capability building and inward transfers in Cuba’s petroleum 
industry. It was argued that since Cuba’s petroleum sector is located far from the global 
technology frontier, a broad and context-specific understanding of innovation is assumed. 
Further, what is most relevant for the development of Cuba’s petroleum sector is to facilitate 
inward transfers of technology and knowledge from abroad, and to adapt these to local 
circumstances.  
 It was further argued that the access to foreign technology and knowledge in the 
petroleum industry – especially in relation to upstream operations where most of the 
economic rents are distributed – are mediated by the relative bargaining power of the host 
state. Such transfers are, power considerations aside, difficult to facilitate and heavily 
dependent on the petroleum technology policy of the host state: whether it aims at facilitating 
such transfers, and whether it nurtures absorptive capacity in its domestic petroleum sector 
actors. In this respect, it was theorized that the successful facilitation of such transfers, as 
indicated by increased domestic petroleum sector capabilities, will increase the relative 
bargaining power of the host state in future bargaining processes, and should thus be high on 
the agenda of the petroleum policy of host states. For host states this is decisive both to secure 
a larger share of the economic rent in future bargaining processes, and also for future inward 
transfers.  
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3. CONTEXT 
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant context of the petroleum sector of Cuba. 
First, Cuba’s economic situation is presented. This section will focus on the period since the 
abrupt ending of Cuba’s longstanding economic and political orientation towards the East 
Bloc in the early 1990s. Second, an account of the international petroleum industry is 
outlined. Here I will concentrate on the historical shifts in relative bargaining power between 
international oil companies and petroleum-rich countries in the developing world. The last 
two sections of the chapter discusses the development of the petroleum sectors of Norway and 
Angola, two countries that differ in many respects, but have both succeeded in accessing 
technology and knowledge from abroad, and utilized it to build significant domestic 
petroleum sector capabilities.     
 
3.1 CUBA IN TRANSITION 
3.1.1 Backdrop 
Ever since the revolutionary seizure of power by communist rebel forces in 1959, Cuba has 
survived more than 50 years of U.S. sanctions intended to topple the government of Fidel, and 
in later years, Raúl Castro. It has also defied predictions that it would not survive the collapse 
of its one-time supporter, the Soviet Union. Through the Partido Communista de Cuba and 
affiliated mass organizations, government bureaucracy and state security apparatus, the top 
national leadership has exercised control over virtually all aspects of Cuban economic and 
political life. The tight restriction on political rights such as freedom of speech and 
organization has, however, made social rights decisive in legitimizing the regime (Plahte, 
2010, p. 156). In accordance, the regime has made efforts to provide its citizens with universal 
and free access to health care and other services. These benefits, along with a considerable 
public commitment to education, science, and technology have also been linked with the 
wider social and economic development of the nation (Jover, Arriete, Ones, González, & 
Cuavas, 2011; Sáenz, 2008). 
However, Cuba’s revolution has for long periods of time been bankrolled by some 
external power. Up until the collapse of the East Bloc, the country benefited from access to 
large and stable markets, along with capital, cheap loans, and technology - the latter often far 
from cutting-edge but nevertheless important for productivity growth in various sectors. Apart 
from this, Cuba secured its energy supplies through a highly advantageous trade agreement, 
by which Cuban sugar was exchanged for large quantities of cheap crude oil from the Soviet 
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Union. The oil was used in the country’s refineries and thermoelectric power plants, with the 
surplus being re-exported to other markets for profit and stocks of foreign currencies.  
All this came to an end with the abrupt breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, which left Cuba in a deep economic crisis. Some macroeconomic data might illustrate 
the severity of the situation. Between 1989 and 1993 the level of GDP dropped by some 35 
percent, whereas the level of unemployment raised by 8 percent (Mesa-Lago & Vidal-
Alejandro, 2010). Physical production in most of the country’s key agricultural and industrial 
products fell dramatically, whereas the fiscal deficit rose from 7.3 to 33.5 percent of GDP. 
Moreover, merchandise exports and imports both contracted by nearly 80 percent, and the 
country’s international hard currency debt increased by approximately 42 percent (Perez-
Lopez, 2002). Scarcities increased and shortages of almost any kind became commonplace, 
leaving conditions across the island in rapid deterioration. In short, the crisis threatened to 
undo thirty-five years of social gains and economic achievements.  
In response, the government initiated austerity measures, officially named the ‘Special 
Period in Time of Peace’, aimed at reducing expenditures, perhaps best illustrated with a 
sharp reduction in energy consumption, and a plunge in real social expenditures per capita at 
78 percent (Mesa-Lago & Vidal-Alejandro, 2010). Attempts were also made to diversify the 
structure of the economy by moving away from the production and export of goods with low 
technological intensity such as sugar and tobacco, to higher value-added services in health, 
education, and tourism (Jover et al., 2011). The authorities also reformed the foreign 
investment law, which made sense because Cuba lacked access to multinational financing 
sources, and had only very limited access to bilateral credit due to its foreign debt 
(Villanueva, 2012). Further, restricted self-employment in over 100 occupations, such as in 
home repair and transportation, agriculture, and in personal services such as in tourism were 
authorized (Perez-Lopez, 2002). 
As for science and technology policies, efforts were made to establish a more 
comprehensive system, while maintaining the public expenditure on science, technology, and 
research and development close to one percent of GDP. In 1995 the official System of 
Science and Technological Innovation (SCIT), Cuba’s formal equivalent to the National 
Innovation System, was established (Jover et al., 2011). As a result of the policy measures, 
Cuba managed an average GDP growth rate of 4.6 percent between 1996 and 2000, “a nearly-
miraculous turnaround for an economy widely believed to be in the ropes in the early 1990s.” 
(Perez-Lopez, 2002, p. 516). 
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3.1.2 Recent Developments 
Although experiencing an overall growth rate in GDP, it has only been at a modest 3.2 
percent since 1993 (Torres, In Press). Some of the economic changes initiated during the 
1990s came to a halt in the early 2000s, in part helped by the willingness of Venezuela’s 
president Hugo Chávez to supply Cuba with large amounts of petroleum in exchange with 
healthcare and other services. The beneficial agreement relieved the pressure on Cuban 
finances. For some years at least, the government could seemingly afford to misallocate 
resources and turn its back on efficiency and market principles (Domínguez, 2012). 
In recent years, the failure to embark on a path of substantial and sustainable growth 
has been acknowledged by the top national leadership, however. In 2010 Cuba’s new leader 
Raúl Castro stated that Cuba was in the need of a serious updating of its economic model 
(Castro, 2010). The global financial crisis had left Venezuelan resources sharply reduced, 
which yet again revealed the vulnerability of relying of external powers for national welfare. 
The statement was in fact in line with the reform measures Raúl had initiated since his 
ascendance to power in 2006/2008, and a sign of what was to come. Since his takeover Raúl 
had, among others, legalized private operations of taxistas and granted large acres of usufruct 
land to farmers and cooperatives. In April 2011 he summoned the Sixth Party Congress - the 
first since 1997 – aimed at securing the survival of Cuban socialism by addressing the low 
rates of productivity and efficiency in most sectors. The Cuban model was, in essence, not 
economically viable.  
In 2011 the Congress approved a document drafted by the Party Congress titled 
‘Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and Revolution’ (Sixth Congress 
of the Communist Party of Cuba, 2011). It is a detailed domestic policy blueprint that forms 
the basis of future reforms. It systematizes and formalizes the previous reform measures, and 
covers a wide range of areas. Further, it aims at changing the structure of employment by 
laying off a substantial amount of state-employed workers to various occupations in the 
private sector. Moreover - according to the document - local and small-scale private 
cooperatives will be allowed in some sectors and activities, whereas the number of state 
enterprises is to be reduced. In agriculture the state will allow more room for free market 
mechanisms and non-state producers. There will also be more room for private restaurants 
and rentals in tourism. The importance of foreign investment for inward transfers of capital, 
technology, and access to markets are restated. What is more, foreign investments are targeted 
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to create jobs and increase national production in strategic areas, even if there is no major 
benefit in terms of foreign exchange earnings.  
 
3.1.3 Deep-rooted Problems 
Despite the efforts, the reform measures have by many observers been characterized as slow 
and not substantial enough to address the core causes of Cuba’s economic problems 
(Hershberg, In Press). The roots of the problems are deep, and perhaps have its origins in the 
long economic and political integration with the East Bloc economies during the Cold War 
(Brundenius in Torres, Triana, Monreal, & Brundenius, In Press). Through this relationship 
Cuba copied the economic planning model of the Soviet Union. This model was based on 
numbered targets that were to be met by the expansion of capital and labor, the traditional 
factors of production. The model diverted from Western growth models which, since Solow 
(1956), increasingly denoted the role of total factor productivity - or technological change - 
for economic growth. Adding to this has been a series of structural problems, and low 
utilization of the country’s relatively high levels of human capital, which current policies have 
been unable to address in a sufficient manner (Torres, In Press). 
The latter point also seems to be the case when considering the nation’s science, 
technology, and innovation policy which, despite significant successes in areas such as the 
biotechnology sector, is still associated with substantial flaws (Jover & Arriete, In Press). 
First, the linkages between research entities and productive sectors are still weak and based on 
an obsolete linear “science push” model which has been hegemonic in Cuban STI policy for 
the past 50 years. Second, the STI policy is still lacking an explicit policy for technology 
transfer, making transferred technologies determined by government decisions tied to 
international trade and investments. Third, the SCIT is still associated with an insufficient 
legal and methodological basis. The strained economic situation has also led to lower levels of 
R&D funding than in previous years, while the low access to foreign currency financing – 
which pays for materials and specialized equipment – has curbed STI efforts. Finally, the 
country’s strained finances have also led to problems related to knowledge flows through the 
Internet and other information networks (Jover & Arriete, In Press).   
 
3.1.4 The U.S. Embargo 
Adding to these factors, which are domestic in nature, the longstanding standoff with the U.S. 
has constrained Cuba’s economic options in a number of ways. Parts of it has been imposed 
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since October 1960 after Cuban authorities nationalized the properties of U.S. citizens and 
corporations, and was widened to a near-total embargo in 1962. The commercial, economic, 
and financial embargo was codified into U.S. law in 1992, and further broadened through the 
Helms-Burton act, passed by the U.S Congress in 1996. The embargo applies to almost all 
transactions involving Cuba or Cuban enterprises, and prohibits U.S. ‘persons’7 from 
participating in such transactions unless they have obtained a specific license from the U.S. 
Department of Treasury. The embargo also applies to subsidiaries of U.S. enterprises, and 
entities deemed to be owned or controlled by Cuba. Furthermore, U.S.-originated technology, 
U.S.-originated goods, and many goods produced with U.S.-originated components or 
technology cannot be transferred to Cuba or used in operations in Cuba. The Helms-Burton 
act also authorizes sanctions on individuals or entities that profits from or participates in 
property that was confiscated from U.S. nationals or have become U.S. nationals, although no 
lawsuits has been filed to date. In practice the embargo seals off access to Cuba’s most natural 
trading partner in the developed world. It also constrains potential foreign investors and trade 
partners from other countries by imposing heavy sanctions on firms that do business in Cuba 
(Hershberg, In Press). 
 In summary, Cuba is on the path of slow economic and institutional transformation, 
although most scholars agree that the implemented and planned upgrading of the economic 
model is not substantial enough to address the core causes of the economic problems. The 
longstanding U.S. embargo has been an obstacle for Cuban development efforts, but is only a 
contributing factor. According to Brundenius (2009) Cuba’s growth performance was for 
many years relatively successful, at least in a Latin-American context. From the mid-1980s, 
however, the economic model was stagnating, and struggling to produce growth (Brundenius, 
2009).   
 
3.2 THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY  
The oil and gas industry is associated with high economic risk, particularly in upstream 
operations. Despite the fact that innovations in seismic and other areas have made field-
characterizations more reliable than in earlier periods, economic evaluations still need to 
calculate for a variety of uncertainties. These can be related to costs, the probability of finding 
and producing economically viable reservoirs, technology, and oil price. This is all the more 
                                                 
7
 U.S. ‘persons’ include U.S. citizens, U.S. residents, individuals or enterprises located in the United States, 
enterprises organized under U.S. laws, and enterprises owned by any of the foregoing.   
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urgent when considering the large capital investments required upfront in such operations, 
particularly offshore.  
Further down the chain, on the development and production stages, uncertainties take 
other forms. Here, they are related to infrastructure, production schedule, the quality of the 
petroleum, operational costs, reservoir characteristics, and others. In sum, despite 
considerable technological innovations, no blueprint is given for the successful discovery and 
development of hydrocarbon resources (Suslick, Schiozer, & Rodriguez, 2009).  
 Still, the market price for oil and gas has historically been way above the price 
required to keep the factors of production in active use, and also above the price required to 
make profits out of the operations. Thus, despite the high requirements of capital and 
technological master along with the considerable economic risk, the petroleum industry is one 
where large economic rents can be earned (Ryggvik, 2010; Vivoda, 2009). 
   
3.2.1 Historical Developments 
Because of the high levels of capital and technology needed to extract and produce 
hydrocarbons (Humphreys et al., 2007), countries rich in petroleum resources typically find 
themselves in need to seek the expertise of foreign oil companies to extract and process their 
hydrocarbon resources. Historically, the distribution of economic rents has been a subject of 
fierce bargaining between various international oil companies and petroleum-rich developing 
countries (Stevens, 2008). During the first decades of the 20
th
 century, a few major 
international companies dominated the scene. These are often referred to as the ‘Seven 
Sisters’. Using their modern names they were Exxon Mobil (US), Chevron (US), Gulf of 
Texaco (US), BP (Britain), Shell (Britain-The Netherlands), and CFP (France). Through the 
secret ‘As Is’ agreement of 1928, the Sisters left aside their main differences and carved up 
the world oil market between them. 
The international oil companies were often backed by their respective national 
governments which, since the decision of Winston Churchill in 1912 to convert the British 
navy from coal to oil, increasingly saw the securement of oil supplies as a top national 
priority. According to Ryggvik (2010, p. 53) the international oil companies secured 
ownership of oil fields through the application of a variety of measures. These spanned from 
bribery of corrupt politicians or officers to outright toppling of ‘hostile’ governments. As a 
result, the share of petroleum rents accruing to host states was typically limited to salary 
payments, small compensation to land owners, and briberies.  
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 The balance of power shifted, however, when oil producing states in the Middle East 
and elsewhere increasingly regained control of their resources. According to Stevens (2008) 
there were three main reasons for this shift. First, the concept of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over 
national resources was on the rise in intergovernmental organizations and elsewhere, marked 
among others by a series of resolutions passed by the United Nations during the 1950s and 
1960s. The resolutions advised host states to acquire full control of their natural resources in 
order to exploit their fields maximally. Second, among host states there was a growing 
dissatisfaction with the oil concessions signed before World War II. In short, these contracts 
were designed so that the international oil companies secured large rents, at financially very 
favorable terms, without much effort, for many decades. As an example, in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
and Saudi Arabia – all major producers – the average life of these concession contracts were 
82 years. Finally, there was a rapid increase in the demand for oil in the U.S. and European 
markets, which made the oil fields of the Middle East unprecedentedly important. The rise in 
demand also created niches in the market for smaller oil companies that were more willing to 
accept the new economic demands posed by Middle Eastern oil states (Engen, 2009). 
The resulting resource nationalism corresponded with a view that gradually gained 
ground in many oil producing states: in order to reduce their dependence on the international 
oil companies, they had to develop domestic technological capabilities to be able to negotiate 
better deals and run their oil fields without foreign assistance. Two measures were taken to 
this end. First, the oil states established publicly owned national oil companies to gain 
expertize and secure direct state participation within the oil industry. Second, the major 
exporting countries decided to cooperate on matters of mutual interest, which was formalized 
through the creation of OPEC in 1960. Throughout the decade cooperation was further 
institutionalized, and major exports countries were able to renegotiate their concession 
contracts or, in some cases, nationalize the entire industry (Tordo et al., 2011, p. 18). 
The shift in the balance of power was thoroughly marked with the selective oil 
embargo of key Arab exporters against Western nations in 1973, which triggered a 
quadrupling of oil prices. By 1976 the old style concession system had been swept away, and 
the producer governments of the Middle East had full control of their oil operations and oil 
prices (Stevens, 2008). Moreover, the wave of resource nationalism further spread throughout 
the developing world, making the 1970s the peak decade of this trend. Outside the U.S, 
Canada, and the centrally planned economies; from 1973 to 1975 public sector control in the 
oil industry rose from 9 percent to 62 percent in production, from 14 percent to 24 percent in 
refining, and from 11 percent to 21 percent in marketing (Heller, 1980). The oil rich countries 
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still lacked capabilities in downstream operations, however, such as in refining and access to 
markets. As a consequence the international oil companies still exercised considerable 
leverage in downstream operations in many developing countries (Ryggvik, 2010, pp. 57–62). 
Although the wave of resource nationalism had tipped the balance of power in favor of 
oil producing states, the oil price shocks and large revenues gathered throughout the 1970s 
had left considerations of enhanced domestic capabilities less urgent. In the wider economic 
and social debate, state owned enterprises were subject to increasing attacks for their lack of 
efficiency and poor results compared to their private counterparts (Tordo et al., 2011, p. 19). 
Further, the discourse of privatization and liberalization that characterized the 1980s 
and 1990s made many countries more sympathetic toward FDI, a trend that increased the 
competition for the technology and expertise of international oil companies. Foreign 
participation became especially urgent after 1986 when the oil prices dropped abruptly as the 
delegates of OPEC had failed to keep the production levels at agreed upon quotas. In addition, 
the oil appeared to be coming out of more difficult geography and geology. In sum, these 
factors made the international oil industry move from a seller’s to a buyer’s marked, and a 
series of governments reopened their upstream sectors for foreign participation, at relatively 
favorable terms. In the early 1990s the opening of the petroleum fields in former East Bloc 
countries further decreased the competitive position of the oil-producing (Stevens, 2008). All 
this pointed to a shift in the balance of power towards the international oil companies. 
Since the turn of the millennium, the balance of power has tilted in favor of the host 
states yet again. After a collapse in 1998 the international market price for oil has reached 
unprecedentedly high levels. Competition among international oil companies became fiercer 
towards the end of the century, which led to a larger emphasis on value-based management of 
the oil companies. In effect this means that the companies are valued in terms of their rate of 
return, favoring short-term value creation for shareholders. As a consequence, investments 
fell steadily, especially after 1998 (Stevens, 2008). In combination with the rise in demand in 
East Asian markets and new geopolitical uncertainties, the low level of supply-side 
investments swelled prices. This has led many host states to rethink their contracts, seeking 
higher taxes, royalties, and increased local industry participation through local content 
demands (Accenture, 2008; Vivoda, 2009). In addition many national oil companies have 
emerged as serious competitors, both at home and abroad.    
As a result of the waves of resource nationalism, oil producing states now own and 
control between 77 and 90 percent of the total proven oil reserves worldwide, with similar 
numbers applying to gas (Tordo et al., 2011). In the next 20 years an estimated 90 percent of 
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new hydrocarbon production will come from developing countries (Baker III Institute, 2007). 
The international oil companies on the other hand, have full access to countries with only six 
percent of the proven resources worldwide, and an opportunity to engage in joint ventures or 
product sharing agreements in countries that own an additional 11 percent (Mouawad, 2006). 
Overall, the situation has made peripheral areas, such as in deep- and ultra-deep waters more 
attractive for oil companies of various origins and sizes. 
 
3.3 NORWAY’S PETROLEUM SECTOR 
Norway’s offshore based petroleum industry is the first sector that will be used as 
comparative material in the analysis. Like Cuba today, Norway is a small state that sought the 
participation of foreign oil companies in a period where the balance of power generally 
favored host states. Norway is, however, frequently ranked among the top nations in measures 
such as GDP per capita (IMF, 2012a) and HDI (UNDP, 2013),
8
 and is often characterized as 
the prime example of a country that has managed to turn its natural resources into economic 
and social growth and development. 
 
3.3.1 Existing Capabilities and the International Context 
Before offshore exploration began in the late-1960s, Norway did not have an existing 
petroleum sector such as the onshore-based sector of Cuba. It had, however, a certain 
absorptive capacity through three established industrial groups (Engen, 2009). First, 
Norwegian shipbuilders had become increasingly specialized during the late-1960s, and could 
in cooperation undertake complex operations, such as constructing oil rigs and platforms. 
Second, there existed a group of private ship-owners who had had prior experience with the 
international petroleum industry through the ownership of tankers. Further, Norwegian 
financial organizations had interests in Norwegian shipyards and the shipbuilding industry. 
Third, the chemical giant Norsk Hydro had international links to the petroleum industry, and 
began to build up an internal staff with offshore expertize in the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, like 
Cuba today and Angola in the 1970s, the industrial base was not in any way capable of 
operating an offshore petroleum sector without foreign involvement (Engen, 2009). 
On the institutional side, Norway benefited from having prior experience in the 
granting of concessions and taxation of natural resources. This had been developed through 
                                                 
8
 Its nominal GDP totaled $501.582 billion in 2012, whereas its GDP per capita was at $99,664 (IMF, 2012a). Its 
level of HDI was measured at 0.955, ranking the nation at the very top (UNDP, 2013). 
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the concession system for hydroelectricity, crafted some fifty years before. Just as in Cuba 
and Angola, the dependence on foreign participation in the petroleum sector was well-
recognized by Norwegian authorities early on. In consequence, Norway sought to maximize 
foreign participation at the initial stages, partly at the expense of domestic actors such as 
Norsk Hydro (Ryggvik, 2010, p. 73).     
 As stated, the international context was rather favoring host states in the 1960s and 
1970s. The threat posed by rising resource nationalism made both major and smaller oil 
companies looking for promising and politically stable regions. As such the North Sea was 
perceived as attractive, particularly after natural gas was found near Groningen (the 
Netherlands) and off the South-East coast of Great Britain some years before. The North Sea 
was also located close to the rising markets of Europe. Thus: “On the whole […] the broader 
changes in the international environment strengthened the bargaining position of the 
Norwegian government and Norwegian firms in the early development of the oil industry.” 
(Engen, 2009, pp. 184–85).   
 
3.3.2 Creation of Statoil and Early Sectoral Policies 
Neither the international oil companies nor the Norwegians had any prior experience with 
drilling for oil and gas in the North Sea. At the outset, the international oil companies 
preferred light platform designs and sub-sea solutions with little involvement from Norwegian 
sub-contractors. This stood in opposition to the goals of Norwegian authorities, who outlined 
a petroleum technology policy that implied the highest possible participation of Norwegian 
industry (Engen, 2009). In the eyes of Norwegian authorities, this was seen as essential to 
secure the largest share of petroleum rents possible.  
In effect, the concession system was shaped to make it politically advantageous for the 
internationals to engage Norwegian firms in the process. The system also shaped the 
technological and organizational trajectory of the industry, as illustrated with the agreement to 
use Norwegian concrete technology in the construction of offshore platforms (Engen, 2009). 
Further, Norway’s policy of slow depletion was designed to give Norwegian oil companies 
and suppliers time to develop indigenous industry capabilities, a policy that lasted into the 
1980s. 
 Through Statoil, the national oil company created in 1972, national political control of 
the oil sector was sought achieved by mastering all aspects of petroleum industry operations. 
The rationale behind Statoil’s further development largely followed these goals (Ryggvik, 
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2010, p. 96). Statoil soon became an important instrument in dealings with the internationals: 
“Agreements regarding training and transfers of knowledge and technology from other 
companies were negotiated, and Statoil itself took the role of intermediary in delegating tasks 
to Norwegian industry.” (Engen, 2009, p. 185). Statoil’s powers were limited, however, by 
the petroleum industry competence base that was developed in the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD). The NPD was established as an advisory organ for the Ministry of Oil and 
Energy, the latter which held the role as concessionaire and maintained the overall political 
responsibility of the sector (Ryggvik, 2010, p. 97).    
 
3.3.3 Development of a Domestic Petroleum Innovation System 
The favorable international context, as well as a domestic effort to build indigenous 
competencies had reduced some of the asymmetries that existed between Norwegian and 
foreign actors. Nevertheless, it took 32 exploratory wells before any major reservoirs were 
discovered (Store Norske Leksikon, 2005). Once discovered the agreement by Phillips and 
other internationals to approach the policy demands of Norwegian authorities in a flexible 
manner was eased (Figure 3.1 and 3.2). In addition, any concerns about cost explosions, 
whether due to lack of prior experience or choice of solutions that fitted the domestic 
industry, were swept away by the quadrupling of the prices in 1973 (Engen, 2009). 
In the late-1970s Norwegian actors were brought into the center of operations through 
the development of the Condeep-platforms, which were large gravity platforms placed on the 
seabed. The complex set-up of these platforms required the various oil companies, suppliers, 
sub-contractors and authorities to build up large bureaucracies in order to control each other, 
and the number of Norwegian stakeholders in the petroleum industry expanded significantly. 
Although cumbersome and costly, the result was increased competence and linkage building 
among the actors.  
Throughout the 1980s international and domestic linkages were further developed, 
which increasingly also included indigenous research capabilities. Again the government 
provided incentives for domestic capability building by so-called ‘goodwill agreements’. Here 
international petroleum companies gained ‘goodwill points’ by contracting with Norwegian 
firms and research institutes, and through the transfer of technology. The contribution of 
foreign companies to domestic capability building was monitored and reflected in the next 
concession rounds (Sæther et al., 2011).  
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It was in this period that Statoil became capable of operating offshore fields 
independently through an agreement with the American oil company Mobil (Ryggvik, 2010, 
p. 108). This proved crucial for the relative bargaining power of Norway as a host state. From 
now on, in various bargaining processes, foreign oil companies could not effectively threaten 
to pull out to grasp a higher share of the petroleum rent, simply because Statoil then take over 
and do the job (Ryggvik, 2010, p. 113). Through the longstanding and targeted technology 
policy of Norwegian authorizes; to facilitate inward transfers and develop the capabilities of 
Statoil and other actors, Norway had significantly increased its relative bargaining power 
versus the foreign oil companies investing in its petroleum sector. The process suggests a 
circular causality between host state relative bargaining power and capabilities as suggested 
by figure 2.5.   
Further, with the inclusion and development of Norwegian research capabilities, and 
the increased linkages among the actors, the Norwegian petroleum innovation system had 
matured from its early phases (Engen, 2009). Through substantial policy efforts, linkages had 
been established between a wide range of domestic and international firm and non-firm 
organizations, resulting in significant capability increases among domestic petroleum sector 
actors. In other words, the Norwegian petroleum innovation system had evolved from an 
emergent to a mature system, as illustrated by Figure 2.3.   
Even though the system at this stage was internationally uncompetitive, the sharp 
decline in oil prices from 1986 on led to a reorganization of the sector, aimed at reducing 
costs by 50 percent. Firms were given greater independence in the planning and 
implementation of alternative technological solutions than in the earlier phases of the 
industry. Through increased R&D funding, both from public and private sources, new 
technologies were introduced, among others in recovery and development of the oil fields. 
The new post-Condeep technical concepts also required simplified organizational models, 
which along with the introduction of computer-based solutions and unmanned installations 
further reduced the costs, and laid the foundation for the internationalization of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry in the past two decades (Engen, 2009). 
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Figure 3.1: Total oil production in Norway, 1980 – 2012, thousand bbl/d, (EIA, 2012a). 
 
Figure 3.2: Total production of natural gas in Norway, 1980-2011, billion cubic feet, (EIA, 2012a). 
  
3.4 ANGOLA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR 
Angola’s offshore oil-based petroleum industry is the second sector to be drawn on in the 
analysis. Similarly to Norway and Cuba, Angola is a small country, with a population 
reaching approximately 18.5 million. Angola differs substantially from Norway most other 
indicators, however. According to the International Monetary Fund its nominal GDP totaled 
$118.719 billion in 2012, whereas its GDP per capita was at $5,873, ranking it as number 107 
(IMF, 2012b). Its level of HDI was measured at 0.508 in 2012, categorizing Angola among 
the countries with low human development by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP, 2013). 
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3.4.1 Early Developments 
Angola started extracting oil in the 1950s, and oil had prior to its independence from Portugal 
in 1975 become a major export, reaching 150,000 bbl/d. This was by and large conducted by 
foreign oil companies, such as Angol, a subsidiary of Portugal’s Sacor, or Cabinda Gulf Oil 
Company Limited, a subsidiary of America Gulf Oil. Although the leftist MPLA movement 
seized power in November that year, the country was torn by rival factions until 2002. The 
MPLA officially adopted Marxist-Leninism in 1976, expropriated Portuguese propriety, and 
introduced central planning of the economy. The oil sector was, however, largely sheltered 
from the political storm because of its apparent revenue-generating abilities, and has since 
been a trustworthy source of income to the Angolan presidency (De Oliveira, 2007). 
 The successful development of the Angolan petroleum sector was far from apparent at 
the outset. By the mid-1970s the vast majority of educated and technically able personnel had 
fled, and the country lacked the appropriate infrastructure and regulatory oversight needed to 
operate a well-functioning energy sector (EIA, 2013a). This was in contrast to Norway which, 
despite lacking in petroleum sector experience, had both industrial and institutional 
competences to build on. Nevertheless, a commission of MPLA-backed businessmen, 
engineers and other technical experts managed the transition of the oil sector to national hands 
in a relatively smooth manner.  
From the start, the necessity of foreign participation in the sector was recognized as 
fundamental, as Angola alone did not have the capability to explore and produce offshore-
based oil by itself. Foreign participation was welcomed, despite the general wave of resource 
nationalism and anti-imperialistic sentiments characterizing the international oil industry at 
the time. The American Gulf Oil subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Company Limited, which had 
exited in 1975, was lured back. This was achieved by a combination of assurances of 
pragmatic and business-minded intensions on the Angolan side, and pressure from Nigeria, 
which hinted at retaliation against Gulf’s interests in the Niger Delta should Gulf boycott the 
new state (De Oliveira, 2007). Further, the luring back was achieved despite the fact that the 
leftist orientation of the new state had made it a sworn enemy of the U.S., Gulf’s home 
country, but again in an international context where the international companies found it 
increasingly harder to access the oil fields of many nations. Other countries which had 
operated prior to 1975, such as Petrofina and Texaco were also encouraged to return, while 
nationalization of the oil sector was explicitly ruled out by the Angolan leadership.  
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3.4.2 Creation and Development of Sonangol 
The only exception to this rule was the takeover of the Portuguese oil company Angol in 
1976. This formed the basis of Sonangol, Angola’s NOC which since 1978 has been the sole 
concessionaire, sector regulator, and tax gathering agent in Angola’s oil industry (EIA, 
2013a). Due to the paucity of human resources, Sonangol prioritized contractual negotiations 
with the foreign oil companies, while the latter would remain responsible for exploration and 
production. Sonangol partnered with the Algerian NOC Sonatrach in 1976, which besides 
giving advice in contractual negotiations also trained a considerable number of first-
generation Angolan personnel. Italy’s ENI also played a role in providing technical education. 
In addition the Cambridge, Massachusetts consulting firm Arthur D. Little became a major 
source of apprenticeship (De Oliveira, 2007). 
As a consequence, Sonangol managed to develop and uphold a continuity of 
technicians, enlarged by new legal, engineering, geological, and economic expertise, and was 
by the beginning of the 1990s the leading domestic entity in Angola’s political economy. In 
1991 Sonangol was restructured into a holding company, and has since developed a large 
number of subsidiaries concerned with both core and non-core businesses. The subsidiaries 
are treated preferentially in the procurement of goods and services to oil companies operating 
in Angola (Alvesson, Bhattarai, & Pastor, 2003). Through its subsidiaries Sonangol has 
operations in upstream, downstream, and midstream activities, in later years increasingly also 
in gas.  
 
3.4.3 Continued Openness 
The emphasis on foreign participation has in later years not only been confined to contractual 
negotiations. A growing number of joint ventures have been established in various activities 
throughout the petroleum sector value chain. Three factors have been especially important for 
the successful openness to foreign participation in the sector. First, and increasingly over the 
years, the oil of Angola has been seen as very attractive among foreign private and public oil 
companies. The production output has steadily increased since the independence (Figure 3.3 
and 3.4), and the light and sweet quality of the crude makes it well-fitted for large export 
markets such as China and the U.S. (EIA, 2013a). 
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Figure 3.3: Total oil production in Angola, 1980-2012, thousand barrels of oil a day (bbl/d), (EIA, 2013a). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Total production of natural gas in Angola, 1980-2011, billion cubic feet, (EIA, 2013a).      
 
Although the bulk of Angolan oil is located offshore, technological innovations have made it 
possible to access oil in deep and ultra-deep waters. After large reservoirs were found in ultra-
deep waters by Elf in 1996, Angola quickly became the hotspot for companies such as BP, 
Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil, Statoil, Petrobras, CNOOOC, and Sinopec.  
Second, from the point of view of the foreign oil companies, the interactions with 
Sonangol have been relatively hassle-free. As mentioned, the oil sector of Angola has been 
sheltered from the rest of the economy, which in contrast is characterized as one of the riskiest 
economies worldwide in which to invest (De Oliveira, 2007). According to the International 
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Energy Agency no less than US$ 17 and US$ 23 billion of FDI was poured into the Angolan 
petroleum sector between 2003 and 2008 (IEA, 2006). 
Third, by leveraging its role as a concessionaire Sonangol has served as a main vehicle 
for enhancing local participation (Tordo et al., 2011). Training programs of Angolan 
personnel are required from all oil companies operating in Angola, which is expected to 
provide US$ 200,000 per year per block during the exploration phase, and US$ 0.15 per 
barrel of oil during production.  
Although the requirement of a minimum 70 percent of Angolans in oil operations are 
rarely met, and domestic capabilities in non-firm organizations seems very limited, the 
government hopes these programs will increase the technical capability of its domestic 
workforce (EIA, 2013a). In the meantime Sonangol, through its various subsidiaries are 
building capabilities through various interactions with foreign companies. Perhaps most 
notably is the capability development of Sonangol P&P, which now operates several onshore 
and offshore fields in Angolan territory. 
Recent issues, such as revisions of the Angolan Petroleum Law to increase local 
content, wishes by Sonangol to slow project developments, and demands for ever-more 
substantial sign-on bonuses have been contentious (De Oliveira, 2007). However, they have 
also marked the relative bargaining power and competence of Sonangol, which put it in a 
more equitable position vis-à-vis the foreign operators, thus signifying a circular causality 
between host state relative bargaining power and capabilities in the case of Angola as well.    
3.5 SUMMARY: NORWAY AND ANGOLA 
As hinted on from the preceding sections on the petroleum sectors of Norway and Angola, 
some common factors for successful sectoral development might be identified.     
 As for bargaining power, both countries heavily depended on the resources of foreign 
oil companies for extracting and producing petroleum resources. In terms of basic entry 
conditions, Angola benefitted from having proved resources, with an export level of 100,000 
bbl/d in 1973. In Norway, it took a number of exploratory wells before any major fields were 
discovered, but with Ekofisk – at the time the largest offshore petroleum discovery ever made 
– the basic entry conditions were firmly in place for future bargaining. 
 Similarly, as explored in section 3.2.1 both countries benefitted from a favorable 
international context on most indicators. This was particularly the case after the quadrupling 
of oil prices in 1973.  
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 As for host country contextual factors, the two countries differed significantly on a 
number of indicators, such as in level of economic development and relative dependence of 
the domestic economy on FDI. This also seems to have been the case when considering 
various investment risks for foreign contractors. However, despite the adoption of Marxist-
Leninism by the MPLA in 1976, which spread fear of expropriation, and a decades-long civil 
war, the petroleum sector was largely sheltered in Angola. Thus, both countries by and large 
managed to offer what was perceived as sufficient investment climates in the eyes of the 
foreign oil companies.  
 As for petroleum technology policy, the authorities of both countries have favored a 
high degree of openness for foreign participation in the petroleum sector. Both have aimed at 
accessing inward transfers of technology and knowledge held by foreign actors, while 
correspondingly developing domestic capabilities in domestic actors in the petroleum 
industry. In the case of Angola, however, due to a lack of absorptive capacity in domestic 
actors, this line of policy towards foreign oil companies only seem to have been substantially 
pursued in later years, and seem by and large to be limited to Sonangol and its subsidiaries.  
 In both cases, the circular causality between host state relative bargaining power and 
capabilities seems to have manifested itself and made a positive contribution to the 
development of the respective petroleum sectors of the two countries. In particular, the 
capability building in the respective national oil companies Statoil and Sonangol has 
contributed to this. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodological outline of this thesis. I will start out by giving a brief 
description of the case study research method and justify why this type of method has been 
applied to study Cuba’s petroleum sector. I will then present an outline of the research design. 
This is done to give a transparent account of the various steps of the study. Subsequently I 
provide a discussion of the applied data collection sources and discuss why they were chosen. 
I will then go on to describe how I collected and analyzed the empirical data, before I discuss 
various biases and limitations of the chosen methods, empirical data, and analysis. The 
chapter ends with a brief discussion of ethical considerations.  
 The goal of this chapter is to provide the reader with a transparent account of how the 
data was collected, processed, and analyzed. In doing so it is my hope that the reader can 
clearly assess the validity and reliability of the research process and findings. 
 
4.1 THE CASE STUDY 
4.1.1 Why a Case Study? 
The research questions posed in this thesis are so-called “what” questions aimed at exploring 
different processes and characteristics of Cuba’s petroleum industry. According to Yin (2009) 
questions of this type might use several different research methods, including the case study 
method (Yin, 2009, p. 9). Case study research is well suited to discover nuances, contextual 
influences on and explanations of a phenomenon, and is often used to “delve into under-
theorized phenomena.” (Baxter, 2010, p. 89). As such case studies can be used to test, falsify, 
expand, or generate explanatory theoretical concepts. Case study research does not 
discriminate between different types of data collection methods. In contrast, different kinds of 
qualitative and quantitative methods can be utilized to shed light on the phenomenon under 
study (Baxter, 2010; Punch, 2005; Yin, 2009). The emphasis of case study research lies not on 
the choice of data collection method but in that one case “will be studied in detail, using 
whatever methods seem appropriate.” (Punch, 2005, p. 144). 
Due to the scarcity of previous research and available data on the topic, the case study 
approach suits the objective of this thesis. It allows for an exploration of different aspects of 
Cuba's petroleum sector and takes contextual factors into account. In addition, the emphasis 
on the complementarity of different data collection methods makes the case study especially 
suitable here, as no source of data could single-handedly offer a sufficient amount of data for 
a proper analysis of the phenomenon in question.  
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4.1.2 Research Design     
Case study research possesses no codification of research design that is generally accepted 
and fitting for all cases. This is not to say that design considerations are neglected in this 
approach. On the contrary, the inclusion of certain steps in the research is seen as crucial in 
order to advance from the initial research questions to their concluding answers, and to make 
sure that the evidence firmly address the research questions (Yin, 2009, pp. 25–27). As such, 
Figure 4.1 outlines the main steps of my research design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The research design of this thesis. 
 
The general topic of my thesis was outlined by the ongoing NUPI project “Cuba phase 2: 
Economic and Institutional Reform in Cuba” (NUPI, 2011). I was given the opportunity to 
choose my topic of preference within this framework. After choosing the case of study – 
Cuba’s petroleum industry – I conducted a thorough literature review spanning three broad 
areas: innovation theory, the petroleum industry, and Cuba. The literature review was 
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conducted to identify relevant and well founded research questions. The research questions 
then guided the data collecting procedures, where I found that different sources of data had to 
be accessed in order to increase the validity of the study. As data were collected I organized it 
through transcriptions (interviews), and otherwise by thematic categorization. Finally the data 
was analyzed in order to answer the research questions and address their theoretical 
implications.            
 Although the research design in Figure 4.1 is depicted as a neat process with clear-cut 
stages, in reality the procedure could better be characterized as a process of zigzagging back 
and forth between the different stages as the project proceeded. For example, during the data 
collection process, it became clear what kind of questions that could and could not be 
answered based on the available material. This lead to revisions of the research questions, and 
shifts in emphasis to other parts of the literature than what was originally planned. As the 
research progressed, I increasingly favored a broad approach, aiming at studying the case 
from several different angels and theoretical frameworks.   
 
4.1.3 The Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis in this thesis is Cuba’s petroleum sector. I have chosen not to delimit the 
unit by focusing on a specific part of the system, or a particular stage of the value chain.  
Rather, I have maintained a holistic approach by emphasizing linkages between the 
constituents of the sectoral system, and between the different actors and stages of the chain.  
That being said, I have narrowed the analysis of Cuba’s petroleum sector by choosing 
specific research questions, and by selecting certain theoretical frameworks to guide my 
analysis. As such, certain aspects of Cuba’s petroleum industry; inward transfers and 
domestic capability building have been emphasized at the expense of others features of the 
industry. 
 
4.1.4 Validity and Reliability 
In social research validity and reliability are contested concepts. In what follows, validity is 
understood as “the isomorphism (or otherwise) between the reality studied and the reality 
reported [in a study].”  (Punch, 2005, p. 29). Following Punch (2005), several aspects of the 
concept need to be assessed: how well the data of the study represent the phenomena under 
study (data validity); how well the different parts of the study fit together (overall validity of 
the research); how well the study reflects the real-life phenomenon (internal validity); and to 
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what degree the findings can be generalized to other settings (external validity) (Punch, 2005, 
p. 29).  
Throughout the research process I have sought to address these considerations using a 
variety of measures, as will be discussed in further detail in the sequences below. For now I 
will just address these issues briefly. The issue of the data validity of this thesis is discussed in 
different parts of this chapter. While collecting the data often proved challenging, I discuss 
the measures taken in order to enhance the validity of the data in section 4.5.  
The overall validity of the research has been sought by maintaining a research design, 
recognizing the interconnection of the parts when making changes along the way. The internal 
validity of the study has been sought by applying operational concepts that are well-
recognized in the research community, and by using multiple sources of evidence and 
participant checking where possible.   
On the issue of the external validity of the findings it is acknowledged that N=1 
studies like this one is not fitted to make statistical generalization. However, the findings 
address the theoretical concepts outlined in chapter 2, and might provide certain analytical 
generalizations (Baxter, 2010, p. 96; Kvale, 2007, p. 127; Yin, 2009, p. 43). These will be 
addressed in the concluding remarks of this thesis.  
Reliability on the other hand refers to the consistency of the research, meaning that the 
results of a study could be reproduced by other researchers using the same instruments under 
the same circumstances (Yin, 2009, p. 45). Given that this type of study necessarily involves 
contextualized social interactions, true reliability is difficult – if not impossible – to achieve. 
Nevertheless, I have sought to offer a transparent account of the research process, the choices 
made, and why they were made throughout the chapter. In line with the recommendations of 
Yin (2009, pp. 45, 118-122), I also developed a case study database to enhance reliability 
(Appendix 3).    
 
4.2 SOURCES OF DATA 
In case study research, the high complementary between different sources of evidence are 
emphasized (Yin, 2009, pp. 6–8, 101). The use of different sources of data allows for the 
development of converging lines of inquiry through triangulation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007, pp. 183–5; Punch, 2005, pp. 184, 241; Yin, 2009, pp. 115–16). In this thesis I have 
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collected data from three different source categories: interviews, documentation, and archival 
records.
9
  
 
4.2.1 Documentation and Archival Records 
The findings of this study have relied on a broad range of documentation and archival records. 
They span from annual reports and presentations from different foreign petroleum companies 
operating in Cuba, and non-firm organizations such as Norad and Petrad. I have also reviewed 
statistical data published by the Cuban government, newspaper articles and formal studies 
covering the case under study, as well as internal records.  
Documentation and archival records share many of the common strengths and 
weaknesses as sources of evidence. Their merits include that they are stable over time and 
exist independent of the case study. In addition they are generally exact in their description of 
events, names, and references. They can also cover a broad range of settings and events, over 
a long time-span. Archival records, such as publicly disclosed statistical data also have the 
advantage that they are usually precise and contain quantitative data (Yin, 2009, p. 102). 
Further, documentation and archival records can provide information about settings or their 
contexts, key figures, and organizations which might not be available from other sources. On 
other occasions they may provide corroboration or challenge data from other sources 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 122). 
As for the weaknesses of documentation and archival records, they can be difficult to 
retrieve and access, and selective due to biases of the author or incompleteness of the 
disclosed data. In addition, the purpose or targeted audience of the documents and archival 
records differs from those of the conducted case study (Yin, 2009, pp. 102, 105–6). These 
limitations require the researcher to evaluate the sources thoroughly. The researcher must 
firmly acknowledge that documentation and archival records are social products (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007, pp. 130–33), and assess their authenticity, credibility, representativeness, 
and meaning (Jupp cited in Punch, 2005, p. 185).   
4.2.2 Interviews 
Interviews are commonly regarded as an essential source of case study data, as most case 
studies deal with human affairs or behavioral events (Yin, 2009, p. 108). The strengths of the 
                                                 
9
 Yin (2009, pp. 103, 105) provides an analytic distinction between documentation and archival records. 
Documentation include personal documents in various forms, written reports of events, administrative 
documents, formal studies or evaluations of the same “case”, and different forms of news clippings. Archival 
records are “public use files” such as statistical data, service records, organizational records, maps and charts, 
and survey data.   
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interview method is that it focuses directly on the topics of the case study, and might provide 
detailed data upon which causal relationships and explanations can be inferred (Yin, 2009, p. 
102). In addition, “own opinions and tentative conclusions can be checked, verified, and 
scrutinized.” during interviews (Dunn, 2010, p. 103). On the other hand, interviews can be 
subject to different biases due to poorly articulated questions, response bias, poor recall, and 
reflexivity because the interviewee gives what he or she thinks the interviewer wants to hear 
(Yin, 2009, p. 102).  
As is common in case study research, the interviews conducted in this thesis are more 
in the form of guided conversations than structured queries (Yin, 2009, p. 106). This form of 
semi-structured interviewing is recognized by a certain predetermined order, but is also 
flexible during the course of the interviews (Dunn, 2010, p. 102). After conducting the 
literature review I formulated a general interview schedule that covered all the main research 
themes of this thesis (Appendix 4). I sent the interview guide both to my supervisor and 
contact person in Cuba to ensure that they contained valid and well-formulated questions. I 
also included several secondary questions and prompts connected to each primary question.   
I maintained a certain degree of flexibility in my interview design, however, by 
tailoring the guide to different interview subjects. Here some themes were highlighted 
whereas other sections were downplayed or even excluded from the guide. I always sent my 
interview guide to the subjects upfront in order to prompt thoughts on the themes to be 
discussed (Dunn, 2010, p. 105) and to obtain informed consent. The types of questions were 
primarily of a descriptive nature, aiming at obtaining valid factual information. In this regard 
the interviews might be categorized as factual interviews (Kvale, 2007, p. 71). Other 
questions were formulated to seek the opinions of the interview subjects (See Dunn, 2010, p. 
106), such as their assessment of the main challenges for the development of indigenous 
capabilities in Cuba’s petroleum industry.  
 
4.3 COLLECTING THE DATA  
Based on my literature review the collection of documents and archival records were done 
through key-word searches on digital databases, libraries, or search engines. I relied on a wide 
range of document types. As the process evolved I chose to broaden my search criteria to 
collect a higher amount of documentary evidence. For the main part of the collection process, 
the operating criterion for collection and review of documentary evidence was that it 
addressed the Cuban petroleum industry, its technology policy, institutions or organizations.  
53 
 
As I reviewed the documents and archival sources I picked up key words or references 
that were used in subsequent searches. I also relied on literature tips from informants, my 
supervisors, and other more peripheral persons in the research process. In addition, I received 
some documents from my field trip to Cuba that were not readily available through common 
digital searches (Yin, 2009, p. 103). Further, some of the documents and archival data were 
available in Spanish exclusively. In order to address the language barrier, I took an Internet-
based Spanish course starting in the summer of 2012 and used dictionaries in the process of 
collecting this data. Although Spanish is still far from fluently mastered by this author, I do 
believe it made me able to identify and review these textual sources.  
After reading through the documentary data I systemized their storage thematically in 
digital files on my laptop. Further, I developed a data base of the documents containing 
information about the author(s), title, a concise general description, and its application in this 
thesis (Appendix 3). This was done in order to make the collection of documentary evidence  
thoroughly conducted (Punch, 2005, pp. 252–53); by identifying strengths and weaknesses in 
the data, and to “make the documents readily retrievable for later inspection or perusal.” (Yin, 
2009, p. 120).  
All in all I allocated relatively much time and effort reading and reviewing literature. It 
is my belief that this made more able to establish rapport with the interview subjects by 
producing an informed interview guide, and pose prompts and follow-up questions during the 
interviews.     
The collection of interview data was initiated by a selection of informants based on my 
literature review, seminar-participations, and other background work. Here both central actors 
in Cuba’s petroleum industry and knowledgeable researchers were identified and targeted as 
interview subjects. Additional subjects were targeted by asking people during seminars, e-
mail correspondence, or interviews if they knew of other persons that could be interesting to 
interview about the case. This combination of sampling strategies, termed ‘criterion sampling’ 
and ‘snowball sampling’ respectively, is common in so-called purposive sampling (Patton 
(2002) cited in Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010, p. 75).  
The negotiation process was mainly initiated with a formal letter of introduction by e-
mail. In line with the recommendations of Dunn (2010) I sought to build report by introducing 
myself and establish my bona fides and general purposes of the research project in this phase. 
Further, I explained how I got their contact information, and why I wanted their insights on 
the case. I also attached a tailored interview guide to each of the targets to give an impression 
of the time-scope of the interview (Dunn, 2010, p. 113). The general interview guide was 
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moreover reviewed by my main contact person in Cuba to avoid undermining rapport at this 
stage.  
As experienced by others doing research on Cuba (Plahte, 2010), however, in most 
cases accessing informants turned out to be very difficult to achieve. In particular this was 
experienced during my field trip to Cuba. The petroleum industry in Cuba is considered a 
highly strategic sector where only small amounts of data are publicly available. In the months 
before the trip I had asked several researchers with field trip experience in Cuba for advice 
and contact persons. I also visited the Norwegian embassy in Havana for potential interview 
subjects. While otherwise pleasant they could not offer me any additional contact persons 
than those that were already on my list.  
On the other hand I established contact with a renowned Cuban economist attached to 
the NUPI project, who acted as my main contact person during the stay. This person helped 
me with my interview requests by sending them from his e-mail address, with introductory 
notes about me and the research project. He also provided me with several potential interview 
subjects. As such he also took the role of a gatekeeper in the process of accessing Cuban 
informants. It is my clear impression that I did not experience any surveillance or shepherding 
as can sometimes be exercised by gatekeepers (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 51). On the 
contrary he was willing to provide me with his leverage, knowledge and social network. 
Although this type of interaction always entails some sort of channeling of the research 
project (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 59), I felt that the new lines of inquiry that 
resulted from this interaction contributed to enhance the validity of the study.  
Despite these measures, answers were either non-existent or slow, and did not 
substantiate into interviews before my departure back to Norway. In consequence I had to rely 
on interview subjects that were not part of the daily activities in Cuba’s petroleum industry. 
As previously mentioned, very few external persons have in-depth-knowledge about the 
Cuban petroleum industry, and of the few foreign oil companies that have operated in Cuba, I 
was only able access one, despite repeated requests. This was on the other hand Sherritt 
International, which is the only foreign oil company operating in Cuba today.  
I also contacted Statoil in this process, but since they were not the operator in the 
exploratory drilling well they had limited day-to-day experience with the Cuban petroleum 
sector. The operator of the exploratory well, Repsol, did not respond my requests.   
However, the Norad-led Oil for Development initiative has had a Cuba program since 
2011 which has included seminars and workshops addressing challenges related to deep water 
petroleum activities. Through Norad I managed to contact a senior executive officer involved 
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in the Cuba program. Although I also had scheduled an interview with one of the project 
directors in the Norad-affiliate Petrad, in the end nothing materialized from the negotiation 
process. 
Most importantly, I got an in-depth interview with the Cuban-American oil researcher 
Jorge R. Piñón, who is associate director at The University of Texas at Austin – Center for 
International Energy and Environmental Policy. Judging from my literature review he is the 
most renowned expert on Cuba’s petroleum industry, and knows the people in Cupet – Cuba’s 
state-owned oil company - and petroleum ministry closely. As will become evident in the 
analysis, I relied quite extensively on the research and interview data collected from Piñón. 
Piñón is frequently used as (the only) source and expert on Cuba’s petroleum sector in 
newspapers such as the New York Times, and was otherwise judged as very credible by 
various persons involved in the research process.  
Nevertheless, it has to be stated that the dependence on Piñón is an issue for the data 
and internal validity of this thesis. Throughout the process I sought to counter this by 
triangulating the sources wherever possible, experiencing that they in large correlated highly 
with the evidence collected from other data sources.    
Table 4.1 presents the different interviews conducted in this thesis.  
 
Who When Interview Technique 
Tonje Flatmark Sødal 
Higher Executive Officer, 
Norad 
19.11.2012 Face-to-face with note 
taking, mail correspondence  
Dr. Ricardo Torres Pérez 
Economist  
CEEC 
31.07.2012 
15.01.2013 
28.01.2013 
Face-to-face with note 
taking 
Jorge R. Piñón 
Associate Director 
University of Texas 
15.02.2013 Skype interview with 
audiotape recording 
Sherritt Communications 
Department 
Sherritt International 
05.04.2013 E-mail correspondence, 
answers attached to 
interview schedule 
Table 4.1: Details of interviews conducted in the research project.  
 
As for collection strategies I used several different in this thesis: informal face-to-face 
interviews with note-taking, phone interviews using Skype and the Amolto Call Recorder add 
on, and mail correspondence. I recorded the interviews using either audio-recording or note-
taking, or a combination of the two. Both techniques are associated with different advantages 
and disadvantages. Audio recordings give the interviewer more time to prompt, formulate 
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new questions, and otherwise “maintain the conversational nature of the interview.” (Dunn, 
2010, p. 119). It will also give the most complete recording of the spoken words of the 
interview. On the other hand an audio recorder can also destroy rapport by making the 
informant nervous, and is also associated with certain technical risks (Kvale, 2007, pp. 93–
94). Further, non-verbal data such as gestures and body language are not recorded on audio 
tapes. Note taking can counter some of these risks, but also put a great demand on the 
attention, and general craftsmanship of the note-taker. It also requires good shorthand writing 
skills, although note-taking can help to maintain the concentration of the interviewer, making 
him focus on the essence of what is said (Dunn, 2010, pp. 119–120).   
 In this thesis, audio recording was only used when I made the long distance call to 
Piñón. The interview was conducted with Skype, and automatically recorded through the 
Amolto Call Recorded add on.
10
 The sound file was then uploaded to transcribe.wreally.com 
where I transcribed the interview into textual form.  
 According to Kvale (2007), when assessing the validity of transcripts they “are not 
copies or representations of some original reality, they are interpretative constructions that are 
useful tools for given purposes.” In consequence “there is no true, objective transformation 
from the oral to the written mode.” (Kvale, 2007, p. 98). Instead of asking ‘what is a correct 
valid transcription?’ one should strive to obtain a useful transcription for the purpose of the 
research. As the purpose of this interview was primarily to obtain the subject’s account of 
factual information and characteristics, I did not include any specialized form of transcription. 
I did, however, strive to produce a detailed account of what was said during the interviews, 
including every word that was spoken, with pauses, hyphens and the like.  
In the face-to-face interviews I chose to rely on note-taking as I would not risk 
alienating the subjects and undermine rapport. During these interviews I wrote down the key 
points of what was said, making arrows back-and-forth to connect sections and key-words. 
Immediately after the interview I elaborated on my notes in my note-book while the session 
was still fresh in mind. When I got access to my computer I transferred these notes to digital 
format. This repeating process allowed me to immerse with the data, and served as part of a 
preliminary analysis (Dunn, 2010, p. 121).  
                                                 
10
 As one key informant was situated in the U.S. I chose to do the interview through Skype. Skype charges NOK 
83,97 for a 90 day period of calls to the United States, offering 400 minutes per month. Skype and the Amolto 
Call Recorder add on was tested repeatedly to ensure adequate sound and recording quality before any 
interviews were undertaken. The Skype interviews functioned as regular phone calls where I called to the 
subject’s cell phone, thus minimizing the bias produced with visible audio recorders. Video recordings were not 
produced from these interviews.   
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A third form of interview technique that I applied was so-called asynchronous 
computer-mediated communication, or e-mail correspondence. This was vital all the time 
some of the interviewees were very distantly located. This technique can also help overcome 
social hurdles such as shyness and cautiousness, and is otherwise well-suited for sensitive 
topics. It also allows informants to choose the time of their responses, giving them time to 
produce reflective and detailed answers in written form (Dunn, 2010, pp. 129–130). 
E-mail interviewing has, however, several pitfalls related to “the spatial and temporal 
displacements between the informants and the researcher.” (Dunn, 2010, p. 130). It does not 
provide visual and contextual cues, delays prompts, and makes rapport building challenging 
due to the apparent gaps in communication. The latter point was experienced during this 
research project, when two informants after initially agreeing to answer the questions of the 
interview guide ceased to respond, despite several subsequent reminders. In general, however, 
I did try to address some of these concerns by providing detailed information and a tailored 
interview guide to the interviewees at the initial stages, while posing friendly reminders with 
at least one week in between. Although this type of negotiation often spanned several months, 
I finally received answers from one key source while using this method.  
With the exception of the e-mail interviews, I sent the transcripts or notes that I 
wanted to use in my thesis for clarification and authorizing to the respondents that requested 
this. This process of participant checking (Dunn, 2010, p. 123) marked the final stage of the 
collection of interview data in this thesis.     
 
4.4 ANALYSING THE DATA 
The analysis of the collected documents and archival records was initiated by a process of 
data reduction where I highlighted phrases and key words that could inform the initial 
research questions and theoretical concepts. I chose to categorize the documents and archival 
records thematically in accordance with their topic and main content. While working with 
each document, I extracted the highlighted passages into different documents that sorted into 
new thematic categories. I then made attempts to provide tentative conclusions by addressing 
the research questions and theoretical framework.  
 The coding and categorization of data was by no means a linear process, however. 
Rather, it could be categorized as an act of recursive juggling (Cope, 2010, p. 285). As new 
evidence was collected and evaluated, new categories were established while others were 
altered or rendered obsolete. This process also extended to other part of the research design: 
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new evidence or the lack thereof led to modifications of the theoretical framework and 
corresponding research questions.  
 As an example, early on one of my main research questions concerned how increased 
innovative ability in the Cuban oil sector affected the overall innovative ability of the Cuban 
national innovation system. As it turned out, this research question was scrapped due to lack 
of accessible data, and a wish to focus the analysis more exclusively on the petroleum sector.    
 Similarly to the analysis of documents and archival records, the analysis of interview 
data did not follow any specific analytical method. Here I approached the transcripts 
pragmatically to identify key passages, themes, and opinions. According to Kvale (2007) this 
type of ad hoc analysis, where no systematic mode is followed, is termed bricolage, and is 
common in interview analysis (Kvale, 2007, p. 115). After the transcriptions were made I read 
through the interviews to get an overall impression of the accounts. When rereading them I 
coded by highlighting passages that were of particular value for the purpose of the research, 
identifying key concepts and information. I also divided the different passages thematically to 
see how they connected with my research questions, and how they supported, extended, or 
weakened empirical data from other sources. 
 
4.5 BIASES AND LIMITATIONS 
According to Hammersley and Atkinson’s (2007) account on reflexivity, social research 
cannot be “carried out in some autonomous realm that is insulated from the wider society and 
from the biography of the researcher” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 15). This is 
connected to another epistemological point: that all research methods to some degree are 
subjective and value-laden (Winchester & Rofe, 2010, p. 16). In line with these views I do 
acknowledge that my orientations and values in certain ways have shaped the selection and 
findings of this study. 
 This is not to say that there are no strategies that can be followed in order to reduce the 
bias of a study, however. Yin (2009) states that one test of selection bias is to assess your 
degree of openness to contrary findings (Yin, 2009, p. 72). During the collection and analysis 
process I often encountered evidence that did not fit my presumptions. An illustration of this 
is that I based on my literature review on the petroleum industry expected that Cuba – by 
virtue of being a host state – should be better positioned in the bargaining with foreign oil 
companies than what was concluded to be the case. In this and similar situations I do believe 
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that I have been able to remain open. In addition, the repeated changes in research design can 
be seen as an indicator of this.  
 Nevertheless, according to Ragin & Amoroso (2011) elimination of selection bias 
cannot be achieved by the researcher himself. Only through peer reviews and responses by 
other researchers, now and in the future can this type of bias be recognized fully (Ragin & 
Amoroso, 2011, p. 70). In accordance, I have tried to make this chapter as transparent as 
possible so that others can reflect on the methods and sources that I have selected to reach my 
findings. In addition, persons that were central to the research process, such as my supervisors 
have read and commented on all parts of the thesis.    
 Another type of bias that deserves an own section here is related to access and 
availability of evidence. As commented on, despite spending a lot of time and effort trying to 
collect evidence from different sources, I had in large part to rely on sources not stemming 
directly from Cubans involved in the day-to-day activities of the Cuban petroleum sector. The 
difficulties of access information was not limited to interview subjects, as access to web pages 
of central Cuban organizations were either denied throughout the research period (such as the 
Ministry of Basic Industry), very unstable (the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment), 
contained mainly superficial information combined with ‘dead links’ (the National Office of 
Mineral Resources), or simply did not exist (as in the case of Cupet).  
 Further, a certain share of the collected data was previous studies of Cuba’s petroleum 
sector or Cuba’s energy sector. Such studies are of course subject to the interpretations and 
biases of the author. Again, however, I sought to triangulate the data collected from these 
studies with other sources (Punch, 2005, p. 241; Yin, 2009, pp. 114–18), such as statistical 
data offered by the national statistical office in Cuba, as well as with reports provided by oil 
companies such as Sherritt. I also sought to encounter the relative lack of accessible data by 
making changes in my research design, adjust my ambitions, and formulate new questions 
that could be answered based on the data that was possible to collect.  
As for the documents and archival records that I collected while on my field trip in 
Cuba or gathered from Cuban web pages, I was guided by the evaluation of Plahte (2010): 
“Generally, Cuban sources should be regarded as quite reliable. […] Any manipulation of 
information by the government seems to take place by selection of released facts, rather than 
by distortion and fabrication of data.” (Plahte, 2010, p. 69).  
As stated, I also spent a lot of time assessing the trustworthiness of key informants by 
discussing their bona fides with other persons central in this thesis project, and by evaluating 
their works and citations in renowned publications. Finally, when I had to rely on 
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documentary data in the form of previous formal studies, I checked their number of citations 
in other research to access their impact and trustworthiness where this was available.  
All in all, by being part of a larger and established research project, where I was given 
the opportunity to use the project framework, network, local contacts and partners, I feel that 
the validity of the work has been considerably enhanced. This made it possible for me to 
check the trustworthiness of key informants and sources with persons central in the thesis 
project, obtain a clearer contextualized understanding of Cuba, while being able to discuss my 
interpretations and findings with experienced researchers from various fields.  
 
4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS   
As social research involves collecting data from and about people it also involves ethical 
considerations (Punch, 2005, p. 276). Ethical considerations are institutionally regulated in a 
number of ways. Some ethical considerations are clear from the outset, such as the deliberate 
publish of made-up data, plagiarizing, the deliberate mistreatment of research participants, 
and concealment (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011, p. 81). Other principles, such as safeguarding the 
privacy and confidentiality of the subjects, their informed consent, and avoiding their harm 
might, however, be less clear-cut in social contexts. As such, although important, ethical rules 
and committees have been criticized as being too rigid, and incompatible with the variable 
and unpredictable nature of social research (Dowling, 2010, p. 30; Ragin & Amoroso, 2011, 
p. 95).  As such ethical considerations are often left to be worked out by the researcher 
throughout the research process (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011, p. 91). 
The notion of critical reflexivity – a process of constant, self-conscious scrutiny of the 
self as researcher and of the research process – is a crucial conduct in this regard (Dowling, 
2010, p. 31), and has been an important demeanor of mine throughout the research process. I 
have also done my utmost to respect the persons involved in this research by seeking to obtain 
the informed consent of the interview participants, offering anonymity, citation-checks and 
the right to deny tape recording if desired. The interview guide was attached to every request I 
sent to possible participants, which in addition to the aforementioned offerings informed 
about the purpose and future availability of the research.       
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
As was discussed in section 3.1.1 and 3.2.2 in the context chapter, Cuba has for long periods 
been dependent on large, cheap, and stable supplies of petroleum from abroad. This has been 
crucial for both the energy security and overall welfare of the island state. Two highly 
advantageous trade agreements stand out in this regard.  
First, with the trade of Cuban sugar in exchange with cheap crude oil from the Soviet 
Union, which lasted until the collapse of the latter. Second, through the barter agreement 
signed in October 2000 with Venezuela, which is still in place. Here, Cuban healthcare and 
other services are exchanged with Venezuelan crude oil and petroleum products. To date, the 
barter agreement with Venezuela provides Cuba with the almost all of its petroleum imports, 
estimated to be in the range of 100,000 bbl/d (J. Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 
2013).  
In between the two beneficial agreements, and illustrating Cuba’s dependence on 
foreign beneficiaries, was a period of economic crisis where Cuba’s energy consumption was 
sharply reduced and rationalized. Frequent blackouts caused by the lack of supplies to the 
heavily petroleum dependent electricity grid caused civil unrest. In this period, Cuba’s 
petroleum sector was opened for foreign participation to increase domestic petroleum 
production.  
 Although the trade agreements with the Soviet Union and Venezuela have been 
essential for Cuba’s energy security and economic welfare, the country also has a long history 
of small-scale domestic petroleum production. Scattered around the country are numerous 
surface manifestations of oil, and in the decades before the revolution a number of exploration 
wells were drilled in the area surrounding Jatibonico in the central parts of Cuba, as well as in 
areas close to the north coast of Havana (Amaro & Tenreyro, 2007). The discovered fields 
were small, however, and yielded no more than a total 600 – 800 bbl/d at the eve of the 
revolution in 1959. After the nationalization of the petroleum industry, exploration efforts 
were continued, building on documents and maps made by U.S. companies, which had 
previously owned and operated the industry. To organize the efforts, Cuba established an own 
petroleum institute in 1961, the Instituto Cubano del Petróleo (ONRM, 2013a). 
During the 1960s, exploratory efforts yielded meager results. In fact, it was not until 
an agreement was signed with the Soviet Union in the exploration and production of oil that 
major fields were discovered, starting with the Varadero oil field in 1971 – Cuba’s largest to 
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date (Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). Throughout the 1970s- and 1980s domestic production 
levels picked up. In 1986 the levels were 3.3 times higher than in 1978, and 12 times higher 
than in 1956 (Castellón, 2004).  
Nevertheless, from 1988 on, production levels decreased, caused among others by 
increased shortages of equipment and instruments, specialized technical resources, and delays 
in investment programs as the relationship with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate. In 1991 
domestic oil production was no more than 11,671 bbl/d, and vastly exceeded by the 
corresponding consumption; 203,670 bbl/d (Figure 5.1). In relation, a cash-strapped Cuba 
opened its petroleum sector for foreign participation in 1993, with the goal to reduce imports 
and increase domestic production levels.  
 
 
* Total oil production: production of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas plant liquids, and other 
liquids, and refinery processing gain (loss).  
** Consumption of petroleum products and direct combustion of crude oil  
Figure 5.1: Cuba’s domestic production and consumption of oil, 1980-2011, bbl/d (Based on data from EIA, 
2012b).
11
 
  
5.2 THE BASIS OF CUBA’S RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER 
In the following sections I present the basis of Cuba’s relative bargaining power versus 
foreign oil companies. As stated in section 2.3 and 2.5 of the theoretical chapter, the relative 
                                                 
11
 Due to the long time scale, the numbers here are retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA). Corresponding and retrievable numbers from the Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de Cuba that are 
publicly available on the web only covers the years 1990, 1995, 2000-2011 (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de 
Cuba, 2011).  
0
50
100
150
200
250
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
Domestic Oil Production*
Domestic Oil Consumption**
63 
 
bargaining power of a host state is theorized to be an important determinant in the distribution 
of economic rents and for accessing inward transfers. Accessing technology and knowledge 
from foreign oil companies investing in its petroleum sector is of particular importance for 
Cuba, given its lack of access to multinational financing sources, and limited access to 
bilateral credit.  
Most of the analysis considers Cuba’s basic entry factors, arguing that the 
attractiveness of Cuba’s petroleum resources is the most imperative factor for Cuba’s 
bargaining power at this stage of the sector’s development.  
 
5.2.1 Basic Entry Factors 
The bargaining power model (see section 2.3) proclaims that host states need to hold a 
sufficient amount of attractive resources to enter and negotiate in bargaining processes with 
foreign oil companies. Petroleum resources vary in terms of reserve size, longevity, and 
profitability.  
 Cuba’s oil and gas discoveries to date have mainly been found in small and medium-
sized fractured carbonate reservoirs in the North Cuba Fold and Thrust Belt, along a 200-by-
15-kilometer stretch off the northern coastal and onshore region between Havana and 
Corralillo, North-East of Montebo (Figure 5.2). Due to their high levels of complexity and 
heterogeneity, recovering petroleum from these types of reservoirs is considered to be very 
challenging (Schlumberger, 2008).   
 
 
Figure 5.2: Cuba’s oil zones with oil and gas fields (Presented in Portela, 2012). 
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Cuba does not publish data on petroleum reserves, but the country’s proved crude oil reserves 
are estimated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) to be at 120 million 
barrels, ranking the island state with the 62
nd
 largest proved oil reserves worldwide (Table 
5.1). Cuba’s proved natural gas reserves are estimated to be 2.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf), the 
54
th
 largest in the world (Table 5.2). Most of the oil from the main oil fields is 9 to 12 degree 
API gravity heavy crude oil with a large content of sulfur and heavy metals.  
 
2011 Proved Crude Oil Reserves by Country 
(billion barrels) 
>200 Saudi Arabia (262.6); Venezuela (211.2) 
100-200 Canada (175.2); Iran (137.0); Iraq (115.0); Kuwait (104.0) 
50-100 United Arab Emirates (97.8); Russia (60.0) 
25-50 Libya (46.4); Nigeria (37.2); Kazakhstan (30.0); Qatar (25.4) 
10-25 United States (23.3); China (20.4); Brazil (12.9); Algeria (12.2); Mexico 
(10.4) 
<10 80 countries, including Angola (9.50); Norway (5.67); and Cuba (0.12) 
0 (none) 117 countries 
Table 5.1: List of countries by proved crude oil reserves, 2011, (Adopted from EIA 2013b). 
 
2011 Proved Natural Gas Reserves by Country 
(trillion cubic feet) 
>1,000 Russia (1,680); Iran (1,046) 
300-
1000 
Qatar (896); United States (305)  
200-300 Saudi Arabia (296); Turkmenistan (265); UAE (228) 
100-200 Nigeria (187); Venezuela (179); Algeria (159); Iraq (112); Australia 
(110); Indonesia (106) 
50-100 Kazakhstan (85); Malaysia (83); Egypt (77); Norway (72); Uzbekistan 
(65); Kuwait (64); Canada (62);  Libya (55) 
10-50 Approx. 15 countries, including Angola (11) 
1-10 Approx. 30 countries, including Cuba (2.5) 
Table 5.2: List of countries by proved natural gas reserves, 2011, (Adopted from EIA, 2013c). 
 
The combination of Cuba’s reserve characteristics and heavy crude oil make extraction and 
processing a real challenge. As a consequence, current recovery rates are estimated to be at a 
low seven percent of proved reserves (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). Further, the 
characteristics of the crude leave Cuba’s refineries, largely equipped with Soviet technology, 
unable to process it. In consequence the domestic oil is largely burnt directly as crude for 
electricity consumption in Cuba’s thermoelectric power plants (Nerurkar & Sullivan, 2011). 
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For these reasons, Cuban domestic crude is sold at a discount of common reference 
products and crude oils produced in other countries. According to the Canadian private oil 
firm Sherritt International (2011), which is the only foreign oil firm with petroleum 
production in Cuba today, the average realized sales price per barrel of oil produced in Cuba 
was US$ 68.47 in 2011, up from US$ 52.24 the year before. In comparison, the corresponding 
numbers for U.S. Gulf Coast Fuel Oil No. 6 – a refined product marketed along the U.S. Gulf 
Coast – were US$ 95.41 and US$ 69.76 respectively. The numbers for Brent crude oil – 
which is of higher quality than the Cuban crude – was US$ 112.14 and US$ 79.89 (Sherritt 
International Corporation, 2011). 
Still, characteristics about heavy oil reservoirs, such as generally long field lives 
coupled with enhanced recovery technologies make heavy oil development more attractive 
today than in previous decades, at current world oil prices at some US$ 100 per barrel.  
Cuba’s onshore and coastal crude oil production reached its peak in 2003 and has 
stabilized around 50-55,000 bbl/d (including some natural gas liquids) in recent years. Its 
natural gas discoveries to date have been associated natural gas found within the crude oil 
reservoirs. The production of natural gas peaked in 2007 with some 20-21,000 barrels of oil 
equivalent a day (boe/d), and has decreased somewhat since. According to the EIA (2012b) 
“any additional increases in production [of crude oil and associated natural gas depends] upon 
the discovery of substantial new reserves" (EIA, 2012b). This statement is also supported by 
the Canadian oil company Sherritt International.  In its fourth-quarter 2012 report the 
company states that its gross working-interest production in Cuba for 2013 is expected to be 
some 11 percent lower than in 2012 due to natural reservoir declines (Sherritt International 
Corporation, 2012a). This is also in line with trends from the past few years (Sherritt 
International Corporation, 2011).  
 Apart from Sherritt’s concession to block number 7 (Figure 5.3), another four foreign 
companies held a total of 10 onshore and coastal blocks in Cuba as of 2009 (Piñón & 
Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). Among these, only preliminary seismic work has been conducted. 
The exception to this is Russia’s Zarubezhneft, which currently conducts exploratory drilling 
in the deep shelf oilfields off Cayo Coco (coastal block L, Figure 5.3). Zarubezhneft also 
holds concessions in block 9 (onshore), and block III (in the offshore transition zone). The 
drilling in block L began in late 2012, with the results expected to be presented in mid-2013. 
The total investment levels of Zarubezhneft’s drilling are estimated to be at US$ 126 million 
(Cuba Standard, 2012; Zarubezhneft, 2011). 
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  It is the deep offshore blocks in the Gulf of Mexico that seems to be the most 
promising area for substantial petroleum reserves. The area lies in the same geological strata 
as the petroleum-rich Mexican and U.S. Gulf. Here, Cuba’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
covers a 19,000 km
2
 area with an average ocean depth at approximately 2000 meters (Figure 
5.4). A U.S. Geological Survey report estimates a mean 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered oil 
and a further 9.8 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of undiscovered natural gas along Cuba’s North Belt 
Thrust (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008). According to the same report, the high-end potential 
of the same area is estimated to be 9.3 billion barrels of oil and 21.8 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas.  
If certified as recoverable, the undiscovered offshore reserves would rank Cuba among 
major Latin American petroleum producers such as Colombia and Ecuador. The report 
contains the only hard geological data that publicly exists of Cuba’s petroleum potential in its 
EEZ. However, the real potential might be even bigger when other parts of the EEZ are 
included (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 10). Cuba’s own estimates of the whole area has 
been reported to be as high as 20 billion boe (Voss, 2011).  
Operating at these depths is very expensive and carries high geological and technical 
risk. Industry experts anticipate that a crude oil price of more than US$ 65 per barrel must be 
in place before any deepwater projects would be financially worthwhile (Simpkins, 2013). 
The Cuba North Coast Deepwater project would take from two to three years to bring into full 
development, with an estimated total cost of US$ 1 billion to US$ 3 billion (Piñón & 
Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010).  
Despite the uncertainties and high-cost prospects, however, Unión Cuba-Petróleo 
(Cupet) had by the end of 2009 cosigned 21 of the 59 deep-water blocks in the EEZ, with nine 
more completed by mid-2011. Since 2009 crude oil prices have grown significantly, and are 
today in excess of US$ 90 a barrel (see Appendix 2), making deepwater projects potentially 
very profitable.    
Exploratory drilling so far has been sobering, however. In 2004 Repsol YPF from 
Spain drilled the first exploratory well within the EEZ. The well confirmed a system of high-
quality crude oil, but was considered noncommercial (Reuters, 2008). During 2012 three 
additional wells were drilled, using the semi-submersible rig Scarabeo 9
12
: first by Repsol in 
consortium with Norway’s Statoil and a unit of India’s ONGC in May; then by a subsidiary of 
Malaysia’s Petronas and Gazpromneft of Russia in July; and lastly by PDVSA of Venezuela 
                                                 
12
 The rig contains less than 10 percent U.S. components, thereby avoiding the triggering of U.S. sanctions.   
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in October. Of these three it was reported that the second well hit an active petroleum system 
but that the discovery was not commercially viable (Orsi, 2012b). The first and third well 
came up dry (Orsi, 2012a, 2012c). 
In the aftermaths of the dry well both Repsol (Repsol’s Chairman Antonio Brufau to 
BBC News, 2012) and Statoil left Cuban waters. ONGC still holds two independent blocks, 
and is currently searching for partners to share the high costs (Franks, 2012a).  In 2011 
Petrobras also decided to withdraw from its block due to discouraging seismic results, and a 
wish to concentrate more exclusively on Brazilian reserves (Frank, 2011). Other companies 
with block concessions seem either incapable of being operator of such deepwater projects, or 
have dubious financial resources (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010).  
   
5.2.2 International Context  
As noted in section 3.2.1 in the context chapter, the international context has generally 
favored the relative bargaining power of host states since the turn of the millennium. This was 
also in place on the initial stages of domestic petroleum sector development in Norway and 
Angola, arguably strengthening the relative bargaining position of these countries.   
Over the past 10-15 years increased industry competition has left host states in a better 
position to play foreign oil companies against each other, and the high oil prices have left host 
states less dependent on foreign participation to increase efficiency. Further, the perceived 
scarcity of petroleum resources, combined with a resurgent resource nationalism, and a high 
concentration of remaining resources have all favored the relative bargaining position of the 
host states (Vivoda, 2011).   
A by-product of the international developments during the past 10-15 years has been 
that oil companies, both private and public, have increased their efforts to search for and 
produce hydrocarbons in peripheral areas, such as in heavy crude oil onshore reservoirs or 
deepwater areas. As such, an estimated total of US$ 2 billion have been spent in Cuba’s 
upstream oil and gas sector between 1991 and 2010 (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). 
Further, a reported US$ 700 million have been spent in exploratory works offshore Cuba 
during the past decade (Gibson, 2013). In addition, one of the oil companies that drilled an 
exploratory well in the EEZ was the national oil company of Cuba’s close political and 
strategic ally, PDVSA of Venezuela. At a first glance, then, one might expect that the 
international context is very favorable for Cuba indeed. 
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 As pointed out in the section above, however, large sunk cost in exploration efforts 
and an otherwise favorable international context did not prevent leading oil companies like 
Repsol, Statoil, or Petrobras from leaving Cuba when oil was not discovered. Further, the 
strategic relationship Cuba enjoys with Venezuela is severely restricted in at least one crucial 
point. As with the Cuban petroleum sector, the Venezuelan industry is exclusively onshore-
based. Thus PDVSA has very limited offshore experience. In fact, the exploratory well it 
drilled off Cuba last year was the first offshore well ever drilled by the Venezuelan company. 
In the foreseeable future then, with the disappointing results from 2012, no exploratory wells 
will be conducted in Cuba’s EEZ, neither by PDVSA nor by any other foreign oil companies 
(J. Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013).  
To sum up, although Cuba by virtue of being a host state enjoys a favorable 
international context, this seems to have been limited to making Cuba’s prospected offshore 
resources attractive enough to explore for oil. It did not, however, prevent leading oil 
companies to leave when the prospects decreased during 2011 and 2012.  
 
5.2.3 Host Country Context 
If the current international context favors host states, and to a point also Cuba in that it has 
made exploratory drilling in its EEZ more attractive, domestic factors in Cuba generally seem 
to disfavor Cuban relative bargaining power. There are a number of reasons for this 
interpretation.  
First, the model predicts that if the petroleum sector is of high strategic importance for 
the host country, foreign oil companies are expected to find themselves in a relatively weak 
bargaining position because the host state is more prone to intervention. As will be further 
discussed in section 5.3, the petroleum sector is one of Cuba’s prioritized sectors, with the 
country depending on liquid fuels for 85 percent of its power production – the bulk of which 
is secured through the favorable agreement with Venezuela (Belt, 2010).
13
 To achieve the 
goal of increased domestic production (Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, 
2011), Cuba depends heavily on the resources of foreign oil companies, particularly offshore. 
For Cuba then, the strategic importance of the sector does not seem to increase its relative 
bargaining power. Rather, Cuba depends on attracting their participation in order to achieve 
the goals that made the sector strategic in the first place: energy security, and economic and 
social welfare.  
                                                 
13
 According to British Petroleum statistical review from 2012 oil and other liquids remains the leading fuel with 
33.1 percent of global energy consumption, with natural gas at 23 percent (British Petroleum, 2012). 
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 Further, the model predicts that the level of economic development of a country is 
expected to reflect its level of absorptive capacity (Vivoda, 2011). If a country possesses 
actors with high levels of absorptive capacity, it is expected to be better suited to recognize 
new information, assimilate it, and apply it for commercial ends. This is thought to increase 
the relative bargaining power of the country. While Cuba is a developing country, the country 
has long emphasized the role of competence in scientific and technological fields for 
economic growth and social welfare. As such, it is commonly noted that Cuba scores 
relatively well on most indicators of human capital (Brundenius & Göransson, 2011; 
Brundenius, 2009; Domínguez, 2012; Jover, Arriete, Ones, González, & Cuavas, 2011).  
 The expectation that host states are in a better bargaining position due to their ability 
to recognize, assimilate, and apply new information for commercial ends is of course the idea 
that is expanded on through the circular causality model proposed in the theoretical chapter 
(Figure 2.5). As will be further discussed in section 5.4, actors in Cuba’s petroleum sector 
seem to possess a significant degree of absorptive capacity. As stated, however, in upstream 
operations this is largely confined to onshore and/or coastal activities. 
 As such, it was in the onshore sector that the scrapping of the Canadian oil company 
Pebercan occurred. To my knowledge, this is the only published occurrence of such an 
incident in Cuba’s petroleum sector. This was in 2009, when Cuban authorities, through 
Cupet, terminated the product sharing agreement it had cosigned with Sherritt’s Montreal-
based partner Pebercan Inc., nearly ten years before the contract’s termination date (Feinberg, 
2011; Havana Journal, 2009a). While the exact causes of the early termination have yet to be 
commented on by Pebercan or Cupet, it seems to have involved severe payment difficulties on 
the part of Cupet for the crude oil produced by Pebercan on Cuban soil.  
By 2009, however, Pebercan had transferred all of its contractual operations to 
Sherritt, and was in practice relegated to the role of a silent financial partner in upstream 
operations on the island. In 2009 then, Cupet did not seem to be dependent on the unique 
resources of Pebercan as an oil company. To state that this was in fact due to the absorptive 
capacity of actors in the Cuban petroleum industry is, however, stretching it far. The 
operations of Pebercan were transferred to Sherritt, another foreign oil company, and not to 
Cupet.   
 Further, the political and cultural context of host states, including its attitude towards 
foreign participation are expected to mediate bargaining power. The ambiguity of Cuban 
authorities towards FDI are well-documented (Feinberg, 2012; Villanueva, 2012). On the one 
hand Cuba offers a fair amount of incentives through its foreign investment law. In the 
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petroleum industry this is also expressed through a commercially very favorable product 
sharing agreement offered to foreign participants. On the other hand, the top national 
leadership was long very suspicious towards foreign capital, and orthodox factions in both the 
government and Communist Party have revealed their enduring distrust in the Guidelines 
(Feinberg, 2012). Foreign actors in the petroleum sector have not been sheltered from this, as 
illustrated by the Pebercan incident.
14
  
In relation, the country has received less favorable risk assessments from various 
strands. According to Coface (2013), Cuba scores unfavorable both in terms of risk 
assessment and business climate assessment. Of the factors contributing to the high risk 
environment is Cuba’s economic dependence on Venezuela, its limited access to foreign 
finances, and the U.S. embargo (Coface, 2013). The Economist Intelligence Unit 
characterizes the investment climate in Cuba somewhat more favorable, but categorizes it 
among countries with a questionable capacity and commitment to honor obligations, and a 
patchy payment record (EIU, 2013).  
 Of the foreign oil companies with the most substantial involvement in Cuba today, 
Sherritt and Zarubezhneft, both acknowledge risks related to their Cuban investments. Sherritt 
(2011) lists risks such as fluctuations in official or convertible exchange rates and high 
inflation rates; changes in political attitudes toward foreign investments; environmental risks 
represented by hurricanes and tropical storms; and the possible inability of the Cuban 
government to fulfill its payment obligations to the company (Sherritt International 
Corporation, 2011). Zarubezhneft (2011) adds that the absence of an independent court 
system, and limitations on business and private property contribute to the high risks 
associated with conducting business in Cuba (Zarubezhneft, 2011). Again, the Pebercan case 
is illustrative, showing that “when the Cuban state falls seriously into debt with an 
international partner, it may choose to close it down and wrap the arrears into a broader deal 
liquidating all assets.” (Feinberg, 2012, p. 34).   
 To what degree the risky business climate have made the Cuban petroleum sector less 
attractive for foreign oil companies, and thus reduced Cuba’s relative bargaining power, is 
difficult to assess due to the general lack of accessible data on the subject. It did not, however, 
discourage a broad range of foreign oil companies to bid for concessions and conduct 
                                                 
14
 Although Sherritt have also experienced payment delays, it received US$74.1 million of the US$ 140 million 
that Pebercan received in the settlement, “as its share of the proceeds in respect of its interests in Block 7.” 
(Sherritt International Corporation, 2012b). The Pebercan incident has not deterred Sherritt from further 
investing in Cuba’s petroleum sector, however. In 2011 the company completed seven development wells, and 
prepared applications for additional blocks for future exploration (Sherritt International Corporation, 2011). 
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exploratory activities in Cuba’s EEZ when the prospects for significant petroleum discoveries 
were perceived to be high. 
 Other host state contextual factors seem less ambiguous, however. In terms of host 
country size and size of local markets (both of which are predicted to increase host state 
relative bargaining power if they are large), none of these benefits Cuba. With a population of 
some 11 million producing a nominal GDP of US$ 68.715 billion, the per capita GDP is at 
US$ 6,106, ranking the country as number 88 of 195 countries according to the United 
Nations (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). The dire economic situation – amplified 
by severe difficulties in accessing external finances – makes Cuba very dependent on 
attracting FDI (Villanueva, 2012). All of this suggests a lower relative bargaining power for 
Cuba. 
 To sum up, contextual factors associated with Cuba as a host state, although difficult 
to firmly assess, seem generally much less favorable than the international factors described 
above. Cuba is very dependent on the resources of foreign oil companies, particularly in 
offshore operations. The spurring of domestic petroleum production is especially important in 
Cuba, where the petroleum and power sector are highly interlinked. The ambiguous attitude 
towards FDI and a risky investment climate are also suggested to reduce Cuba’s relative 
bargaining power, although in Cuba’s case the risks were not so high as to have prevented 
significant levels of interest and investment.  
 
5.2.4 The U.S. Embargo 
One factor that does not readily fit the bargaining power framework is the risk represented by 
the U.S embargo (see section 3.1.4). This puts Cuba in a special position compared with other 
countries. Again, Sherritt (2011) notes that the U.S. embargo represents a significant risk, and 
that “the threat of potential litigation discourages some potential investors, lenders, suppliers 
and customers from doing business with Sherritt.” (Sherritt International Corporation, 2011, 
p. 60). Further Zarubezhneft (2011) states that 
 
[t]he most considerable risk for the company’s projects in the Republic of Cuba is the existing 
economic blockade on the part of the USA that negatively affects the cost and project implementation 
periods. Finally, it may have a negative effect on total profitability and the period of the projects’ 
implementation in the Republic of Cuba. (Zarubezhneft, 2011, p. 28).      
 
As for the exploration efforts in Cuba’s EEZ, the combination of deep depths and the U.S. 
embargo made exploratory drilling especially challenging. Currently, only the Scarabeo drill-
rig, which was leased during 2012, is able to drill at these depths without provoking U.S. 
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sanctions. According to Jorge R. Piñón, the challenges posed by the U.S. embargo contributed 
to making the exploratory drillings of 2012 on average 15-18 percent more expensive than 
comparable operations in the US Gulf Coast (J. Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 
2013). Further, by denying companies with engagement in Cuba to access the highly 
competitive U.S. oil service and equipment market, as well as its huge consumer market, any 
oil company with petroleum discoveries in Cuba will have a hard time monetizing it (Piñón & 
Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010).  
 Again, however, Cuba’s possible petroleum resources in the EEZ were perceived to be 
attractive enough to invest a substantial amount of time and costs to hire the Scarabeo 9 to 
avoid triggering U.S. sanctions, from a broad range of major foreign oil companies. Whether 
further exploratory efforts would have been conducted without the U.S. embargo, both 
offshore and onshore is difficult to assess due to the lack of data. Nevertheless, U.S. 
companies, which have expressed wishes to invest in Cuba (Gorman, 2004), are closed off.  
 
5.2.5 Summary: Cuba’s Relative Bargaining Power 
The rationale behind assessing the basis of Cuba’s relative bargaining power is that it was 
theorized as a prerequisite for accessing foreign petroleum industry knowledge and 
technology. As such, this section has sought to identify opportunities and barriers for Cuba in 
accessing these assets.   
 Cuba’s basic entry conditions – its proved and possible petroleum resources – have 
attracted a number of foreign oil companies to sign concessions, both for onshore, coastal, and 
offshore blocks. Its proved resources are small compared with most petroleum countries, 
however, and production to date has stemmed from onshore or coastal fractured carbonate 
reservoirs, containing mostly heavy and sulfur-rich crude. By and large, Cuba’s proved 
reservoirs are small in an international context, and in natural decline.  
 Cuba’s greatest potential of substantially adding to its petroleum resources lies 
underneath the seabed of the deepwater areas of its EEZ. If the estimated reserves located 
here are certified as recoverable, it would rank Cuba among major Latin American producers; 
while lowering its dependence on subsidized petroleum imports. Exploratory drilling so far 
has failed to provide commercial discoveries, however, and judging by the pull-out by major 
companies such as Repsol, Petrobras, and Statoil the commercial interest of the area has 
decreased significantly during the last few years. As a result, exploratory drilling in the area is 
currently postponed indefinitely.  
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 Presently then, (if one is to attribute all foreign activity exclusively to the resources of 
a country, while ignoring factors such as investment risk), Cuba’s petroleum resources attract 
considerable investments in upstream operations from only two companies. Of those only 
Canada’s Sherritt is producing oil and gas, while Russia’s Zarubezhneft conducts exploratory 
drilling in coastal waters. Offshore, where Cuba has the highest probability of being in a 
relatively strong potential bargaining position, actual bargaining agreements have failed to 
manifest whatsoever. The overall attractiveness of Cuba’s basic entry conditions, then, are 
perceived as low compared to those of most other petroleum producing countries.   
 In consequence, one might suggest that international and host country contextual 
factors do not seem to play any substantial role for the relative bargaining power of Cuba, 
simply because – disregarding the small-scale onshore and coastal resources – there is not 
much to be bargaining about. As shown in the context chapter, the prerequisite for inward 
transfers in Norway and Angola was of course that prospects of substantial petroleum 
resources were in place, and subsequently discovered.  
 While this might be true, international and host country factors were also crucial for 
the successful facilitation of inward transfers in those countries. At the initial stages, both 
countries benefitted from a favorable international context resembling many aspects of the 
situation today. Domestically, both countries – although differing substantially on most 
indicators – managed to offer what was perceived to be a sufficient investment climate in the 
eyes of the foreign oil companies.
15
  
 For Cuba as well, international and host country factors will be crucial for the future 
prospects of the petroleum sector when and if additional discoveries are made. In addition, 
although the onshore- and coastal resources are small compared to those of most petroleum-
endowed nations, in the small and developing country-context of Cuba they provide 
substantial possibilities in many respects: for increasing profits and energy security; for 
accessing foreign technology and knowledge; and for building capabilities if petroleum is 
found in larger quantities in the future.    
 As such, although Cuba’s petroleum reserves today are limited, the only offshore area 
that has been explored to some extent is along the North Belt Thrust close to the mainland. 
Further, at least two of the four exploratory wells that were drilled in Cuba’s EEZ were not 
dry, but characterized as ‘non-commercial’. In comparison, as stated in section 3.3.3 of the 
                                                 
15
 While not as sincere as the risks associated with investing in Angola, risk was also a concern for foreign oil 
companies investing in Norway in the late 1960s. Here, risk was connected to the perceived socialism of the 
Norwegian government (Ryggvik, 2010, p. 71).  
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context chapter, it took a total of 32 exploratory wells before any major fields were 
discovered off the coast of Norway. As expressed by Jorge R. Piñón: “I’m still optimistic that 
Cuba will be able to find commercial oil reservoirs offshore. How much, how big, that I think 
is too early.” (J. Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013).   
 Stating it differently, there are still possibilities for major petroleum discoveries in the 
future, and with that; for accessing the industry know-how and technology held by foreign oil 
companies. In the international context, factors such as increased industry competition, 
exceptionally high oil prices, a perception of petroleum scarcity, and a high degree of 
resource nationalism and resource concentration have contributed to this. As a result, 
peripheral areas such as the deepwater areas of Cuba’s EEZ have become more attractive in 
the eyes of most oil companies. As such Cuba has seen considerable levels of FDI spent in its 
offshore oil and gas sector during the past two decades. Again, however, the favorable 
international environment did not prevent major oil companies to pull out from Cuba when 
the exploratory work failed to produce commercial discoveries. For Cuba then, one might say 
that the favorable international context rendered its basic entry conditions more attractive, 
making exploratory drilling possible, but that this was of little significance when petroleum 
was not discovered. 
 If future discoveries are to be utilized, however, host country contextual factors should 
also favor Cuba’s relative bargaining power. As suggested by the empirical analysis; in 
general, this does not seem to be the case. While the strategic importance of the petroleum 
sector is high, the sector has depended heavily on the resources of foreign oil companies to 
increase production, and will continue to do so in the future. This will particularly be the case 
for upstream operations offshore, where Cuban actors have little experience, and requirements 
of capital, technological know-how, and managerial skills are much higher than in 
corresponding operations onshore.  
 Further, Cuba’s size, the size of its domestic market, as well as its high dependence on 
FDI for the well-being of its economy all point to a disfavoring of Cuba’s relative bargaining 
power. The same is suggested for the unfavorable risk assessments – which also involve the 
U.S. embargo – and the ambiguous policy of the Cuban authorities towards foreign 
investment and participation. Regarding the latter points, however, it was noted that these 
factors have not been so unfavorable as to preclude investments in the sector whatsoever.  
 From these considerations, it might be possible to reach an answer to the first sub-
research question of this thesis: 
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 What is the basis of Cuba’s bargaining power versus foreign oil companies? 
 
The empirical material suggest that, despite a favorable international context, Cuba’s limited 
level of proved resources and the unsuccessful exploratory work done in its EEZ, paired with 
a high dependence on the resources of foreign oil companies and an otherwise unfavorable 
host country context, form a basis of weak relative bargaining power for Cuba versus foreign 
oil companies. This is particularly the case in offshore operations where, even though the 
resource potential is highest, commercial discoveries are yet to be proved, and Cuban 
capabilities are the most limited.  
 As will be further discussed in section 5.3.1, the weak relative bargaining power of 
Cuba seems to be reflected in the favorable product sharing agreement offered to foreign oil 
companies interested in investing in the petroleum sector of the island state. Nevertheless, as 
seen in the cases of Norway and Angola, a high dependence on the resources of foreign oil 
companies did not preclude the access to, and facilitation of substantial inward transfers and 
domestic capability building in the petroleum sectors of these countries. 
   Of course, the successful development of the petroleum sectors of these countries 
would not have been possible without the discovery of substantial amounts of petroleum 
resources. While Cuba’s onshore and coastal reservoirs are in general decline, exploratory 
drilling in Cuba’s EEZ is postponed indefinitely. Cuba’s access to the knowledge and 
technology held by the foreign oil companies are limited by these facts. Still, substantial 
offshore reservoirs might be discovered in the future, which will leave Cuba in a better 
potential relative bargaining position. In addition, while existing onshore- and coastal 
reservoirs seem to be in general decline, the exploratory drilling currently made by 
Zarubezhneft off Cayo Coco might produce significant results.  
As argued in section 2.5 of the theoretical chapter, whether and to what degree Cuba 
will be able to utilize these resources depends on its interest in, and ability to facilitate inward 
transfers to domestic actors, while simultaneously develop the abilities of these actors to 
assimilate and exploit the transfers. As shown in the cases of Norway and Angola, these 
considerations figured high on the petroleum technology policy agenda in both states, the 
result of which – increased domestic capabilities – have contributed greatly to increased 
relative bargaining power, inward transfers, and the acquisition of economic rent in these 
countries. 
    
76 
 
5.3 CUBA’S PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
In the following sections I map out the main components of Cuba’s petroleum technology 
policy. As stated in section 2.5 of the theory chapter, the technology policies of a host state 
plays a crucial role for the nature and facilitation of inward transfers. Two aspects are 
highlighted in this regard: (i) Cuba’s policy towards foreign participation in the sector since 
the beginning of the 1990s; and (ii) whether there exists a policy of domestic capability 
building through inward transfers and domestic support.  
 
5.3.1 Outward Orientation 
After the abrupt ending of bilateral relations in the beginning of the 1990s, Cuba reexamined 
its policy towards foreign investments in order to increase the role of FDI in its economy.  As 
noted, attempting to attract FDI made sense because Cuba lacked access to multinational 
financing sources, and had only very limited access to bilateral credit due to its foreign debt 
(Villanueva, 2012). In consequence, Cuba established the Escuela Cubana de Negocios in 
1992. The rationale behind the establishment was outlined in three general principles: (i) to 
offer legal guarantees to foreign partners that took the risk of investing in the country; (ii) to 
conquer new international markets; and (iii) to develop and access new technologies from 
abroad (Cuban petroleum industry source). By accessing new markets, capital, and 
technology Cuba was to embark on the development path and reduce the gap to frontier 
countries.  
 At the national level the outward orientation was institutionalized with Law 77 of 
1995 and Resolution 5290 of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, both still 
in effect (MINCEX, 2013; Villanueva, 2012). In relation, the petroleum sector was early on 
targeted and opened up for foreign investment. A total of 33 onshore and coastal blocks were 
opened for bidding in 1993, followed by 59 offshore blocks in the Gulf of Mexico Economic 
Zone in 1999 (Figure 5.3 and 5.4).  
 Attracting FDI into the petroleum sector has continued to figure high on the Cuban 
political agenda. In a 2012 list of portfolio projects available for foreign investment issued by 
the Ministerio del Comercio Exterior y la Inversión Extranjera (MINCEX), onshore and 
offshore projects in the petroleum industry are included and emphasized (MINCEX, 2012). In 
particular, projects to explore for petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico Economic Zone have been 
of special importance (Villanueva, 2012). Further, U.S. participation has been explicitly 
welcomed on a number of occasions (Hernanez Perez, cited in Wayow, 2011).  
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Figure 5.3: Cuba’s onshore and coastal blocks with concessions of foreign oil companies as of 2010, (Cuba 
Standard, 2010, map courtesy Jorge R. Piñón).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Cuba’s offshore blocks with concessions of foreign oil companies as of 2010,  (Cuba Standard, 
2010, map courtesy Jorge R. Piñón). 
 
All of Cuba’s blocks are offered for bidding to foreign oil companies through a so-called 
product sharing agreement (PSA, see Appendix 1), which is a common contractual agreement 
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accepted by most oil companies in the petroleum industry today. Under its PSA, Cupet 
awards the rights to a third-party contractor to explore for and produce hydrocarbons within 
one of the blocks for a given period of time. The third-party contractor is the joint venture 
enterprise established between the Cuban government entity and the foreign oil company, and 
is responsible for supplying all capital, equipment, installations, technology, and personnel 
required to carry out the operations as outlined in the contract (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 
2010). 
According to the MINCEX (2012) Cuba requests investments in the range of US$ 15 
and US$ 20 million in onshore and coastal blocks from foreign contractors. The 
corresponding requests in offshore blocks are between US$ 160 and US$ 180 million 
(MINCEX, 2012). The large upfront investments can be recovered through so-called cost oil 
(see Appendix 1), however, if oil or gas is found in commercially viable quantities. Once 
costs have been recovered, the remaining oil – or ‘profit oil’ (see Appendix 1) – is divided 
between Cupet and the foreign contractor in agreed proportions as outlined in the PSA. In the 
case of Sherritt this amounts to 45 percent of the remaining production once costs have been 
recovered (see table 5.3). The contractor’s share of oil production can be exported in kind or 
sold to Cupet according to an agreed-upon price formula. In the case of Sherritt: “All of 
Sherritt’s oil sales in Cuba in 2011 were to an agency of the Government of Cuba.” and “The 
pricing for oil produced by Sherritt in Cuba is based on Gulf Coast Number 6 reference 
prices.” (Sherritt International Corporation, 2011, p. 27).  
As for the associated natural gas, the foreign partner does not receive any allocation of 
the production, but is entitled to recover all production costs. Further, the contractor generally 
pays taxes of 25 percent of personnel salaries and 30 percent on net profits to the Cuban 
government (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). The PSA that Cuba offers provides the 
foreign investor with attractive terms and is characterized as commercially very favorable 
(Belt, 2010; J. Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013.
16
 Overall the institutional 
framework surrounding foreign participation in Cuba’s petroleum sector can be characterized 
as favorable for the foreign partner, an interpretation supported by the Russian oil company 
Zarubezhneft (2011) stating that “Cuban law “On foreign investments” gives foreign investors 
the opportunity to receive significant benefits.” (Zarubezhneft, 2011). 
                                                 
16
 The PSA that Cuba is offering has in fact been characterized as “much more commercial than the one from 
Venezuela or other countries”. (Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2103). For a comparison with 
other countries, see Appendix 5).  
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 Judging by its formal institutional framework, then, Cuba has carried out a high degree 
of openness in its oil sector since 1993. As stated in section 5.2.2 estimates from 2010 suggest 
that Cuba has seen close to US$ 2 billion of foreign investment spent in its upstream oil and 
natural gas sector alone (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010), contributing to a seven-fold 
increase in domestic production (Figure 5.5 and 5.6).  
 
 
* Including diluents.
17
 Numbers reported by the ONE is given in metric tons, and a weighted average conversion 
factor of 6.35 barrels per ton has been selected here.  
Figure 5.5: Cuba’s crude oil production, 1990, 1995, 2000-2010, bbl/d (Author compilation, based on data from 
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de Cuba, 2011).   
 
                                                 
17
 Cuban crude oil is too vicious to be easily pumped or transported by pipeline and/or marine vessel. Typically, 
naphtha, condensate, or other diluents are added to improve the viscosity of the crude oil.  
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Figure 5.6: Cuba’s natural gas production, 1990, 1995, 2000-2010, bbl/d equivalent (Author compilation, based 
on data from Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de Cuba, 2011). 
 
 
As discussed in section 5.2.3, however, Cuba’s policy towards FDI has generally been 
encumbered with ambiguity (Feinberg, 2011, 2012; Villanueva, 2012). In the petroleum 
industry this is perhaps best illustrated with the aforementioned scrapping of Pebercan Inc. in 
2009, a contract that was originally set to last until 2018. Nevertheless, and judging by the 
numerous co-signings of block licenses with various foreign oil companies in recent years, the 
Pebercan incident should not be interpreted as a general withdrawal from Cuba’s openness 
towards foreign participation in the sector. Again, Pebercan had by 2009 transferred all of its 
contractual operations to Sherritt (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). Stated differently, 
whatever role Pebercan had played in providing Cuba’s petroleum sector with foreign 
technology, capital or access to markets had been taken over by Sherritt.
18
  
 Cuba’s outward orientation has not been limited to investments from foreign oil 
companies in the exploration and production of oil. As part of the diversification of its 
international economic relations, the island state has reached out to forge economic relations 
with states in Europe, Canada, and – over the last decade – to major emerging economies like 
China, Brazil, and Venezuela.  
                                                 
18
 As stated in section 5.2.3, however, it have been argued that this reveals a pattern, showing that “when the 
Cuban state falls seriously into debt with an international partner, it may choose to close it down and wrap the 
arrears into a broader deal liquidating all assets.” (Feinberg, 2012, p. 34). Although Sherritt have also 
experienced payment delays, it received US$74.1 million of the US$ 140 million that Pebercan received in the 
settlement, “as its share of the proceeds in respect of its interests in Block 7.” (Sherritt International Corporation, 
2012b). 
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In particular, the close relationship with Venezuela has been extremely favorable in 
that it both narrows down Cuba’s bulging foreign exchange shortfalls (Feinberg, 2012), and 
maintain the financial sustainability of the heavily crude oil-dependent power sector (Belt, 
2010). Depending on the international market price of crude oil, Cuba sends healthcare and 
other services to Venezuela as barter for 40-50 percent of the market value of the roughly 
100,000 it receives a day. The remaining 50-60 percent is treated as a loan and financed for 25 
years at one percent interest rate (J. Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013).
19
 In 
effect, the barter agreement subsidizes Cuba’s energy consumption by supplying Cuba with 
two thirds of its petroleum consumption, and close to all of its petroleum imports. With oil 
prices at above US$ 100 a barrel, it would cost Cuba close to US$ 3.7 billion a year if this oil 
were to be bought on the open market. In other words, the deal provides Cuba with a subsidy 
equivalent to a US$ 2-3 billion a year in annual cash infusion. For a country with merchandise 
exports of US$ 3-4 billion a year this is a very significant amount.  
 The special relationship that Cuba has enjoyed with Venezuela since the beginning of 
the 2000s has coincided with an increased favoring of fewer and state-owned foreign 
investors (Villanueva, 2012). At first glance the favoring of state-owned companies seems to 
apply to the petroleum sector as well.  Judging by the groups of foreign oil companies with 
block concessions in Cuba (Figure 5.3 and 5.4), only Sherritt and Repsol are privately owned. 
The rest of the companies are either wholly owned by their respective home countries, or the 
home country is the major shareholder. Whether this has been a deliberate policy on the part 
of the Cuban government is difficult to conclude on, however. The only company with 
petroleum production in Cuba today, Sherritt International, is privately owned. Further, the 
company with the largest investments (Allen, 2012; Franks, 2012b) to date offshore, Repsol 
YPF, is also private.    
 
5.3.2 Inward Transfers 
Cuba has favored FDI as a measure to access foreign technologies and other knowledge-
related assets as part of its outward orientation. The creation of a favorable formal 
institutional environment has contributed to a dramatic increase in domestic production of 
crude oil and associated natural gas. Several important technologies have been introduced in 
Cuban onshore and coastal upstream operations since the opening of the sector. Among the 
technologies introduced in Cuba’s onshore and coastal upstream operations since the 
                                                 
19
 Other agreements have also been made, both with Venezuela and other countries, as will be discussed in 
section 5.3.     
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beginning of the 1990s are horizontal and bi-horizontal drilling technologies, auger drill bits, 
pumping units, seismic equipment, and enhanced recovery methods.  
 The facilitation of inward transfers to domestic actors seems to be institutionalized 
through the PSA. As stated, here the third-party contractor – or joint venture enterprise 
between the Cuban state entity and the foreign oil company – is responsible for supplying 
capital, equipment, installations, technology, and personnel needed to carry out the 
operations. As such, Cuba awards the right to explore and produce hydrocarbons at its soil to 
foreign oil companies, while seeking to create linkages and inward transfers between the 
foreign contractor and the domestic entity – which is Cupet – through the joint venture. 
 Much of the new technology stems from joint ventures with Sherritt in upstream oil 
and gas production, and in gas processing and distribution. Sherritt’s petroleum reservoirs in 
Cuba are located in shallow and coastal waters, but close enough to the coast to access the 
reservoirs using directional drilling technology from onshore locations. In 2005, a Sinopec 
subsidiary, Great Wall Drilling Co., signed a service contract with Cupet to provide a number 
of bi-directional drilling rigs and other service equipment to be leased in conjunction by 
Sherritt and Cupet (Oil & Gas Journal, 2005; Reuters, 2005). Bi-directional rigs allows for 
drilling vertically and then horizontally or at an angel to access coastal reservoirs, and are 
currently used by Sherritt and Cupet in block 7. Sherritt has also implemented enhanced 
recovery technology to optimize the production of heavy oil in Cuba (Sherritt International 
Corporation, 2011), aiming at increasing recovery rates up from the current 7 percent.   
 Sherritt is also in a joint venture named Energas S.A. with Cupet and Unión Eléctrica 
– Cuba’s state owned power enterprise – in the processing and distribution of associated 
natural gas found within domestic crude oil reservoirs (Sherritt International Corporation, 
2011). The Energas joint venture, where Sherritt supplies all capital, technology and finances, 
has allowed for utilization of natural gas into power gas turbines. Otherwise the raw natural 
gas would have been flared at the reservoir sites, creating pollution and un-utilized (Sherritt 
Communications Department, personal communication, April 5, 2013). Sherritt has also 
introduced combined-cycle turbines at facilities in Varadero, which greatly enhances 
efficiency, while the same technology is to be installed at Boca de Jaruco. In 2011, Energas 
produced 1,853 GWh of electricity, representing some 11 percent of Cuba’s electricity 
production (Sherritt International Corporation, 2011). The gas-fired facilities established 
under the Energas has contributed to a drop in the dependence of oil and other liquid fuels for 
energy production from 93 percent of the total, to 85 percent in recent years (Belt, 2010). 
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 In 2009 Cupet concluded a number of PSA’s with the Russian national oil company 
Zarubezhneft, which among others has led to exploratory drilling in block L. In 2011 another 
PSA was signed for pilot works, field follow-up exploration, and use of secondary enhanced 
recovery methods on the Boca de Jaruco field, one of Cuba’s largest. According to estimates 
made by the Russian company the introduction of these technologies, using steam and thermal 
well treatment to reduce viscosity will allow for an increased recovery factor from 6 percent 
during 30 years of development to 36 percent in the next 25 years (Zarubezhneft, 2011). 
Further, through its company branch in Cuba, Zarubezhneft is performing annual transfers for 
the education of Cuban personnel in the framework of realization of the oil exploration and 
production project in block L (Zarubezhneft, 2011). 
These are all examples on how Cuba has managed to create linkages and access 
inward transfers based on the attractiveness of its petroleum resources. This has often been 
sought through partnerships with foreign companies – in particular Sherritt International. 
Through joint ventures such as the Energas, employees in project activities have benefited 
from additional training in the operation and maintenance of the facilities (Sherritt 
International Corporation, 2011). Joint venture training programs such as this one is of 
particular value for the Cuban workforce, as the technologies applied here are generally not 
available through purely “domestic” activities (Cereijo, 2010). 
To what extent the linkages created with foreign companies have contributed to 
increased capabilities among domestic actors in the petroleum sector is difficult to assess. As 
will be further discussed in section 5.4.1, however, in 2011 Cupet produced the bulk of 
Cuba’s total crude oil production independently, in considerably larger quantities than the 
total levels of 1991. According to Piñón and Benjamin-Alvarado (2010) Cupet has also 
conducted exploratory work without foreign assistance in different areas east of Havana Piñón 
& Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). Further, during my interview with Jorge Piñón, he stated that:  
 
they have learned a lot from Sherritt […] So the capabilities of Cupet from a technical point of view are 
good, but limited to the production of onshore and/or coastal reservoir of heavy oil, period. (J. Piñón, 
personal communication, February 15, 2013).     
 
In a rare statement cited in the Oil & Gas Journal (2007), Carlos Lage Davila, a 
former member of Cuba’s Politburo and secretary of the Council of Minister’s Executive 
Committee, stressed that Cuba was increasingly able to service their own (onshore based) oil 
and gas industry. This also seems to be in line with another source, which states that many of 
the introduced technologies have been rapidly assimilated by the experienced Cuban 
84 
 
petroleum workforce (Cuban petroleum industry source). Lage Davila further stated that the 
country had twelve drilling rigs, allowing for control of wells belonging to Cupet, and to lease 
rigs to foreign companies. “We have five machines to repair wells [and] another two for the 
cementing process. All this shores up our own capacities, and it is something that we must 
continue to make progress on.” (Carlos Lage Davila, cited in Oil & Gas Journal, 2007).  
Judging by these statements, domestic capability building has been a recognized 
priority by Cuban authorities. Further, inward transfers of technology, industry know-how, 
and managerial skills has been sought and successfully assimilated through cooperation with 
foreign oil companies, of which Sherritt has been the most prominent.   
In offshore operations, where Cuba has much less experience, transfers in the form of 
local employment, where Cupet engineers and rig workers come and work on the exploratory 
rigs seem to have been more prominent than technology transfers (J. Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013).  However, there seem to have been side agreements that 
if production ever came on stream, technology transfers and additional training would take 
place. “But that would not take place before oil was found.” (J. Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013). This also lends support to the view that sufficient basic 
entry conditions need to be in place before any such demands might materialize through a 
bargaining process. 
 Cuba does enjoy a favorable relationship with Venezuela on the other hand. Cupet and 
PDVSA share a number of onshore heavy oil projects, including the upgrading of the 
Cienfuegos refinery which will be discussed in section 5.4. None of these are in production, 
however. Thus, the transfer of knowledge and technology between actors in the petroleum 
sectors of the two nations is limited to onshore heavy oil, and in refining in particular (J. 
Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013).   
Further, Cuban administrative and technical staff has attended courses in petroleum 
policy and resource management, and petroleum development operations held by the 
Norwegian Norad affiliate Petrad. Through the Oil for Development Programme Norad shares 
the Norwegian experience in petroleum sector management. By Cuban request, Norad and 
Cuba signed an agreement in 2011 for three annual workshops and seminars to be held until 
November 2013 (Norad, 2012). The economic framework for the program is relatively small 
compared with those of other countries. According to Petrad (2013), however, a workshop on 
local content is to be held in June 2013 (Petrad, 2013), signifying Cuba’s aim to increase local 
participation in the sector.      
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Despite the mentioned linkages, Cuba’s access to international petroleum industry 
knowledge networks generally seems very limited:  
 
Remember that today we learn with other companies and you need to learn from Statoil, Petrobras, 
Shell and we do that because we talk to each other and we do that because we have joint ventures, we 
go to congresses, we work together, we have the Halliburton’s and the big companies, and that whole 
network is really where you get a lot of hands on experience. Cupet doesn’t belong to that network. (J. 
Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013). 
 
This is not just because of the U.S. embargo. In principle Cupet could go to Europe or initiate 
joint ventures with world leading companies such as Shell, but is restricted because Cuba 
lacks the money, offshore expertise, and projects to join such networks (J. Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013). In consequence, this means that Cuba’s chances to 
facilitate inward transfers and linkages abroad is by and large limited to companies investing 
in its petroleum sector – which is off course dependent on  petroleum discoveries at Cuban 
soil – and through its strategic cooperation with Venezuela – which is limited to onshore 
heavy oil operations.  
After his ascendance to presidency, Raúl Castro soon travelled to countries such as 
Brazil, Algeria, Russia, and Angola (Havana Journal, 2009b), all notable oil producers and 
exporters. The trips were allegedly made to expand on its international petroleum networks, 
and reduce its dependence on imports from Venezuela: 
 
Because what he was afraid of – and they’re still concerned today by the way, every time I go to Cuba I 
hear the same thing and they recognize this. They said that we have again put all of our oil eggs in one 
basked like we did during the 1980s, that we relied on the Soviet Union, and when it disappeared one 
day we found ourselves without oil. And they have done the same thing today. (J. Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013).  
 
 
Cuba has not managed to negotiate any foreign ventures in the production of oil, however, 
with the exception of a five percent share in a small onshore block in Angola (EIA, 2013a). 
Allegedly this was a favor by the MPLA government who was assisted by Cuban forces 
during the civil war of the mid-1970s.  
 
5.3.3Domestic Linkages 
Assessing to what degree Cuban policies promote domestic capability building by for 
example providing a system of supporting institutions and non-organizations is difficult due 
to limited information. It is clear, however, that Cuba has delegated considerable efforts to 
enhance the role of science and technology in the fulfillment of national development goals. 
In effect, Cuba has been able to develop a highly qualified labor force in many areas 
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(Domínguez, 2012; Sáenz, 2008). In addition, Cuba has since the first years of the Revolution 
placed special efforts in the search for petroleum (Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). 
As stated in section 5.1, the Instituto Cubano del Petróleo, established in 1961, had oil 
exploration as one of its main objectives. In its initial years the Institute, which made up the 
domestic petroleum-related knowledge base at the time, had little but two Cuban geologists. 
The science and technology work, such as the geological mapping of the main island, as well 
as the practical field search was directed by geologists and geophysicist from the East Bloc. 
Likewise, Soviet equipment was used in the processes and transferred at very favorable credit 
terms (Sáenz, 2008). Apart from the knowledge and technology transfer invested in Cuban, 
Cuban geologists and geophysicist were also sent to the Soviet Union for learning. Within 20 
years Cuban specialists were capable of exploring for oil gas independently (Sáenz, 2008). 
Still, the lack of equipment and spare parts, deterioration of specialized technical 
resources, and delayed investment programs beginning in the late 1980s had severely strained 
domestic capabilities by the beginning of the 1990s. According to one estimate, no less than 
an average of 90 percent of domestic production during this decade stemmed from fields 
reopened by foreign oil companies  (Castellón, 2004). In 1998, however, eight of the 18 wells 
that were drilled were done with Cuban resources and included horizontal drilling technology 
(Castellón, 2004). The successful integration of foreign practices and technologies could not 
have been achieved without qualified domestic technical personnel. Of the 21,000 Cuban 
workers in the petroleum industry in 2004, more than 2000 held a technical degree from 
Cuban universities (Castellón, 2004).  
As stated in section 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 in the context chapter, Cuba developed a formal 
national system of innovation during the economic hardships in the mid-1990s. The petroleum 
sector does not seem to be integrated in this system in any systematic and comprehensive 
way, however.
20
 Nevertheless, in 1994 Cuba’s Ministry of Basic Industries (MINBAS) 
completed a study aimed at identifying technological demands in different state enterprises 
located under the MINBAS umbrella. At the same time various technological possibilities 
offered by scientific and technological centers were mapped out. The results of the project, 
named Integrated Management and Financing of the S&T Activity in the Ministry, was 
implemented in 1995 (Sáenz, 2008). Here, strategic objectives in the Ministry were turned 
into projects that could be taken up by research groups. For the petroleum sector, enhanced 
                                                 
20
 Of the articles that I have reviewed (Jover et al., 2011; Jover & Arriete, In Press.; UNESCO, 2010) which 
consider Cuba’s NIS contains no explicit mention of the petroleum sector.  
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recovery rates of the heavy crude oil and the utilization of associated natural gas for power 
production were the most notable projects.  
Through the building of linkages between domestic state enterprises and research 
organizations that this project represented, it might be argued that a domestic Sectoral 
Petroleum System of Innovation had begun to emerge. It was not an exclusive petroleum 
system of innovation, however, as the MINBAS was in charge of a number of additional 
industries such as nickel and renewals.  Further, with respect to the two projects above, both 
were only achieved through the participation of foreign oil companies.  
  
5.3.4 Summary: Petroleum Technology Policies 
As stated in the previous summary section (5.2.5), even though Cuba’s relative bargaining 
power seems low, this does not preclude successful facilitation of inward transfers and 
domestic capability building if substantial discoveries are made in the future. At the same 
time it was argued that the facilitation of such processes heavily depended on Cuba’s 
petroleum technology policy.    
 The empirical evidence suggests that, since the beginning of the 1990s, Cuba has 
favored a high degree of openness toward foreign participation in the sector. This was part of 
a broader change in the technology policy of the country which aimed at increasing the level 
of FDI in the economy. In the petroleum sector, this line of policy was targeted at attracting 
the participation of foreign oil companies to increase domestic production of oil and gas. This 
was especially pressing, as consumption vastly exceeded domestic production and the access 
to cheap oil from abroad was cut.  
 The shift in policy orientation was formally institutionalized through the legal 
framework on the national level, and in the commercially favorable PSA that Cuba offers 
foreign oil companies interested in exploring and producing petroleum in one of the country’s 
onshore, coastal, or offshore blocks. Since the opening of the sector, production of oil and gas 
has increased seven-fold since 1991.     
 In general, however, it has been noted that while the institutional framework seems 
favorable towards FDI, Cuba has led an ambiguous policy on the matter (Feinberg, 2012; 
Villanueva, 2012). In the petroleum sector this is perhaps best illustrated by the Pebercan 
incident. On the whole, however, and judging by the recent cosigning of a number of foreign 
oil companies, this incident does not seem to have been part of a broader withdrawal from the 
openness-oriented policy.       
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 In addition to the openness towards foreign participation, Cuba actively seeks to 
establish linkages with foreign oil companies to expand on the knowledge and technological 
base of its domestic actors. The interactions between Cuban state enterprises and foreign oil 
companies are structured through the PSA, where the third-party contractor – or joint venture 
enterprise between the Cuban state entity and the foreign oil company – is responsible for 
supplying the capital, equipment, installations, technology, and personnel needed to carry out 
the operations. As such the PSA is the main instrument of which Cuba facilitates inward 
transfers.  
 Through the joint ventures, a number of technologies such as bi-directional drilling 
rigs and enhanced recovery methods have been introduced. The training programs and 
involvement with new technologies have provided Cuban workers with greater opportunities 
to delve into DUI modes of learning. Further, the Cuban education system seem by and large 
to supply manpower capable of assimilating most of the introduced technologies in own 
operations. Most importantly, this has enabled Cupet to significantly increase its independent 
petroleum production since 1991. 
 Apart from the foreign oil companies investing in the petroleum sector and the 
strategic relationship with Venezuela, however, Cuba’s access to foreign petroleum industry 
technology and knowledge – in particular the international knowledge network of various oil 
industry actors – is very limited. This is not just because of the U.S. embargo, which prohibits 
U.S. companies to engage in business activities in Cuba, but also because of Cuba’s own lack 
of financial resources, attractive projects, and offshore expertise. Given the current economic 
situation, accessing these networks depend on major petroleum discoveries, of which chances 
after 2012 seem to have diminished significantly.  
 The details of Cuba’s technology policy towards increasing linkages and enhancing 
the absorptive capacity of domestic petroleum sector actors are difficult to assess due to the 
data limitations on the subject. Nevertheless, the top national leadership has long emphasized 
the role of science and technology to spur economic and social development. Although the 
petroleum sector does not seem to be part of the formally established national system of 
innovation in any comprehensive and formal way, efforts to develop and expand on the 
domestic petroleum industry knowledge base have long figured high on the political agenda.  
 The expansion of the knowledge and technology base has, however, since the 
establishment of the Instituto Cubano del Petróleo been dependent on the participation of 
foreign actors. This was first secured through the strategic relationship with the East Bloc 
89 
 
(ONRM, 2013b; Sáenz, 2008), and since the beginning of the 1990s through a less 
discriminatory range of foreign oil companies.  
 This is not to say that efforts to enhance linkages between domestic actors have been 
generally neglected. During the 1990s efforts were also made to build linkages between 
domestic research organizations and state enterprises under the MINBAS umbrella. Some of 
the projects, such as the utilization of associated natural gas for electricity production and 
enhanced crude oil recovery rates, focused exclusively on enhancing capabilities in the 
petroleum sector. While the exact contribution of Cuban research entities to provide STI-
based solutions to these and other challenges seem limited (see also section 5.4.1), the 
identification and targeting of these projects nevertheless appear to have played an important 
role to their solution: attracting and facilitating inward transfers from abroad, in these 
particular projects from Sherritt International. 
 From these considerations, two main points might be extracted to answer the second 
sub-research question: 
 
 What are the main components of Cuba’s petroleum technology policy? 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Cuba has favored a high degree of openness to the 
participation of foreign oil companies in its petroleum sector.  
 This line of policy was chosen in order to spur domestic production of petroleum. 
Through the participation of foreign oil companies, inward transfers and domestic capability 
building have been actively sought. In the onshore-based petroleum sector, such inward 
transfers have been successfully facilitated and contributed to increasing the domestic 
capabilities among domestic actors in various activities.  
 How this has affected Cuba’s relative bargaining power could not be assessed due to 
the lack of data on the details of Cuba’s contractual agreements with foreign oil companies 
since the opening of the sector. While it seems highly likely that actors in Cuba’s petroleum 
sector have increased their capabilities in various areas, not least in upstream operations, a 
comparison between different contracts over the timespan between the opening of the sector 
and the present time would have been necessary to assess any circular causality in the Cuban 
case.  
 To my knowledge, Cuba does not offer a different PSA regarding its offshore blocks, 
where Cuban actors are less capable. Rather, they seem to have sought and managed to 
achieve agreements on inward transfers if production ever came on stream, but the rate and 
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nature of these transfers could not be assessed. Further, regarding the offshore blocks the 
relative lack of capabilities might have been offset by the comparably higher perceived 
attractiveness of these blocks.  
 
5.4 THE VALUE CHAIN OF CUBA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR 
This section seeks to map out the different actors, activities, and linkages along Cuba’s 
petroleum sector value chain. This is done in order to assess the main characteristics of the 
chain, its sources of value creation or lack thereof, as well as to further explore in what ways 
Cuba’s openness toward foreign participation has facilitated inward transfers and domestic 
capability building.   
 
5.4.1 Organizational Structure 
To begin with, in Cuba the whole value chain – from the production of hydrocarbons, via 
processing, distribution and logistics, as well as marketing and sales – is in the hands of the 
state or state-controlled enterprises. As such, the cautious acceptance of private initiatives 
seen in recent years does not apply to activities in the petroleum sector.  
 The organizational structure of the sector is centralized, with the top national 
leadership in charge of entry regulations, targeting goals, outlining laws, and generating 
sectoral policies. A recent restructuring in the ministry performing state duties in the 
petroleum sector resulted in the newly established Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) 
(Cuban News Agency, 2012). The MEM replaced the old Ministry of Basic Industries 
(MINBAS). While the MINBAS was in charge of a vast range of industries, the MEM is to 
concentrate only on petroleum, electric power, and mining. According to Granma (2013), this 
was done to rationalize the activities of the Ministry for the promotion of energy security, and 
economic and social progress (Granma, 2013). 
 Under the Ministry, the Oficina Nacional de Recursos Minerales (ONRM) plays a 
major role in the regulation, supervision, and control of petroleum activities. The goal of the 
ONRM is to secure rational use mineral resources, and to exercise state control over geology, 
mining and petroleum activities. According to its own web page the ONRM was transferred to 
the new Ministry, with all its functions and powers (ONRM, 2013c). The ONRM is also in 
charge of hosting an international geology conference held in Havana every second year, 
where one section is specifically concerning petroleum geology systems (Geociencias, 2013). 
Under the ONRM is also the Escuela Superior de la Industria Basica which provides training 
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programs for managers and technical staff in the industries (Cuban petroleum industry 
source).  
 Under the new arrangements, the national oil company Cupet is still likely to be 
responsible for all up-, mid-, and downstream value-added activities, including in liquefied 
natural gas and basic petrochemicals. It is also likely to be accountable for its own 
international activities (Piñón, 2010). Through its commercial arm, Cupet is in charge of 
developing and entering into contracts and ventures with foreign oil and service companies 
(Unión Cuba-Petróleo, 2008). Foreign companies interested in exploration and production 
activities must, however, obtain a qualification certificate from the ONRM (Figure 5.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Organizational structure for the regulation of exploration and production activities in Cuba’s 
petroleum sector.  
 
Included in Cupet are several smaller companies with activities in petroleum engineering and 
projects, pipelines, storage, maintenance, and assembly (Unión Cuba-Petróleo, 2008). Under 
the umbrella of Cupet is also a petroleum research center, named Centro de Investigaciones 
del Petróleo (CEINPET). The objective of CEINPET is to conduct applied research, 
technological innovation, and advice in order to boost petroleum industry development. The 
institute appears to have had some success in developing technology for treatment of 
contaminated soils, in lubricants development, and related areas. Its scale and overall 
contribution to the creation and diffusion of new innovations and technologies appear limited, 
however: “The research institute is very poor […] they really play more the role of a 
laboratory. It’s not a research institute that you and I would know it.” (J. Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013).   
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5.4.1 Upstream 
As stated, Cuba has 33 onshore blocks open for bidding, of which eleven were leased by 
foreign oil companies in 2010. Except from Cupet and Sherritt, the only substantial 
exploratory work that is conducted today is by Russia’s Zarubezhneft. Zarubezhneft is 
currently leasing the Sogna Mercur drilling rig and explores for oil and gas in the deep shelf 
oilfields off Cayo Coco. The results of the exploratory drilling will not be presented until mid-
2013.
21
 Other foreign oil companies with onshore and coastal concessions have to date only 
conducted seismic works in their blocks. Thus the major actors in Cuba’s upstream onshore 
and coastal industry today are Cupet and Sherritt International, the latter through production 
from onshore and coastal reservoirs within block 7. As shown in section 5.3.1 Cuba’s 
domestic production has leveled at some 70,000 boe/d.  
Much of the crude oil production results from the PSAs between the two, using 
directional drilling technology from onshore locations targeting coastal reservoirs one to five 
kilometers from shore (Piñón, 2010). Sherritt reported in its 2011 financial statement that 
gross working-interest production (production shared between Sherritt and Cupet) amounted 
to 20,888 bbl/d, which represented approximately 43 percent of Cuba’s total crude oil 
production (Table 5.3). 
 
PRODUCTION AND SALES  
DAILY PRODUCTION VOLUMES (bbl/d) 
For the years ended December 31    2011  2010  Change  
Gross working-interest oil production in Cuba * 20,888  21,204  (1%)     
Net working-interest production    
Cuba (heavy oil)      
 Cost recovery     3,430  3,910  (12%) 
 Profit oil     7,856  7,218  9% 
 Total      11,286  11,128  1% 
* Gross working-interest oil production is allocated between Sherritt and Cupet in accordance with production-
sharing contracts.  
Table 5.3: Sherritt’s production and sales in Cuba, 2011, 2010, including cost recovery and profit oil (Adapted 
from Sherritt International Corporation, 2011, p. 43).   
 
                                                 
21
 Although the exploratory work conducted in Cuba by Zarubezhneft is in deepwater areas, the blocks leased by 
Zarubezhneft is categorized as a coastal block. Further, these activities are not part of the EEZ and not as deep as 
the exploratory wells drilled here in 2004, and 2012. 
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Of this production, Sherritt’s share - or net working-interest production (which equals sales 
volume) - was 11,286 bbl/d. Production costs were US$ 12.07 per barrel whereas the realized 
sales price was US$ 68.47, suggesting that even with fractured and heavy oil reservoirs, a 
significant economic rent can be achieved in Cuba’s onshore-based petroleum sector. All of 
Sherritt’s oil sales go to a Cuban government agency. The realized price is a discount off US 
Gulf Coast fuel oil No. 6 (which 2011 average price was US$ 95.41) due to the low quality of 
the crude. The annual gross profit earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) were US$ 235.9 million – a 33 percent increase from the year before, 
primarily due to higher market prices for oil (Sherritt International Corporation, 2011). 
According to my calculations, this leaves Cupet with an independent production of 
27,688 bbl/d and a total of 37,290 bbl/d when the production from the PSA with Sherritt is 
included.
22
 Cupet sells its petroleum production to the national electrical power company, 
Unión Eléctrica. In contrast with the oil sold by Sherritt, these prices are not reported and do 
not reflect world prices. It is, however, heavily subsidized in order for the cash-strapped 
Unión Eléctrica to be able to buy the oil. The electricity enterprise sells its generated 
electricity to end-users at lower prices than the costs of production. All of this make the 
efficiency of this part of the value chain low and difficult to measure (J. Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013).   
 Cupet and Sherritt have also established a highly successful joint venture along with 
Unión Eléctrica in the production and processing of associated natural gas, launched in 1997. 
The ownership of the venture is equally split between the three. The objective of the venture 
is to convert flared gas from the oil fields into fuel through a combined-cycle process, 
allowing Cuba to make use of the associated natural gas for on-site power generation plants. 
The process entails removing sulfur from the crude oil, utilizing the associated gas to fuel 
power turbines. Sherritt’s role in the venture is to bring finance, capital and technology, 
whereas Cupet supplies the gas at no charge. Unión Eléctrica buys the power from the plants.  
In 2011 Energas produced 1,853 GWh of electricity, which represented approximately 
10 percent of Cuba’s electricity production. The total capacity of the facilities stands at 356 
MW, up from 173 MW in 2004. Plans to construct a new and expanded power facility at Boca 
de Jaruco have been initiated, and is expected to be operational in the first half of 2013. This 
will expand the power generation capacity to 506 MW (Sherritt International Corporation, 
                                                 
22
 These calculations are based on numbers from Sherritt’s annual report from 2011 (Sherritt International 
Corporation, 2011). Cuba’s only publishes total production numbers (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de Cuba, 
2010), which includes diluents, meaning that the true crude oil production is somewhat less than reported. 
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2011). According to Cuban officials, natural gas recovery rates are approximately 94 percent 
(Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). 
While it is true that the introduction of foreign technology and knowledge by Sherritt 
and others have increased hydrocarbon production, it has been estimated that Cuba could 
increase its domestic crude oil production to approximately 75,000 bbl/d. This could happen if 
Cuba was able to access the services, technology, equipment, and capital available through 
U.S. oil and oil services companies; increasing recovery rates from the current seven to 
somewhere between 17 and 20 percent (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). 
Offshore, Cuba has 59 exploration blocks up for bidding, of which 30 blocks were 
leased by late-2011. The only area that has been thoroughly explored with seismic data and 
analytical tools is the area closest to Cuba, where the three wells were drilled during 2012 
(Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013). As stated, Cupet itself has very limited 
offshore experience. The same goes for Venezuela’s PDVSA. The well it drilled in late-2012 
was the first one that the company has conducted in deepwater areas (Piñón, personal 
communication, February 15, 2013). After the commercially unsuccessful wells drilled 
throughout 2012 Repsol, the company with the bulk of exploration investments in Cuba’s 
EEZ pulled out. Currently no exploratory drilling is conducted in Cuba’s EEZ, and the rig 
Scarabeo 9 – the only rig in the world capable at drilling at these depths without triggering 
U.S. sanctions – left Cuban waters in late-2012. 
Currently the, no value-added activities are extracted from the offshore areas of 
Cuba’s EEZ.  
 
5.4.2 Midstream 
Due to the viscous quality of the domestically produced crude oil, it has to be diluted before 
transportation. Cuban crude oil transportation is by pipeline, truck, railway or coasting vessels 
from the oil fields to storage centers at Matanzas and elsewhere. According to Cereijo (2010) 
the railway system is so deteriorated that coasting vessels have taken over most of the 
transportation (Cereijo, 2010). From the storage centers, the crude oil is barged off to different 
thermoelectric power plants across the country, and from there through the electrical grid to 
the end users. Overall, the energy infrastructure in Cuba – from refineries to power generating 
plants to electrical grids and local wiring – has been characterized as being in a state of 
advanced decay (Cereijo, 2010). 
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In relation with the utilization of natural gas, however, Cupet has built a system of 
pipelines from the Puerto Escondido and Boca de Jaruco fields. The pipelines transport 
natural gas to the thermoelectric power plant at Santa Cruz del Norte and to the city of 
Havana where it is utilized for electricity production (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). 
 As for imports, the superport of Matanzas can dock tanker ships of up to 150,000 tons 
of dead weight. Beside Matanzas there are an additional ten smaller ports located across the 
country to receive oil and refined products by ships, and 17 warehouses or tanks for storage. 
In addition there is an oil duct connecting Matanzas to the newly restored refinery at 
Cienfuegos, supplying the refinery with Venezuelan crude (Cereijo, 2010). 
 
5.4.3 Downstream  
Due to the viscous and sulfur-rich quality of the domestically produced crude oil, Cuba’s old 
and technically outdated refineries are not capable of processing it (Cereijo, 2010; Piñón, 
2010). The oil that is refined in Cuba is thus imported crude, stemming from the barter 
agreement with Venezuela.  
According to the Guidelines article 241, Cuba aims at increasing the crude oil refining 
capacity and achieve output levels that help reduce the importation of oil products (Sixth 
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, 2011). As of 2010 Cuba has an annual refining 
capacity of 6 to 9 million tons in four refineries with a refining capacity utilization factor at a 
low 60 percent. The other three – located in Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Cabaiguan – have 
been targeted for upgrading, but as of May 2013 no modification of these seems to have been 
conducted. In consequence, the domestic crude oil is transported to different thermoelectric 
power plants and burnt directly as crude, which has done severe damage to the plants and 
hence deteriorated their operating efficiency (Castellón, 2004; Cereijo, 2010). The inability to 
convert the crude oil (which in itself has little end-use value) into usable products severely 
hampers value addition at this stage.  
Through Cuvenpetrol S.A., a joint venture between Cupet and PDVSA, however, the 
Cienfuegos refinery, Cuba’s largest of the four, came back on stream and is currently running 
Venezuelan Meza 30 crude, which is a bit lighter than the domestic Cuban crude. The refinery 
has been producing some fuel oil which is now distributed to some of the thermoelectric 
power plants (Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013). The Cienfuegos refinery is 
also to develop gasoline, turbo combustible, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas. Any refining 
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upgrades in Cuba will be limited by the U.S. embargo, however, as the cutting-edge 
technologies – especially in the refining of heavy oil – are in the hands of U.S. companies.    
 In 2011 China and Cuba signed a letter of intent to invest some US$ 6 billion to 
further expand the Cienfuegos refinery. If implemented, this will more than double the current 
refining capacity from 65,000 bbl/d to some 150,000 bbl/d, and be the largest single overseas 
investment ever made in Cuba. For the moment, the investment plans appear to be on hold as 
future supplies from Venezuela seem uncertain, and because of the failed exploration efforts 
during 2012 (Franks, 2013). 
 As part of the overhauling of its aging thermoelectric power plants, Cuba is in 
progress of converting some of the old plants to run on natural gas instead of oil. A US$ 400 
million regasification facility is planned at Cienfuegos. This will allow imports of liquefied 
natural gas to be re-gasified, and then make the Cienfuegos refinery, power plant and 
petrochemical prospect run on natural gas (Cereijo, 2010; Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 
2010). For Cuba, such projects are important in that natural gas is much cheaper to import, 
and less pollutant.
23
 Again, however, the regasification plant would be limited by the U.S. 
embargo given that the most advanced technology today is located in the U.S.  
   
5.4.4 Petrochemical Industry 
In the Guidelines, Cuban authorities state that it has plans on further develop the Cienfuegos 
industrial park, aiming among others at producing petrochemical products such as ammonia 
and urea (Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, 2011), both of which can be 
applied as fertilizers in agricultural production. The planned petrochemical plant is to be built 
through the Cuvenpetrol joint venture between Cupet and PDVSA, and located next to the 
refinery complex.  
 It has been noted that the petrochemical complex might provide important job 
opportunities for educated technicians (Grogg, 2011), and reduce imports of such products.     
As such it is in line with the general import substitution policy of the country. However, the 
planned scale of only 2000 tons a year will fail to achieve economies of scale, thus leaving the 
                                                 
23
 Based on an energy equivalent basis, crude oil and natural gas prices should have a 6 to 1 price ratio. Due to 
various market characteristics, however, the price of oil had typically trades 8-10 times that of natural gas in the 
past 25 years, when comparing US natural gas (Henry Hub) with the West Texas Intermediate reference crude 
oil. Since 2009, the historical pattern has started to deteriorate due to a combination of rising domestic 
production of unconventional shale gas, and geopolitical events in the Middle East & North Africa Region. In 
2009-2012, the average ratio was 21.2 to 1; in 2012 up to 52 to 1 (EconMatters, 2012).  
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complex uncompetitive in an open market (Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 
2013). 
 
5.4.5 Services and Equipment 
To date there is no independent oilfield services and equipment sector in Cuba. Although 
smaller state enterprises located under the Cupet umbrella are conducting maintenance in 
different fields, Sherritt has to seek abroad for equipment: “When Sherritt needs something 
they have to get it and import it, and Cupet has to run it.” (Piñón, personal communication, 
February 15, 2013). All in all, the prospects of a service and equipment sector similar to the 
one developed in Norway looks rather dim, because of Cuba’s lack of steel and manufacturing 
capabilities. In addition, such a sector would have to face fierce competition from a range of 
supply centers along the Gulf Coast and the Caribbean, such as in Mexico and Trinidad & 
Tobago if Cuba opens its economy.  
 
5.4.6 Environmental Considerations 
Environmental considerations are not included in the formal petroleum value chain presented 
in the theory chapter (Figure 2.1), and the approach has been criticized for the lack of 
emphasis on this area (Bridge, 2008). 
According to the Guideline’s article 218, special attention is to be paid to the 
environmental impact associated with current and future projects in the oil and petrochemical 
industries  (Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, 2011). In general, environmental 
considerations seem to be of high priority, not least because an offshore oil spill like the 
Deepwater Horizon could have severely damaged the economically very important tourist 
industry. In consequence, Cuba has cooperated on these issues within the confinements of 
Norway’s Oil for Development program (Norad, 2012), in addition to Brazil and even the U.S 
government on how to manage a potential Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in Cuban waters 
(Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013).   
According to a report made by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
Limited report (2008), the overall responsibility for oil spill responses resides within the 
National Civil Defense Office. Small and medium spills are handled by the facility or 
municipal authorities respectively, while in major incidents the responsibility is passed on to 
the National Civil Defense Office. Cupet is responsible for responding to spills from its own 
installations or in vicinity installations. It has five regional response centers located close to 
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the major oil fields equipped with skimming vessels, skimmers, boom and vacuum trucks. In 
addition Cupet has links with Pemex of Mexico, PDVSA, and Recope of Costa Rica for the 
exchange of equipment and expertise (ITOPF, 2008). 
As for climate considerations, the high proportion of electric power generation from 
the burning of liquid fuels results in very high emissions (Belt, 2010). According to Sherritt 
(2011), work to reduce emissions in different production batteries through improvements and 
updates of operating equipment, are undertaken to meet Cuban environmental regulations 
(Sherritt International Corporation, 2011). Further, the utilization of natural gas for power 
generation has allowed for the capture of emissions and particulates that were previously 
discharged into the environment (Belt, 2010). This was particularly important considering that 
the air and visual pollution stemming from the flared gas was located close to the tourist 
sensitive areas of Varadero (Piñón & Benjamin-Alvarado, 2010). In general Cuba seems to try 
to keep their oil fields and refineries clean, but are limited by restrictions in capital and 
technology (Piñón, personal communication, February 15, 2013).   
 
5.4.7 Summary: Petroleum Sector Value Chain 
The empirical evidence shows that in Cuba, the whole value chain is in the hands of the state 
through state-controlled enterprises and non-firm administrative and bureaucratic 
organizations. There is no room for domestic private enterprises. The Cuban state, through the 
MEM and ONRM regulates entry conditions by issuing licenses in exploration and production 
activities. The notable domestic enterprises are Cupet, the national oil company, and Unión 
Eléctrica, the state-owned electricity utility. The latter is involved in the chain through its 
purchase of oil and natural gas, and through its distribution of electricity to end costumers. 
Cupet on the other hand, is in charge for all value-added activities along the chain. Through 
its commercial arm, Cupet develops and enters into contracts and ventures with foreign oil 
companies.  
 In upstream activities, Sherritt is involved both in the production of oil and gas and, 
through the Energas joint venture, it also has activities involving gas processing. Further, the 
Venezuelan national oil company PDVSA is involved in various downstream activities 
through the Cuvenpetrol joint venture, in particular in refining, but also in upgrading and 
establishment of complexes in regasification and in the petrochemical industry. 
 Further, the nature and type of the established linkages with foreign oil companies can 
be categorized into two general types. First, ‘market oriented’ linkages are mainly found in 
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upstream activities, where currently only Sherritt is the foreign participant. Here, the 
interactions are structured according to the PSA between the Cuban state entity and foreign 
oil company. In the market oriented linkages Cuba trade parts of the economic rent in return 
for increased domestic petroleum production, and inward transfers of technology and 
knowledge. In the case of the PSA with Sherritt, this amounted to some 54 percent of gross 
working-interest oil production (cost oil + profit oil) before taxes (25 percent of personnel 
salaries, 30 percent on net profits). As for the natural gas, the foreign company receives no 
allocation of the production. In the case of Sherritt, however, its one third interest in the 
Energas joint venture generates income from the gas sold to Unión Eléctrica. Judging by data 
from Sherritt’s 2011 annual report, Sherritt has earned significant profits through its 
petroleum assets in Cuba (Sherritt International Corporation, 2011).     
 The second type of linkages can be called ‘strategically oriented’, and stem from 
Cuba’s close relationship with Venezuela. The current aim of this linkage is to increase Cuban 
capabilities in crude oil refining, regasification, and in petrochemicals. Adding to this is of 
course the barter agreement, which subsidize Cuba’s entire production deficit. Here, 
petroleum rents are imported to Cuba, partly in exchange with Cuban healthcare and other 
services. The strategic relationship with Venezuela contributed to the upgrading of the 
Cienfuegos refinery, which is currently running on Venezuelan crude. It has also led to the 
planning of a regasification facility located close to the refinery, which would make the 
refinery, power plant, and petrochemical complex run on cheaper and less-pollutant natural 
gas.  
 In general the joint ventures have been highly successful in many respects. They have 
among others contributed to significant increases in production levels, inward transfers of 
technology and knowledge, reduction in pollution levels, increased electricity production, and 
increased refining capabilities. 
 There are, however, a number of bottlenecks and limitations to value creation along 
the chain. First, one of the major inefficiencies of Cuba’s petroleum sector value chain is that 
the crude oil and natural gas sold by Cupet to Unión Eléctrica are heavily subsidized or, as in 
the case of natural gas, supplied at no charge. In consequence there are no internal price 
transfer mechanisms reflecting world oil prices, which hamper incentives and efficiency. 
  Second, the U.S. embargo impedes a range of activities along the value chain. In 
upstream operations the embargo has made petroleum exploration in Cuba more expensive 
and difficult to pursuit, particularly offshore. The lack of access to U.S. oil and oil services 
companies have also been a contributing factor to the prolonged low crude oil recovery rates. 
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In addition, any production will be inhibited by the lack of access to the huge and closely-
located U.S. consumer market. Upgrades of various complexes downstream and in mitigation 
are further limited by the lack of access to frontier U.S. technology.    
 Third, a major limitation of Cuba’s petroleum value chain is that the domestically 
produced crude oil cannot be processed at Cuban refineries. This was attempted during the 
1990s, when the abrupt loss of 41 percent of oil imports caused frequent blackouts and civil 
unrest. The result was that the sulfur-rich heavy crude oil caused severe damages on the 
plants, making them operating at a low 47-50 percent of installed capacity between 1990-
1997 (Cereijo, 2010). In other words, refining is not part of the domestic crude oil value chain 
at all, and only adds value through the crude oil imports from Venezuela.  
 Fourth, intentional agreements, e.g. with China in further expanding the Cienfuegos 
refinery have not yet been materialized due to the unsuccessful exploratory wells drilled 
during 2012, and the uncertainties surrounding Cuba’s future relationship with Venezuela.  
 Returning to the third sub-research question of this thesis: 
 
What is the division of tasks between Cuban and foreign actors along Cuba’s 
petroleum sector value chain? 
 
The most basic finding in this section is that in Cuba, the whole petroleum sector value chain 
is in the hands of the state or state-controlled enterprises. With respect to activities along the 
value chain, Cupet – the national oil company – operates at all stages, and produced some 57 
percent of total domestic oil production in 2011, excluding its share in the PSA with Sherritt. 
The other central domestic actor with activities along the chain is Unión Eléctrica which 
purchases the oil and gas and distributes the electricity to end consumers.  
 On the other hand, there is a small number of joint ventures with foreign oil companies 
along the chain. The participation of foreign oil companies has been actively sought and 
institutionalized to contribute to increased total domestic production of crude oil and natural 
gas. Foreign participation has also been sought to increase domestic capabilities at different 
stages on the value chain, in particular in upstream oil and gas, crude oil refining and natural 
gas processing, and in petrochemicals. Of the foreign oil companies, Sherritt is involved in the 
production of oil and gas, as well as in gas processing, whereas PDVSA is involved in various 
facility upgrading downstream as well as in the petrochemical industry.  
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5.5 CUBA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR OF INNOVATION AND PRODUCTION 
Based on the preceding empirical analysis, this section seeks to characterize the building 
blocks of Cuba’s petroleum sector of innovation and production. Subsequently, the findings 
are gathered to answer the main research question of this thesis.  
 
5.5.1 Building Blocks 
The main characteristics of Cuba’s petroleum sectoral system of innovation and production 
will be assessed according to the different building blocks of sectoral systems of innovation 
presented in section 2.1.1 of the theoretical chapter. 
 As stated in that section, knowledge bases and learning processes are central for 
agent’s innovative abilities. Knowledge varies in terms of accessibility and cumulativeness. 
As was theorized, in the petroleum industry, knowledge – in the form of e.g. technological 
know-how and managerial skills – has traditionally been difficult to acquire for host state 
actors. This has been both due to asymmetrical bargaining power, and a high degree of 
cumulativeness of industry knowledge. In consequence, a pattern of Schumpeter Mark II has 
characterized the international oil industry, creating large entry barriers and favoring already 
established firms with experience, economies of scale, and financial resources.  
Through a strategic relationship with East Bloc countries, however, actors in the 
Cuban petroleum sector early on managed to learn and expand on their knowledge bases. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, then, actors in Cuba’s petroleum sector already 
possessed a considerable amount of absorptive capacity through its experience in onshore-
based, heavy crude oil operations. It had acquired the knowledge and skills needed to conduct 
some exploratory activities without foreign assistance, while maintaining a domestic and 
vertically integrated onshore-based petroleum sector value chain.  
Nevertheless, after the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union, a cash-strapped Cuba 
produced only some 11-12,000 bbl/d of crude oil, a level exceeded by domestic consumption 
with well over 200,000 bbl/d. The deficit could not be financed through imports, even at a 
time where international market prices for oil were relatively low (see Appendix 2). As a 
result, Cuban authorities targeted increased domestic petroleum production as one of their 
main goals. In relation, it was acknowledged that the participation of foreign companies, with 
capabilities superior to domestic actors was needed to achieve this goal.  
In other words, the high level of domestic demand, paired with constraints in domestic 
capabilities and technological environment provided the Cuban authorities with strong 
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incentives to seek the inputs of foreign oil companies in the petroleum sector. The decision 
was done based on the problem at hand; the need to reduce the gap between domestic 
production and domestic consumption, and the inability of domestic enterprises – in effect 
Cupet – to sufficiently reduce this gap.   
 In relation, during the 1990s the formal institutional framework at the national level 
was adapted to meet the needs of the sector, targeting inward transfers to attract new 
technology, knowledge, and capital to boost domestic petroleum production. This serves as a 
clear example on how needs and characteristics of a strategic sector affect and changes 
institution at the national level. In turn, the changes made at the national level, particularly in 
the form of a new law of foreign investment and contractual framework, shaped the 
characteristics of the petroleum sector; creating variety by introducing new companies, and 
with them new managerial-skills and technologies.   
Corresponding with the efforts to attract foreign participation, attempts were also 
made to increase domestic linkages between government enterprises and research entities 
during the mid-1990s. Through the Integrated Management and Financing of the S&T 
Activity in the Ministry, technological demands in state enterprises were identified and given 
to research organizations. The contribution of domestic research organizations to the solution 
of the identified problems seemed limited however, as seems to be the case when assessing 
their contribution to the creation and diffusion of innovations in general.  
Otherwise, the types and structure of interactions among heterogeneous firms and 
non-firm organizations are relatively untypical in Cuba’s petroleum sector. A high degree of 
state control shapes the strategies and goals of the state-firms. The state-firms are further 
limited to Cupet and its umbrella of smaller entities performing various tasks along the value 
chain, and Unión Eléctrica which buys the output. Any possibility of variety creation through 
the introduction of new firms along the value chain seems very limited. This leaves processes 
of selection and variety creation regarding domestic firms virtually non-existent. In effect this 
greatly reduces the dynamism of the domestic parts of Cuba’s petroleum sector.  
The dynamism that does exist in Cuba’s petroleum sector seems in large to be created 
through the participation of foreign oil companies in the sector. In this respect, Cuba has 
favored a policy aimed at increasing domestic petroleum sector capabilities through inward 
transfers of technology and knowledge from foreign oil companies. In particular, this has been 
institutionalized through the PSA that Cuba offers foreign contractors, and the engagement of 
Cuban state enterprises in various joint ventures along the petroleum sector value chain. 
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5.5.2 Domestic Capability Building and Inward Transfer  
Based on the empirical analysis from the preceding sections, this section seeks to answer the 
research question of this thesis: 
 
 What characterize the processes of domestic capability building and inward transfer 
 of knowledge and technology in the Cuban petroleum industry? 
 
By virtue of its petroleum resources, Cuba has since the opening of the petroleum sector to 
foreign participation in 1993 managed to attract the interest of a wide range of foreign oil 
companies. On this basis, Cuba has sought to access the technology and knowledge held by 
these companies, and has through its institutional framework sought to facilitate inward 
transfers to domestic actors in the petroleum sector. The goal of this policy seems to have 
been to develop indigenous capabilities at various stages along the petroleum sector value 
chain. Correspondingly, Cuba’s petroleum technology policy has also sought to facilitate 
linkages between various domestic actors, such as between state enterprises and research 
organizations, while supplying the industry with manpower capable of absorbing the inward 
transfers.  
 Nevertheless, the scale of the inward transfers is in particular limited by Cuba’s 
petroleum resources. Currently only two companies are investing substantially in Cuba, with 
only one carrying out petroleum production (Figure 5.8). Furthermore, Cuban actors are 
largely excluded from the international petroleum industry knowledge network. As such, the 
processes of inward transfer of technology and knowledge in the Cuban oil industry are 
limited to whatever agreements Cuba manages to strike with foreign oil companies investing 
in its sector.    
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Figure 5.8: Cuba’s emerging petroleum system of innovation. Note the lack of linkages to the international 
knowledge network, and the relative lack of linkages between domestic actors.  
 
Currently, Cuba’s low relative bargaining power seems to be reflected in its favorable PSA. In 
effect, Cuba offers a large share of the petroleum rent to attract foreign participation in the 
sector in order to spur domestic petroleum production. In addition, actors in Cuba’s petroleum 
industry are closely cooperating with the Venezuelan oil company PDSVA. Through these 
agreements, domestic actors in Cuba’s petroleum sector, most notably Cupet, have managed 
to expand on their knowledge and technology base, and increased their capabilities. 
 Through these linkages, actors in the Cuban petroleum industry are conducting so-
called DUI forms of learning. While the exact learning processes undertaken through these 
interactions are difficult to access, one of the major results has been an increase in 
independent production of crude oil, from 11,671 in 1991 to 27,688 bbl/d twenty years later – 
an achievement undertaken in a period where the main fields were in natural decline.  
  This would not have been possible without a sufficient amount of absorptive capacity 
among Cuban industry actors. As such, although the level of research capabilities in Cuba’s 
petroleum sector seems low, the Cuban educational system seems to supply the industry with 
manpower qualified of absorbing the inward transfers.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Innovation and innovation system studies have traditionally not dealt with natural resource 
industries in developing countries. This seems to be the case even when considering strategic 
industries such as the petroleum industry, where countries with abundant endowments have 
been struggling to transform their hydrocarbons into sustained economic growth and 
development.  
 This thesis has sought to address the void in the literature by applying the sectoral 
systems of innovation perspective and complementary approaches on Cuba’s petroleum 
industry. This was done in order to explore the main characteristics of the industry, as well as 
to assess is opportunities for growth.  
 A main argument throughout the thesis was that if Cuba is to expand on its small-scale 
and onshore-based petroleum sector, it would be well-advised to formulate a technology 
policy aimed at accessing the technology and knowledge held by foreign industry actors. At 
the same time it was acknowledged that the successful access to and facilitation of such 
transfers would be difficult to achieve, depending among others on the relative bargaining 
power of Cuba as a host state, whether Cuba’s petroleum technology policy included demand 
for such transfers, and finally on the ability of Cuban actors to assimilate and exploit the 
transfers.  
 On this backdrop a case study of Cuba’s petroleum industry was conducted, aiming at 
answering the following research question: 
 
 What characterize the processes of domestic capability building and inward transfer 
of knowledge and technology in the Cuban petroleum industry? 
 
In order to approach an answer, three sub-questions were formulated: 
 
 What is the basis of Cuba’s bargaining power versus foreign oil companies? 
  
 What are the main components of Cuba’s petroleum technology policy? 
 
What is the division of tasks between Cuban and foreign actors along Cuba’s 
petroleum sector value chain? 
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6.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
The first sub-research question was posed in order to explore the basis of Cuba’s 
opportunities to access foreign technology and knowledge, while grasping a proportionate 
share of economic rent:   
  
 What is the basis of Cuba’s bargaining power versus foreign oil companies? 
 
Relative bargaining power concerns upstream activities, where most of the economic rent 
stemming from petroleum-rich land is extracted. This thesis have argued that the relative 
bargaining power of host states is not only crucial for rent distribution, but also for the 
leverage of host countries to access technology and knowledge held by foreign oil companies 
interested in investing in upstream activities on their soil. By successfully facilitating inward 
transfers of technology and knowledge from foreign oil companies – making domestic actors 
capable of conducting petroleum sector activities without foreign assistance – the host state 
will, ceteris paribus, be better positioned in future bargaining processes.  
 In a Cuban context, given the country’s limited access to multinational financing 
sources and bilateral credit, this channel of inward transfer seems especially crucial. 
 The main finding from this section was that Cuba’s limited level of proved resources 
and the unsuccessful exploratory work done in its EEZ, paired with a high dependence on the 
resources of foreign oil companies and a generally unfavorable host country context, form a 
basis of a: 
 
(i) Weak relative bargaining power for Cuba versus foreign oil companies. 
 
While the current relative bargaining power of Cuba seems low, significant petroleum 
reservoirs might be discovered in the future. As seen in the cases of Norway and Angola, if 
large reservoirs are discovered, a high dependence on foreign oil companies does not preclude 
the successful development of domestic capabilities, even in challenging offshore operations.   
For Cuba, if offshore production ever comes on stream, the petroleum technology 
policy of the country would be well-advised to actively seek inward transfers of knowledge 
and technology from the foreign oil companies, aiming at increasing domestic petroleum 
sector capabilities. In parallel, inward transfers of this kind – if accessed – are difficult to 
successfully facilitate, in other words effectively assimilated and exploited by domestic 
actors. Claiming that the absorptive capacity of sectoral actors is influenced by ‘systemic’ 
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factors such as the national policy and institutional framework, the second sub-question of 
this thesis was: 
 
What are the main components of Cuba’s petroleum technology policy? 
 
The main findings are:  
 
(i) Cuba has favored a high degree of openness to foreign participation in its petroleum 
sector since the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
(ii) Inward transfers and domestic capability building have been actively sought through joint 
ventures and PSA agreements with foreign oil companies operating in Cuba’s petroleum 
sector. 
 
The openness towards foreign participation was chosen in order to attract FDI into the sector, 
aiming at boosting domestic petroleum production. As such Cuba has outlined a favorable 
formal institutional framework for this type of investment, as expressed by its foreign 
investment law and PSA. Through its contractual framework, it appears that Cuba actively 
seeks to expand on the domestic knowledge and technology base, by establishing linkages to 
facilitate inward transfers of technology, industry know-how, and managerial skills between 
the Cupet and the foreign oil company in question.   
 As for domestic capability building, this seems to have been a priority since the 
nationalization of the sector in the early-1960s. Since the early stages, this has been sought 
achieved through the establishment of linkages with foreign actors. Until the mid-1980s, 
through the strategic relationship with the East Bloc; after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
through a less discriminative and more market oriented policy, targeting different private and 
public oil companies by offering blocks open for bidding.  
 The petroleum sector does not seem to be integrated with the national innovation 
system in any formal and comprehensive way. Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s efforts were 
made under the MINBAS umbrella to facilitate linkages between state companies in the basic 
industries and various research entities. This might resemble some of the measures that were 
made under the maturation period in the petroleum innovation system of Norway, but the 
Integrated Management project was not exclusively focused on the petroleum sector. Further, 
the exact contribution of domestic actors on the technical solution of the identified projects 
seems limited. 
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 In order to further explore the processes of domestic capability building and inward 
transfers, various activities, actors and linkages of the Cuban petroleum system of innovation 
and production, the following question was posed: 
 
What is the division of tasks between Cuban and foreign actors along Cuba’s 
petroleum sector value chain? 
 
The main findings are: 
 
(i) In Cuba, the whole petroleum sector value chain is in the hands of the state. 
 
With respect to value-added activities along the chain Cupet, the national oil company, 
operates at all stages. There is no room for private domestic actors. The other central domestic 
actor is Unión Eléctrica, the state-controlled electricity utility, which purchases the oil and gas 
and distributes the electricity to end consumers. 
 On the other hand: 
 
(ii) There are a number of joint ventures with foreign oil companies along the chain. 
 
The nature of the established linkages with foreign oil companies can be sorted in two types: 
(i) ‘market oriented’ linkages, particularly found in upstream activities where Cuba trades 
parts of the economic rent in return for increased domestic production, as well as for inward 
transfers of technology and knowledge, and; (ii) ‘strategically oriented’ which stems from 
Cuba’s strategic relationship with Venezuela. The aim here is to increase domestic 
capabilities in crude oil refining, regasification, and in petrochemicals. Adding to this is of 
course the barter agreement, which subsidize Cuba’s production deficit versus its 
consumption. Here, petroleum rents are imported to Cuba, partly in exchange with Cuban 
healthcare and other services.  
 In upstream operations, Sherritt is the only foreign oil company with oil and gas 
production today. Through the Energas joint venture it also has activities in the processing of 
natural gas. Further, the Venezuelan national oil company PDVSA is involved in various 
downstream activities through the Cuvenpetrol joint venture, in particular in crude oil 
refining, but also in the upgrading and establishment of complexes in regasification and in the 
petrochemical industry.  
  It was added that there are a number of bottlenecks and limitations to value creation 
along the chain, relating to (i) the lack of market transfer in the petroleum sold from Cupet to 
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Unión Eléctrica; (ii) impediments on a range of activities and upgrades stemming from the 
U.S. embargo; (iii) the lack of capabilities in Cuba to refine the domestically produced crude; 
and (iv) the impediments to further investments and upgrading stemming from the 
disappointing exploratory results in 2012, and the uncertainties surrounding Cuba’s future 
relationship with Venezuela.  
 Based on the findings from the three sub-research questions, the main research 
question of the thesis was answered: 
 
What characterize the processes of domestic capability building and inward transfer 
of knowledge and technology in the Cuban petroleum industry? 
Through its petroleum technology policy, Cuba has sought to access foreign technology and 
knowledge to build domestic petroleum sector capabilities. However, the scale of the inward 
transfers is limited by Cuba’s petroleum resources, and its lack of access to the international 
petroleum industry knowledge network. As such: 
 
(i) The processes of inward transfer of technology and knowledge in the Cuban petroleum 
industry are limited to whatever agreements Cuba manages to strike with foreign oil 
companies investing in its sector.  
 
Through its PSA and contractual framework, however, Cuba has managed to link up with a 
small number of foreign oil companies investing in its sector. Currently, the amount is limited 
to Sherritt International. In addition, Cuban actors are also cooperating with PDVSA through 
its strategic relationship with Venezuela: 
 
(ii) Through these agreements, domestic actors in Cuba’s petroleum sector, most notably 
Cupet, have managed to expand on their knowledge and technology base, and increased their 
capabilities.  
 
The learning conducted through these linkages would not have been possible without a 
sufficient level of absorptive capacity among Cuban industry actors. As such, although the 
level of research capabilities seems low, the Cuban educational system seems to supply the 
industry with manpower capable of absorbing the inward transfers.  
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6.2 PROSPECTS 
Cuba has led a petroleum technology policy aimed at increasing domestic capabilities along 
the petroleum industry value chain. Its relative bargaining power towards foreign oil 
companies has been hampered by various factors, however, with the perceived attractiveness 
of its petroleum resources having been the most fundamental. Despite different risks and 
inherent difficulties associated both with the U.S. embargo as well as domestic risks, a whole 
range of international oil companies stood in line to hire the Scarabeo 9 in 2012, when 
prospects for offshore oil was perceived to be promising.  
 External factors such as perceived attractiveness of petroleum resources and, in the 
case of Cuba; the U.S. embargo, will be difficult to alter. However, the EEZ, having the 
largest hydrocarbon potential is relatively underexplored. A further exploration of the whole 
area might contribute to increase the attractiveness of the EEZ, although advanced exploration 
techniques at these depths generally requires the participation of experienced multinational oil 
companies. Further, Cuba should reduce the ambiguity towards foreign investments, as have 
also been seen in the petroleum sector.  
 With today’s gas prices, and prospects for additional gas production in counties such 
as Angola, Nigeria, the Middle East, Argentina, and the U.S. now with shale gas, chances are 
that the prices for natural gas will be low also in the foreseeable future.  Thus projects such as 
the planned regasification facility in Cienfuegos to make the refinery and power plant located 
there seem very sound in this regard. This will make the running of both the refinery and plant 
much cheaper and effective, while avoiding many of the negative environmental and wear-
and-tear associated with the domestic crude oil. All the more, this makes sense given the high 
insecurities associated with Cuba’s future relationship with Venezuela.   
6.3 CONTRIBUTIONS, POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS  
The contributions from this thesis can be summarized as follows. First, it has shown that the 
combination of different theoretical frameworks works as to study the processes domestic 
capability building and inward transfers in a developing country context. As such, it has 
contributed to expanding the academic knowledge of these processes in Cuba’s petroleum 
industry. An important finding in this regard has been that Cuba, despite being situated in a 
weak relative bargaining power position, has managed to access and facilitate inward 
transfers. It was suggested that this could in part be attributed to Cuban absorptive capacity in 
the petroleum sector. Whether this finding can be extended to other petroleum-rich countries, 
would be an interesting line of inquiry for further research.      
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 Second, by emphasizing the role of power relations and the international dimension, 
the thesis addresses some of the main limitations associated with the sectoral system of 
innovation framework. The thesis also addresses some of the voids in the literature by 
focusing on a natural resource-based industry in a developing country.  
 Third, a new model concerning the circular causality between host state relative 
bargaining power and capabilities have been formulated. While the lack of data on the details 
of Cuba’s contracts with foreign oil companies since the opening of the sector has made it 
difficult to identify a process of circular causality in this country, the model is thought to be 
applicable to other petroleum-rich countries. In relation, this thesis has argued that such a 
process seem to have played an important role for the successful development of the 
petroleum sectors of two countries as different as Norway and Angola, thereby increasing the 
national value-addition stemming from petroleum activities in these countries.     
   Nevertheless, further research on the role of domestic capabilities and inward 
transfers in petroleum-rich countries are needed to confirm or discard its main propositions 
and implications in different host country contexts.  
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APPENDIX 1  
GLOSSARY OF OIL TERMS 
The glossary presented here is mainly adapted from the book Escaping the Resource Curse 
(2007), edited by Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz: New York, 
Columbia University Press. Further, the glossary presented in this book was largely written 
and assembled by David Johnson and Daniel Johnston. See for instance, Johnstion, David 
(1994). International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts. Tulsa: 
PennWell Publishing.   
 
Block A license area or contract area; each individual parcel of acreage held by an 
international oil company or a government. 
 
Bonuses A payment received by the government for the right to conduct petroleum 
operations including: signature bonus; discovery bonus; commerciality bonus; production 
bonus; cumulative production bonus. 
 
Commercial discovery Any discovery that would be economically feasible to develop 
under a given fiscal system.  
 
Concession An agreement between a government and a company that grants the company 
the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport, and market hydrocarbons within a fixed 
area for a specific amount of time. 
 
Contractor An international oil company operating in a country, on behalf of the host 
government, under a production sharing agreement or a risk service agreement, for which it 
receives either a share of production or a fee. 
 
Cost oil An international oil company operating in a country, on behalf of the host 
government, under a production sharing agreement or a risk service agreement, for which it 
receives either a share of production or a fee. 
 
Country risk  The risk and uncertainties of doing business in a foreign country, 
including political and commercial risks.  
      
 
 
Depletion The risk and uncertainties of doing business in a foreign country, including 
political and commercial risks.  
 
Economic profit Gross project revenues minus total costs, which include exploration, 
development, and operating costs.  
 
Economic rent The difference between the value of production and the cost to extract 
it. The extraction costs consist of normal exploration, development, and operating costs as 
well as a share of profits for the industry. 
 
Expected value A weighted average financial value of various possible outcomes, such 
as either a discovery of a dry hole, weighted according to the estimated likelihood (estimated 
probability or success of failure) that either outcome might occur. 
 
Gross benefits The benefits to a country that come with having foreign companies 
operate in a country, such as government take (share of profits), employment gains etc. 
 
License An arrangement between an international oil company and a host government 
regarding a specific geographical area (block) and petroleum operations. In more precise 
usage, the term applies to the development phase of a contract after a commercial discovery 
has been made.  
 
Operator The company directly responsible for day-to-day operations, for maintaining a 
lease or license, and for ensuring the rights and obligations of the other members of the 
contractor group are met. 
 
Product sharing agreement (PSA)  A contractual agreement between a contractor 
and a host government. Here the contractor bears all exploration costs and risks, as well as 
development and production costs, in return for a stipulated share of the production resulting 
from this effort. 
 
Profit oil Used in production sharing agreements; the share of production remaining after 
cost oil and royalties have been allocated to the appropriate parties of the contracts. 
  
 
 
Recoverable The hydrocarbon volumes expected to be produced economically and not left 
behind in the reservoir.  
 
Risk service contract A contractual agreement in which a contractor is paid a cash fee 
in return for performing the service of producing petroleum resources. All production belongs 
to the state. The contractor is usually responsible for providing all capital associated with 
exploration and development. In return, if exploration efforts are successful, the contractor 
recovers the costs through the sale of oil or gas plus a fee.   
 
Wellhead The last valve off of a production platform from which oil is extracted; the 
point of valuation. 
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Annual imported crude oil prices to the U.S., 1968-2012, including forecast (EIA, 2013d).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Annual Imported Crude Oil Price 
dollars per barrel 
Nominal Price Real Price (apr yyyy $)
Forecast 
EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, April 2013 
  
 
APPENDIX 3 
Case study database of documents and archival records.  
What Descriptions and Use 
 Petroleum Industry in Other Countries 
Book: H. Ryggvik: Til Siste Dråpe. Om Oljens Politiske Økonomi Analysis of the development of the Norwegian petroleum sector. 
Used as background and context material, and in the analysis of 
host states’ bargaining power, petroleum policy, and domestic 
capability building in the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
Book-section: O.E. Engen: The Development of the Norwegian 
Petroleum Innovation System 
Analysis of the development of the Petroleum Innovation System 
in Norway. Used as comparative material in the analysis of the 
petroleum system of innovation and policies of other oil rich host 
states. 
Analysis: EIA: Norway Analysis on Norway’s petroleum sector. Used in context and as 
comparative material in analysis. 
Statistics: EIA: International Energy Statistics  Data on petroleum reserves etc. in various countries. Used in 
analysis on basic entry factors.  
Article: A. Mohamed et al.: Modeling the Technology Transfer 
Process in the Petroleum Industry: Evidence from Libya 
Analysis of inward technology transfer in Libya’s petroleum 
industry. Used as comparative example in the analysis. 
Report: H.K. Nordås et al: The Upstream Petroleum Industry and 
Local Industrial Development: A Comparative Study 
Analysis of the upstream petroleum industry of 6 different 
countries. Used as comparative examples in the analysis.  
Article: B. Sæther et al: Innovation by Co-Evolution in Natural 
Resource Industries: The Norwegian Experience 
Analysis of the evolution of Norway’s innovation systems in 
resource sectors. Used as comparative material.   
Article: A. Warhurst: Technology Transfer and the Development of 
China’s Offshore Oil Industry 
Analysis of the role of inward technology transfer in China’s 
offshore oil industry. Used as comparative example in the analysis.  
Journal Article: R. de Oliveira: Business Success, Angola-Style: 
Postcolonial Politics and the Rise and Rise of Sonangol 
Analysis of the development of Angola’s petroleum sector. Used in 
context and as comparative material in analysis. 
Analysis: EIA: Angola Analysis of Angola’s petroleum sector. Used in context and as 
comparative material in analysis. 
Analysis: IEA: Angola Analysis of Angola’s petroleum sector. Used in context and as 
comparative material in analysis.  
 Cuba’s Petroleum Sector 
Article: G. Perez: Cuba Deepwater Exploration Opportunities 
Described in Southeastern Gulf of Mexico 
Analysis of Cuba’s hydrocarbon potential. Used in the analysis of 
Cuba’s entry factors in bargaining. 
Article: N. Nerurkar, M. Sullivan: Cuba’s Offshore Oil 
Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations  
Analysis of the development and status of Cuba’s petroleum 
industry. Used in the analysis of Cuba’s domestic capabilities in 
petroleum value chain.  
Book Section: J. Piñón, J. Benjamin-Alvarado: Extracting Cuba’s 
Oil and Gas 
Analysis of Cuba’s petroleum industry. Used in the analysis of 
Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining, capabilities along the value 
chain, petroleum policies towards foreign oil companies.  
Book Section: J. Benjamin-Alvarado: Evaluating the Prospects for 
U.S-Cuban Cooperation on Energy Policy 
Analysis of the prospects of future U.S.-Cuban cooperation in the 
energy sector. Used in the analysis of Cuban petroleum policy, and 
Cuba’s domestic capabilities.    
Article: U.S. Geological Survey: Executive Summary – Assessment 
of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Jurassic-Cretaceous 
Composite Total Petroleum System in the North Cuba Basin, Cuba, 
2004  
Analysis of the offshore hydrocarbon potential of Cuba. Used in the 
analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining.  
Article: G. Perez: Cuba Deepwater Exploration Opportunities 
Described in Southeastern Gulf of Mexico 
Analysis of the prospects for offshore oil exploration in Cuba’s EEZ. 
Used in the analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining, and 
Cuba’s contractual framework for offshore E&P.  
Newspaper Article: P. Orsi: Repsol: Exploratory Oil Well off Cuba 
Comes up Dry 
Report of the results of Repsol’s offshore exploration well. Used in 
the analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining.   
Newspaper Article: P. Orsi: 2nd Offshore Oil Well also a Bust Report of the results of Petronas’ offshore exploration well. Used 
in the analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining.   
Newspaper Article: P. Orsi: Cuba: 3rd Exploratory Offshore Well 
also a Bust 
Report of the results of PDVSA’s offshore exploration well. Used in 
the analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining.  
Newspaper Article: J. Franks: Repsol’s likely departure a Blow to 
Cuba’s Oil Hopes 
Report stating that Repsol leaves Cuban waters. Used in the 
analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors. 
Newspaper Article: J. Franks: Cuba Says Latest Offshore Well is 
Not Successful 
Report stating that the Repsol well was commercially unviable. 
Used in analysis of Cuba’s entry factors. 
Newspaper Article: J. Franks: Amid Uncertainties, Cuba Seeks 
Funding for Refinery Expansion 
Report on prospected refinery expansion at Cienfuegos. Used in 
analysis on Cuba’s petroleum sector value chain.  
Newspaper Article: M. Frank: Petrobras has Relinquished Cuba Oil 
Block 
Report stating the reason for Petrobras’ withdrawal from Cuba. 
Used in analysis of bargaining power.  
      
 
Newspaper Article: BBC News: Spanish Oil Company Repsol to 
stop Drilling in Cuba 
Report stating that Repsol is to leave Cuba. Used in analysis of 
bargaining power.  
Newspaper Article: G. Allen: U.S. Watches Closely as Oil Drilling 
Begins off Cuba 
Report on the environmental considerations of an offshore oil spill. 
Used as source of foreign investments made by oil companies in 
Cuba’s petroleum industry.  
Newspaper Article: Cuba Standard: Cuba Announces Start of 
More Offshore Drilling 
Report on the exploratory activities of Zarubezhneft off Cuba. Used 
in the analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargaining.  
Newspaper Article: T. Thompson: Cuba to Visit for Oil Drilling 
Talks 
Report on environmental meetings between Cuba and Bahamas in 
relation with Zarubezhneft drilling. Used in the analysis of Cuba’s 
petroleum policies.  
Newspaper Article: J. Varona: Cuba y Rusia en la senda de la 
cooperation 
Report on the cooperation between Cuba and Russia in the 
petroleum industry. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policies.  
Newspaper Article: Prensa Latina: Oil Drilling to Continue in 
Cuban Waters 
Report stating that PDVSA is to continue exploring in Cuban waters 
after the unsuccessful drilling. Used in the analysis of Cuba’s basic 
entry factors in bargaining.  
Newspaper Article: S. Wayow: Cuba Welcomes Help in Oil and 
Gas Industries 
Report stating that Cuba welcomes U.S. participation in petroleum 
industry. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy.  
Statistical data: EIA: Cuba Statistics of petroleum production, consumption, import/export 
balance, refinery capacity, and proved reserves in Cuba. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargains, and in assessing 
the results of Cuba’s petroleum policies.  
Statistical data: ONE: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba: Minería y 
Energia 
Statistics of petroleum production, imports, consumption. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s basic entry factors in bargains, results of Cuba’s 
petroleum policies, Cuba’s dependence of fossil fuels for electricity 
generation.      
Web Pages: ONRM: Fundación ; Antecedentes   Foundation and development of state-owned institutes in Cuba’s 
petroleum sector. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policies 
and value chain.  
Web Page: Geociencias: Geociencias Information about bi-annual petroleum congress held in Havana. 
Used in analysis of petroleum policy. 
Article: J.A.B. Belt: The Electric Power Sector in Cuba: Ways to 
Increase Efficiency and Sustainability 
Analysis of Cuba’s electric power sector. Used in the analysis as 
indicator of Cuba’s dependence of fossil fuels for electricity 
generation.  
Transcript: The Brookings Institution: Cuba’s Energy Future: 
Strategic Approaches to Cooperation 
Discussion of Cuba’s energy future among U.S. energy experts. 
Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy, and domestic 
capabilities.  
Newspaper Article: Cuba Standard: Government Strips Cupet of 
Foreign Trade Privileges 
Report of Cuba’s reordering of foreign trade activities. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy.  
Newspaper Article: Cuban News Agency: Cuba Sets up Ministry of 
Energy and Mines 
Report of the restructuring of MINBAS. Used in analysis of Cuba’s 
petroleum policy.  
Article: M. Cereijo: Republic of Cuba: Power Sector Infrastructure 
Assessment á é ó 
Analysis of Cuba’s power sector. Used in analysis on Cuba’s 
domestic capabilities along petroleum industry value chain, and 
dependence on fossil fuels for electricity generation.  
Portfolio: Ministerio del Comercio Exterior y la Inversión 
Extranjera: Cuba Portfolio Projects 2012  
Portfolio of Cuban projects open for foreign investment. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy, institutional framework.   
Newspaper Article: R. Piñón: Piñón on Energy: Cuba Re-
Organizing its Energy Sector 
Article considering the reorganization of MINBAS. Used in analysis 
of Cuba’s petroleum policy 
Report: Norad: Oil for Development Programme: Annual Report 
2011 
Report presenting OfU’s development programs in different 
countries. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policies, domestic 
capabilities.  
Data Base: C. Navarro: Mexico, Cuba Discuss Cooperation in 
Energy Sector 
Data base news of cooperation talks between Pemex and Cupet. 
Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy. 
Report: C. Romero: South-South Cooperation between Venezuela 
and Cuba 
Analysis of the economic, commercial, and social cooperation 
between Cuba and Venezuela. Used in analysis of Cuba’s 
petroleum policies.  
Article: J.A. Suárez et al.: Energy, Environment, and Development 
in Cuba 
Analysis of energy, environment, and socio-economic development 
in Cuba since 1959. Used in analysis of petroleum policies. 
Booklet: Cupet: Petroleum in Cuba Booklet aimed at presenting investment opportunities in Cuba’s 
petroleum industry. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy, 
value chain.  
Work Shop booklet: Petrad: Workshop on Land Facilities and 
Impact Assessments for the Offshore Upstream Petroleum Sector 
Booklet of Petrad work shop in Cuba, June 2012. Used in analysis of 
Cuba’s petroleum policy. 
Work Shop booklet: Petrad: Workshop on Contingency Planning 
and Emergency Response 
Booklet of Petrad work shop in Cuba, October 2012. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy.  
Newspaper Article: Granma: Ministerio de Energia y Minas: A 
Tono Con Los Nuevos Tiempos 
Article stating the new ministry structure in basic industries in 
Cuba. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy and system.  
Newspaper Article: Havana Journal: President Raul Castro Has 
Met with Ten Presidents Since October 2008 (Now 12) 
Raúl’s trips abroad. Used in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy.  
Newspaper Article: Reuters: Cuba Oil Production to Increase with 
More Chinese Equipment Arriving 
Inward transfer of drilling rigs and service equipment. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy 
  
 
Journal Article: Oil & Gas Jounrnal: Drilling Market Focus: Chinese 
Build Rigs, Drillers Venture Abroad 
Newspaper Article: Reuters: Cuban Off-Shore Oil Drilling Put off 
until 2009 
Report of Repsol’s first well drilled in 2004. Used in analysis of 
bargaining power. 
Web Page: MINCEX: Introducción – Inversión Extranjera On Cuba’s official policy towards foreign investment. Used in 
analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy. 
Newspaper Article: M. Voss: Cuban Oil Projects Fuels US Anxieties U.S. reaction of possible offshore oil in Cuba. Used as source of 
reserves estimate.  
Newspaper Article: Havana Journal: Cuban Government 
Prematurely Terminates Pebercan Oil Production Contract 
The Pebercan incident. Used in analysis of Cuba’s bargaining power 
and petroleum policy.  
Journal Article: A. Navarro: Energy Security: Analyzing US, 
Mexican and Cuban Actors in the Deepwater Gulf 
Analysis of different oil policies between states. Used in analysis of 
Cuba’s petroleum policy. 
 Cuba: Innovation and Economy 
Article: J. Jover et al.: Cuba: University, Innovation, and Society: 
Higher Education in the National System of Innovation 
Analysis of the role of Cuba’s universities in Cuba’s NIS. Used as 
indicator of Cuba’s general human capital, and innovation policy. 
Book Section: J. Domínguez: On the Brink of Change: Cuba’s 
Economy and Society at the Start of the 2010s 
Analysis of Cuba’s economic transition. Used in analysis as 
indicator of Cuba’s economic and human capital resources.  
Book Section: O. Villanueva.: Foreign Direct Investment in China, 
Vietnam, and Cuba: Pertinent Experiences for Cuba  
Analysis of the role of FDI in Cuba. Used in analysis as source on 
the role of FDI in Cuba’s petroleum industry. 
Book Section: C. Brundenius, B. Göransson: Universities in 
Transition: The Changing Role and Challenges for Academic 
Institutions 
Analysis of the role of academic organizations within the contexts 
of innovation and economic growth and development in 12 
countries, including Cuba. Used as indicator of Cuba’s human 
capital and education policy. 
Article: R. Feinberg: The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for 
Foreign Investment? 
Analysis of Cuba’s inward foreign investment policies. Used in 
analysis as contextual evidence of Cuba’s petroleum policies.  
Report: UNESCO: National Science, Technology and Innovation 
Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean  
Report of the formal NIS structure and functions in different Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Used in analysis of Cuba’s 
petroleum policies.  
Article: T. Sáenz: The Path to Innovation: The Cuban Experience Analysis of Cuba’s S&T policies since 1959. Used in analysis of 
Cuba’s petroleum policies, sectoral system of innovation.   
Report: ITOPF: Cuba Description of the oil spill security response system of Cuba. Used 
in analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy and petroleum industry 
value chain.  
Report: D. Villavicencio, L. Ponce: The Republic of Cuba Report on the structure of Cuba’s formal innovation system. Used 
in analysis of Cuba’s innovation policy and system in relation to 
petroleum industry.  
Report: EIU: Cuba Risk Assessment 
Report: Coface: Cuba 
Reports on investment risks in Cuba. Used in analysis of Cuba’s 
bargaining power. 
Journal Article: Oil & Gas Journal: Cuba’s Oil, Gas Production 
Rising, Politburo Member Says 
Article on rising production levels in Cuba. Used in analysis of 
Cuba’s petroleum policy.  
Newspaper Article: P. Grogg: CUBA: Petrochemical Complex Poses 
Major Environmental Challenge 
Newspaper article on prospected petrochemical facilities at 
Cienfuegos. Used in analysis on petroleum sector value chain.  
Newspaper Article: B. Gorman: Spain Drills for Crude Oil in Cuba – 
Halliburton wants Embargo Lifted 
Newspaper article stating the interest of U.S. companies to invest 
in Cuba’s petroleum sector. Used in analysis on relative bargaining 
power.  
Report: S. Castellón: Evolución y Perspectivas de la Producción de 
Petróleo en Cuba 
Report on the development of Cuba’s petroleum sector until 2003. 
Used in analysis on petroleum policy and value chain. 
 Foreign Oil Companies 
Report: Sherritt International Cooperation: Annual Report 2011 Report of Sherritt’s financial statement and activities. Used in the 
analysis of Sherritt’s activities in Cuba’s petroleum industry value 
chain, production numbers, and in extension Cupet’s production 
numbers 
Report: Sherritt International Cooperation: Sherritt Reports 
Fourth-Quarter and Year-Ended December 31, 2012 Results 
Same as the above.  
Report: Sherritt International Cooperation: 2011 Annual 
Information Form 
Same as the above. 
Report: Zarubezhneft: Joint Stock Company “Zarubezhneft” 2011 Report of Zarubezhneft’s financial statement and activities. Used in 
the analysis of Cuba’s petroleum policy, bargaining power, and 
Zarubezhneft’s role in the petroleum industry value chain. 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
APPENDIX 4 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
This interview is part of the data collection process for my master thesis. I am a student at the 
Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture at the University of Oslo (UiO), Norway. I am 
also an intern at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) where I am writing 
my thesis. NUPI is currently cooperating with Centro de Estudios de la Economia Cubana 
(CEEC) on different and relevant economic topics. My thesis centers on domestic capability 
building in the petroleum sector and seeks to explore how Cuba encounters different 
challenges connected to such processes.  
As you might be aware of, Norway managed to develop technologies capable of 
exploiting offshore oil and gas deposits in a cost-effective way, while simultaneously enabling 
Norwegian firms to enter and become globally competitive production and supplier firms. The 
building of domestic capabilities was enabled by the development of a system of 
organizations and institutions designed to support innovation, learning, and transfers of 
knowledge and technology within and towards the industry. Through this interview I will seek 
to develop an understanding of Cuban policies towards domestic capability building in the 
petroleum sector, as well as how such capabilities are sought developed.   
 
Please note that the transcription of this interview will be used for analytical purposes only. 
The transcription will not be disclosed to any persons other than me, with the exemption of 
my supervisors in Norway or other persons close to the project, if I was to need specific 
assistance in the analysis. I would also like to be able to cite phrases from the interview in my 
thesis, with full name and working title if possible. If desired, I will send the citations by e-
mail for approval. Like most theses conducted at the UiO, the thesis will be available online at 
www.duo.uio.no, the digital archive of UiO after completion. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
GENERAL THEMES TO BE COVERED 
I: Structure and Capabilities in Cuba’s petroleum sector today 
1. How would you characterize the structure of the Cuban petroleum sector today?  
a. Degree of centralization in decision-making? (Government -> MINBAS -> 
ONRM -> Cupet/Foreign Companies) 
2. In general, how would you characterize the Cuban petroleum industry capabilities as 
it is today? 
a. In terms of Exploration & Production (upstream) activities? Onshore and 
coastal? Offshore? 
b. Transportation & Storage? 
c. Oil refining & Gas processing? 
d. Marketing & Distribution of oil and gas products? 
e. Petrochemical industry? 
f. Environmental considerations? 
g. What about the existence of a supply sector (oilfield services, equipment)? 
3. What has been the role of foreign oil companies such as Sherritt in terms of access to 
capital, industrial know-how, and technology? 
a. Have Cuban actors been able to assimilate (and transform) these technologies 
in their own operations? 
4. In your opinion, what are the main challenges that Cuba faces today for further 
developing its petroleum industry capabilities – especially offshore? 
a. Access to technology/know-how from abroad? U.S Embargo 
b. Lack of domestic skills, capital/funding or technologies? 
c. Lack of incentives or regulatory framework that inhibits the creation of non-
state firms, e.g. in oilfield services & equipment? 
d. Low degree of bargaining power versus foreign oil companies? 
 
II: Strategies to develop petroleum industry capabilities?  
1. Do you know if Cuba puts up local content demands of some sort in their bargaining 
(for concessions) with foreign oil companies? (Technology/Knowledge transfer, use of 
local workforce, training, etc.) (that is, not only rents (taxes, royalties) in PSAs) 
a. If yes: Have these demands been successful? Examples? 
      
 
b. If no: why not? (lack of interest? lack of bargaining power?) 
2. How important has the cooperation with PDVSA been for Cupet and Cuba’s 
petroleum industry? 
a. For access to knowledge, technology, capital? 
3. Where in the petroleum value chain would you say Cuba is putting most emphasis in 
increasing its capabilities and skills?  
a. To what goal? (increased revenues, or also access to technologies and skills 
that might be used in other industries (backward and forward linkages?) 
4. To what degree would you say Cuba is pursuing capabilities to conduct upstream 
offshore activities? 
III   Domestic system to support the development of increased petroleum 
sector capabilities 
1. Would you say the petroleum sector – to increase domestic production etc. – is highly 
prioritized by Cuban authorities today?  
2. Through its educational system, is Cuba able to supply its petroleum industry with a 
skilled workforce (engineers, managers, geologists etc.)? 
3. How about petroleum research activities (CEINPET) or petroleum organizations 
(institutes)?  
a. How has this research helped actors in Cuba’s petroleum industry (seismic 
studies etc., lubricants)?  
b. Are there any research facilities or petroleum research institutes besides 
CEINPET ? 
4. How would you say Cuban laws (and routines) governing petroleum industry 
activities provide (potential) petroleum actors with incentives to invest in this sector? 
 IV The prospects of offshore oil today 
1. After three dry offshore wells during 2012, how would you consider the prospects of 
offshore petroleum production in Cuba in the near-future (Zarubezhneft)?  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
APPENDIX 5 
GOVERNMENT TAKE OF PETROLEUM PROJECTS AROUND THE WORLD  
 
Government take of petroleum projects around the world at US$20 per barrel and US$60 per barrel (Johnston, 
2007, p. 74).
 
US (OCS) Deepwater 
UK  
New Zealand 
Falkland Islands   
Argentina (Shallow) 
US  (OCS) 
South Africa 
Trinidad (Deepwater) 
Mongolia 
Philippines 
Pakistan  (Offshore) 
Australia (ROR) 
Ecuador 
Pakistan II 
Cambodia 
Gabon 
Morocco 
Peru  
Mozambique 
Azerbaijan (AIOC) ROR 
Congo Z.  
Malaysia (Deepwater) 
Angola (Price Cap Formula) 
Colombia   (R) 
Yemen  Late 1990s (ROR) 
Indonesia 3rd Gen (Frontier) 
Egypt  Offshore 
Azerbaijan EDPSA (R) 
Russia Sakhalin II (ROR) 
Timor Gap  ZOCA  
Norway  
Libya Block 59, 2005 
Egypt  Onshore 
Myanmar  early 1990s 
Qatar  RDPSA (R) 
Nigeria  Shelf 
Malaysia  R/C (R) 
UAE  “Opec Terms” 
Syria   1994 Model 
Indonesia Std.3
rd
 Gen 
Libya Average 2005  
Venezuela  1996  (R) 
Libya Block 54, 2005 
Iran    1
st
  Buyback 
Libya Block 124, 2005 
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Government Take 
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0 
0 
5 
9 
14.6 
16.7 
2.4 
25+ 
30 
13.5 
4 
0 
25 
12.5 
22 
22 
10 
23 
19 
0 
12.5 
13 
7.5 
8 
31 
5 
40 
0 
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